# WORLD POLITICS

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# INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
## An Interpretation of Attitudes

Maurice Zinkin's wife?

By TAYA ZINKIN

INDIA is six years old. Its reactions to the world are still largely a matter not of deliberate policy, but of a set of sometimes inconsistent attitudes toward foreigners, attitudes which are only now, under Prime Minister Nehru's constant prodding, crystallizing into a foreign policy. A policy, whether foreign or domestic, is the pursuit by word and deed of a calculated line of action based on the interest, real or mistaken, of a country, or sometimes of its ruling classes. There is still no such calculation of risks and rewards in India's relations with the world, although a certain continuity of planning and thinking is beginning to emerge. Mr. Nehru's proclaimed "judgment of issues as they arise, on their own merits, with an open and independent approach" is by definition the negation of policy, since it precludes the pursuit of a pattern, or even the calculation of India's interests. To those accustomed to the history-rooted calculations of Europe, such an approach to policy-making seems odd.

Nations, however, like people, are the products of their environment and their heredity, and India's environment is one of relative isolation and its heredity is very short. The West, in its relations with Asia as with the rest of the world, begins deeply committed by a maze of treaties, some of which go as far back as the seventeenth century and most of which are so closely interwoven that upon their maintenance rest the interrelationships of the Western Powers, in Europe as well as in Asia. That England has a five-hundred-year-old alliance with Portugal makes some difference in its attitude toward Goa; on the other hand, India began unfettered and uncommitted in 1947. "We do not consider ourselves bound by treaties over which we were not consulted," said Mr. Nehru in Parliament. Provided, therefore, that he keeps within the general range of Indian attitudes—and from these the public never permits him to stray—Mr. Nehru

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has extraordinary freedom in the formulation of foreign policy.

Mr. Nehru must be the only Foreign Minister whose policy virtually no one opposes. The Socialists disagree with him merely over details; the Communists know that any departure from neutrality could only be in a direction they would not like, so they grumble about the Commonwealth and leave it at that. The Congress is fundamentally a Conservative party and so long as Mr. Nehru does not positively alienate the West, it will not interfere. Moreover, Mr. Nehru has the rare gift of saying what the average Indian feels; as soon as he says something, people recognize that that is what they have been thinking but did not quite know how to express.

That India's foreign attitudes should be Nehru's moods is not surprising. During the days of struggle against the British, Mr. Nehru knew the outside world best. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge. The horizons of many of his colleagues still stop at the frontiers of their state. Even Gandhi, who had been to England and Africa—which is more than many of the second-rankers in the Congress have done to this day—did not know who Charlie Chaplin was, and this at the height of Chaplin's fame. When one tries to rationalize Mr. Nehru's moods, one must remember quite a lot of very un-American factors. He is a Fabian whose Bible is still the *New Statesman and Nation*. His thinking has been governed by the Round Table principle of "compromise," a principle dear to British and Indians alike. Patience in negotiation did produce independence for India. And a man who has spent many of his formative years in jail in a nationalist cause is liable to see the world differently from Mr. Dulles.

## I

To Indians, the West appears as either color-conscious, like the United States, or like Britain in Kenya and Rhodesia, or imperialist, like France and Portugal, unwilling to recognize the signs of the times and the surging nationalism of Africa and Asia. Therefore, when India faces the West, it is perforce on the attack. As Ambassador Bowles once said: "The most dynamic force in the Asian Revolution is the overwhelming determination that

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the colored peoples of the world must be accepted as the equals of the white peoples of the West."[1]

There are in fact four keys to India's outlook on the rest of the world. India is only recently free. India is colored. India is in Asia. India is desperately poor. The cold war means to the West a struggle for the survival of a certain way of life; to India it means a most inconsiderate and exasperating insistence on the settling of Western problems on other people's soil. Such detachment is possible only because India knows that it is a very third-rate military power, made even more limitedly helpful as an ally by its grinding poverty. The Westerner can, or at least should, never forget that India has half the population of free Asia and its only really large reserves of coal and iron. But Indians themselves are sufficiently newly free to forget it quite easily; they are concerned less with their country's future as a Great Power than with its present as a very medium one. To some extent, Mr. Nehru can enjoy power without responsibility in the comforting belief that democracy must win in the end, and that he has not got the airplanes to make the difference between winning and losing in any case.

India shares with the West a common tradition, but this common tradition does not mean a common view of world events, although Europe, and Europe alone, has had a really deep effect on the Indian outlook. In pre-Muslim days, a thousand years ago and more, India affected its neighbors very greatly. The Buddhism of Southeast Asia, China, and Japan all comes from India; Indonesia took from India first Hinduism and then Islam; Angkor Vat and Borobodur alike are in a strictly Indian tradition. But these were all unrequited exports. Even in its relations with its Muslim conquerors India gave rather than received. Sufism owes much to Bhakta, Hindu society owes little to Islam beyond its inflexibility and the destruction of its temples and art. Only under the contact of the British in the last two hundred years has India itself changed, first slowly, then with increasing speed, until today the whole of Indian society is altering before one's eyes. The two world wars were a profound shock to India.

[1] Speech to the India League of America, New York, May 27, 1953.

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From India, they looked like civil wars, fights to the death between men who were essentially heirs to one civilization. Westerners may talk of Oriental cruelty and the Asiatic doctrine of Communism; Indians remember that Marxism and Nazism alike are German, that until the Communists won China, every country which has adopted totalitarianism was Western.

Despite these shocks and these occasional realizations, until 1947 India had on the whole remained insulated from the main currents of European change by the Indian Ocean and British rule. The great upheavals of European history such as the French Revolution had very little impact on India, because by the time that there were enough English-educated Indians to mold Indian thought, the French Revolution had descended into the history books; the Indian elite at Oxford and Cambridge received its message doubly muted by time and by the cotton-wool of English compromise. The first time that India had to face a Western change of values was the time of the Russian Revolution. In the early 1920's, the Russian Revolution was followed by the left in India, as in so many other parts of the world, with much sympathy. Was it not a revolt of the oppressed against their oppressors? Were not the Indians themselves oppressed and had not the Russians proved the genuineness of their detestation of imperialism by giving up their special rights in China and Iran? Alien rule is a great distorter of values. Nevertheless, Indian sympathies for the Revolution would not have lasted as long as they did had it not been for the double barrier of language and travel restrictions. Today India's sympathies with the "New China" are similarly due in part to lack of information about its cost in human lives and liberties, an ignorance equally due to barriers of communication.

Moreover, what little is known in India of Russian or Chinese terror and liquidation does not shock India, as it does the West. India has, like everyone else, its history of arbitrary tyrants, but nowhere in Hindu history have there been such mass-murders for a principle as the massacre of St. Bartholomew or the French Terror. Even conversion to Islam was usually the result either of political expediency, as when upper-class Hindus

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converted, or of economic necessity, as when the Untouchables of Bengal became Muslims in order to cease being Untouchables. The Muslims, of course, did a fair amount of massacring as conquerors—Timur built a whole hill of skulls when he took Delhi—but these were hot-blooded orgies. India's only firsthand experience of organized oppression for a principle is the very Western Inquisition in the Portuguese settlements. There has been nothing in Indian experience even remotely reminiscent of the calculated mass-murders of Auschwitz or Stalin's starving of the Ukraine. These are beyond India's imagination, the more so because so many of these atrocities took place at a time when Indian leaders were interested almost exclusively in attaining independence.

What worries the West in the cold war is the threat of a Communist expansion which would bring to India totalitarian oppression and colonial exploitation of the dreadful ruthlessness which has already come to Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Balkans, Hungary, and East Germany. To many Indians, Communism is primarily just another form of government. Most Indians do not like it and would fight against it with great vigor in their own country, but they do not see why the Chinese should not prefer it if they want to. They regard a Chinese Communist as a great deal more free than, say, a black South African; and they have not noticed any great Western excitement over the freedom of the blacks in Africa. To the West, the turning-point in the relations between the two blocs was Czechoslovakia. But the Czechoslovakian coup occurred only a few months after the assassination of Gandhi, at a time when all India was engaged in surviving the earthquake of partition, the floods of refugees, the Kashmir war, the police action in Hyderabad, tensions with Pakistan, and the last attempt of Hindu Communalism to assert its importance. It is, therefore, not surprising that India should have taken little notice of what happened in Czechoslovakia.

Much more real to India than the breach of all Russia's agreements over Poland or the role of the Russian army in the Czechoslovakian coup are the need for equality between man and man, irrespective of color, and the need to fight poverty and ignorance;

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by comparison with hunger and humiliation, the terror of Communism sometimes seems in India somewhat unreal. Instinctively, Indians want peace before all else. For in peace alone do they see any hope of curing their poverty and changing their society.

In the attempt to preserve world peace, therefore, Mr. Nehru will go a very long way. He will even on occasion depart from his nineteenth-century insistence on morality for a quite twentieth-century realism; and he will sometimes be carried so far away as to be accused of improvidence. He is always preaching peace, no H-bomb experiments, patience, restraint, conciliation, concessions, and until recently his preaching was directed at the West, not at the Communist bloc. Why? Because there is no Iron Curtain between India and the West. India is as well informed of American Senatorial intrigues as the Americans themselves. Walter Lippmann, the Alsops, General MacArthur, Secretary Dulles, Senator Knowland, and Senator McCarthy are familiar names in the Indian press, which gets American news agencies' services. What happens in Russia nobody knows. Few Indians know Russian; Russians do not discuss their foreign policy in English; Indian newspapers do not use Tass; there is, in fact, an Iron Curtain. By contrast, when Vice-President Nixon talked of the possibility of intervention in Indochina, he did so in India's full hearing. Naturally, Indians tend to think it is the United States that has to be talked into peace. And even if Indians suspected Russia of camouflaging its military ambitions with its Peace Congresses—which most of them do not—they would feel that preaching to a Communist is a waste of time. Their reason for this feeling is that India is a democracy; it is not an accident that the Indian National Congress framed the Indian Constitution so much on the lines of the American Constitution. And because Indians want to live in a democratic world, they do to Americans what Americans do to them: they try to make Americans see the cold war through their eyes. They know perfectly well that Communists are allowed to see it only through the Kremlin's eyes; so with the Communists they do not even try.

It must be remembered, moreover, that Indian illusions, if

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any, about the Soviet Union are of the West's own making. It is Western propaganda which has painted Russia as a "barbaric, backward country," in an attempt to discredit it in Asia. But the result is that Indians tend to imagine the Russia of 1917 as being like the India of 1947. They often do not realize that Russia was one of the world's great powers in 1914 as in 1954. Therefore, the progress which has made Russia the world's second power, with a war potential so great that it worries even the United States, is bound to impress Indians far more than the facts warrant. If Communism can do that for Russia, many more than just the Communists think, perhaps it could do it for us, too. And because Indians have so vivid a picture of Russia as, in this respect, themselves, pulling itself into progress by its own bootstraps, they credit Russia with their own urgent organic need for peace.

## II

Such attitudes as a hatred of color prejudice or a desperate desire for peace influence India's relations with all countries. There are other Indian attitudes which vary with India's awareness of the issues and the areas involved. First, there is India's relation to England and, through England, to the Commonwealth. The link between India and England is not only cultural; it is also political, economic, and habitual. The West for India is first and foremost England. A large percentage of India's trade is done with England. Traditionally, India has looked to British manufacturers and technicians for know-how and capital goods. Nearly all the foreign capital in India is British. But economics is only secondary; beyond and more important than economics is the common liberal tradition of which Sir Winston Churchill and Pandit Nehru are equally heirs. Politically, the link between India and England is of considerable strength; India's political institutions follow the English traditions; the routine working of British and Indian political life is the same; the same political words have the same meaning in London and Delhi. England's main political figures are household names for India's educated classes, because of fifty years of close acquaintance with every development on the British political scene. On the other side,

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equally, Pandit Nehru is much better known in England than many French, German, or Russian politicians, and there are in England quite a number of people who for traditional, historical, or professional reasons took, and continue to take, an almost familial interest in India's affairs.

This special relation between England and India means that misunderstandings such as abound between India and the United States are inconceivable. No Indian would exaggerate Mr. Aneurin Bevan as so many exaggerate Senator McCarthy. When the newspaper editors talk of England, they talk in general of what they know. Thus, in a recent survey on the flow of news conducted by the International Press Institute,[2] it was pointed out that England gets more coverage in India than any other country and that the quality of that coverage is, on the whole, high; real distortion is rare, though there is a considerable left-wing bias.

There are resemblances in the historical pattern of England's relations with India on the one hand, and with America on the other, but the resultant bonds are quite dissimilar. England's link with the United States is racial, linguistic, cultural; for Englishmen, Americans are still on the whole cousins, but for the United States as a nation their affection is perhaps limited. Indians are not cousins, but in India as a nation Englishmen feel a certain fatherly pride; and this affection is reciprocated by much affection in India for England. Many American visitors whose memory is still full of the accusations of British atrocities which the Congress was making as recently as eleven years ago have been puzzled to find that not only do the Indians like the British, but that they will always side with the British against the Americans, despite the fact that America gave India moral support during her fight for freedom and is now giving India much more aid than England does. This is because India and England see so many things similarly.

Sardar Panikkar, India's ex-Ambassador to Peking, a man few Americans would suspect of undue tenderness for the West, makes the point that

[2] International Press Institute, Zurich, 1953.

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> It is not correct to say that the like-mindedness which exists today between India and England is a superficial one. It is based on a common experience of 150 years of history. The inheritance from Britain is of even greater importance than the Hindu tradition of the past. Modern India does not live under the laws of Manu. Its mental background and equipment have been moulded into their present shape by over a 100 years of Western education extending over every aspect of mental activity. Its social ideas are derived predominantly from the liberalism of the 19th Century. Therefore, this like-mindedness is a major fact.[3]

An admirable example of this was Mr. Eden's constant consultation with Delhi over happenings at Geneva last summer. To quote Sardar Panikkar again:

> India's close association with a world-wide group of nations gives her a prestige and influence which she would not otherwise possess. The Commonwealth to-day is a major political factor in Asia. Its importance will increase in proportion to the degrees of co-operation between Britain and India. The Commonwealth has therefore come to mean something for India.[4]

It is through England and the Commonwealth that India is called upon to play a role more in keeping with its size than it could otherwise expect at a stage when its military and economic power are still limited. Through the Commonwealth, India is part of a power which can still make world history. And for Indians the Commonwealth is really England. New Zealand and Australia are too far away, although India has for them nothing but cordiality, despite their immigration policy. Ceylon's and Pakistan's relations with India depend on their geographical proximity, not on their membership in the Commonwealth. For South Africa, Delhi has the deepest dislike and contempt.

This leaves Canada. For Canada, India is developing an increasing warmth. Canada has shown India great understanding and friendliness. When Mr. St. Laurent visited Delhi at the beginning of 1954, he said all the right things, and when he returned to his country, he explained the Indian point of view in a way that showed he had really understood it. Canada is for India the halfway house between England and the United States. Canada is nearly as rich as the United States. It is perhaps less

[3] "Will India Stay in?", *New Commonwealth*, April 29, 1954.
[4] *Ibid.*

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dependent on the United States than England is, yet it is small enough for its government not to throw its weight about in a way which might hurt a terribly sensitive people. Moreover, Canada has a small colony of Indian settlers—mainly Sikhs from the Punjab. These settlers, who have kept up connections with their relations in India, are very effective ambassadors of good will. And perhaps of all the diplomats recently in Delhi, the present Canadian High Commissioner is the most popular. Nevertheless, England, and not Canada, is and will remain the lodestone of India's attraction to the Commonwealth. Indeed, it may perhaps be said that it is England which keeps India in, despite South Africa; despite, too, Indian suspicion of color bars in East and Central Africa, though these suspicions have eased of late, as the governments of Kenya and the Central African Federation have shown themselves increasingly determined to make racial partnership a reality. Dr. Malan, of course, is Communism's best propagandist, not only in India, but in the whole of free Asia.

## III

More important even than India's relations with England and the Commonwealth are India's relations with Pakistan. Until 1947 the two countries were one. Then they were divided by a pool of Punjabi blood. Perhaps as many as 300,000 were killed in the partition riots. India had to accommodate eight million refugees (including three million from East Pakistan) and Pakistan perhaps seven million. And India's refugees left behind them in Pakistan property worth perhaps a billion dollars more than that which Pakistan's refugees left in India. Nothing has done more to poison Indo-Pakistan relations than this. Even the problem of Kashmir might have been solved had the conflict not arisen against this background. Even today, passenger trains do not run between Delhi and Lahore, and it is rarer for an Indian to visit West Pakistan than the United States. There were other ways, too, in which the splitting in two of what had been one country—for one hundred years in the Punjab, for two hundred in Bengal—proved painful and difficult. India's jute mills have felt the loss of Pakistan jute, Pakistan's railways the loss of

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Indian coal; a long trade war followed the Pakistani decision not to devalue its rupee when the Indian rupee followed the pound sterling in 1949. One split that has not yet been made final is that of canal water. In three out of the thirty-one canal systems of pre-partition India, India today provides the water and Pakistan the land which benefits from it. India needs the water and, on American precedent, would seem to be entitled to it. There is a treaty of 1948 by which Pakistan agreed gradually to make alternative arrangements by link canals from its own rivers, and the recent World Bank mediations recognized the right of India to the waters of the three rivers concerned—the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej—provided that India paid perhaps 100 million dollars for new link canals in Pakistan. But Pakistan has not yet accepted this solution, perhaps because it owes India, which took over the whole debt of Undivided India, some 600 million dollars as its share, which it shows no sign of paying so far. Then there are a multiplicity of minor issues—the division of the railways, the military stores, the pensions—which are to be gradually worked out by consultation and negotiation at departmental level. This means that toward Pakistan, and Pakistan alone, India has a foreign policy in the Western sense, comparable to, say, recent relations between Yugoslavia and Italy, with Trieste as a not very exact analogy for Kashmir.

Kashmir itself matters less than the West fears. It is vital to India and Pakistan, but it does not affect the balance of power in the world, nor does it threaten world peace. It is true that there is a static war in Kashmir, that India and Pakistan both keep the best of their armed forces there, that it is to both countries a considerable financial burden. But it is not likely to turn into a conflict of arms. Indeed, the military aid that the United States has given Pakistan emasculates all the Pakistani attempts to start another Jehad. If Pakistan were to try, it is to Washington that India would protest at once. The best solution is probably still a plebiscite. Mr. Nehru has repeatedly insisted that he recognizes the obligation he undertook of his own free will of letting the Kashmiris decide their own fate; but that plebiscite will now have to await India's convenience. To a Pakistan armed

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by the United States, India will make no concessions of affection; and Indian policy toward Pakistan has been hardening as Indians have become more and more conscious of what they consider Pakistan's steady hostility, a hostility which many feel was finally proved by Pakistan's acceptance of American military aid. Few in India believe that it is really Russia against whom the aid is wanted. It is likely that Indian policy may harden further, as more revelations are made about how the late Mr. Jinnah in 1946 and 1947 tried to use Their Highnesses the Maharajas to disintegrate India; he failed, but for that the credit goes to Their Highnesses' patriotism, not to any Pakistani good will. Nevertheless, though Indian policy toward Pakistan has hardened, it is still on the whole a policy of patience and tolerance—the elder sister remonstrating with her younger brother when he behaves badly, but wishing him well, rejoicing in his success, because she knows that his bankruptcy must in the end affect her, too.

The creation of Pakistan has, however, had a deep effect on the way India sees the world, for, geographically, the creation of Pakistan has neutralized India. Before the emergence of Pakistan, India's borders extended from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, from one natural border to the other, north to south and east to west. The only gaps in its natural defenses were the passes to Afghanistan. The British in India were permanently worried about the Khyber Pass. The Indian Army's first function was to protect the Northwestern Frontier. The creation of Pakistan has made it possible for India to remain neutral without too much risk. Her vulnerable border with Russia has been given to Pakistan, a new autonomous sovereign buffer-state, doomed to act as India's first line of defense. India need protect itself only on its much more defensible Himalayan and Burmese borders. In addition, India is hypnotized by Pakistan until its mind is almost blanked to the existence of the Middle East. Events in Egypt or Iran hit the newspapers only when Mr. Mossadegh is thrown out or when Nasser and Naguib fight for power.

Politically, the conjunction of American military aid to Pakistan, the H-bomb, and the Indochinese War have confirmed India in its belief that the only possible course to follow is that

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of neutrality. American military aid to Pakistan has brought the cold war to India's doorstep; and the H-bomb explosions, and still more the reporting of them, have made many Indians feel that war must be avoided at all costs, if the world is to survive. It is believed in India that some Americans in the State Department thought that giving military aid to Pakistan was a good way of coercing India into SEATO. If that is so, they could not have been more wrong. Nothing that the United States has done has been so effective in freezing India into an attitude of dynamic neutrality. By "neutrality," Indians mean that they will keep India out of blocs and battlefields; by "dynamic," that they will negotiate, mediate, repatriate, and even court rebuffs in a desperate attempt to promote peace. In its effect on Indian attitudes, American military aid to Pakistan has been more important perhaps than Kashmir. Kashmir, like the other Indo-Pakistan disputes, is a local matter. Left to the Indians and the Pakistani, these disputes will probably gradually get settled. Pakistan cannot forever make an issue of Junagadh or the division of military stores in 1947; India is beginning to feel less strongly about evacuee property. The Indians' fear is that American arms may be just what Pakistan needs to take the plunge and attack them. If the arms are too few to produce any such result, they will doubtless be forgiven, but if they lead to greater Pakistan toughness in matters of dispute, it is to be expected that the effect on Indo-American relations will be sharper. Indians expect Pakistan to saber-rattle, but if the saber is American, they will regard it as a very hostile act on the part of a country which they have hitherto thought of as a friend and a fellow-democracy. When Americans remember how relieved they were at the change of government in Guatemala, after the Guatemalan government had received two shiploads of arms from Poland, they will appreciate Indian feelings about their giving arms to Pakistan.

## IV

We have already seen that India is not happy about South Africa. India is not white, India is newly free, India must side with the colored underdog, and her natural sympathy is in-

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creased by the fact that her own history weds her to the side of nationalist movements against the colonial powers, irrespective of any calculated self-interest. Colonialism to India is evil, not only because it degrades the colonialized, but because it compels the good nationalist to keep such dubious company. As Mr. Moraes wrote in his *Report on Mao's China*: "Freedom, as Nehru rightly urges, is the strongest bastion against Communism. Had India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia not been politically independent, Nehru and Soekarno, like Ho Chi Minh, might today have been the leaders of a liberation movement directed from Moscow and Peking."[5] Moreover, the vast majority of their countrymen would have supported them. Indeed, had Mr. Gandhi not pledged the Congress Party to non-violence, it is almost certain that India's Communists would still be masquerading as Congressmen, as so many of them did until Germany attacked Russia in 1941 and they were ordered to turn violent in support of the "People's War." Had India not become independent, they would have found the Congress channel their best way into power. That is why India gets so worried when there is a resurgence of nationalist feeling against a colonial power anywhere.

India champions independence for North Africa. India was against a Central African Federation that did not have the support of the Africans; India was indignant over the deposition of the Kabaka of Buganda and the exile of Seretse Khama. But India is not troubled by the existence of Senegal, Italian Somaliland, or the Belgian Congo, because the African there seems perfectly content with his status quo, and Indians do not worry for him where he does not worry for himself. Where he is advancing to full self-government, as in the Gold Coast or Nigeria, Indians positively purr their approval; this ordered progress reminds them of the best in their own history.

Not only in Africa, but everywhere, India's sympathies must always be with emergent nationalism. Although India has little in common with Indonesia, since there is no real common tradition between an ex-Dutch and an ex-British colony, Indian cham-

[5] Frank Moraes, *Report on Mao's China*, New York, 1953, p. 202.

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pioning of the Indonesian cause was of great assistance to the Indonesians in their achievement of independence. This was the case not only in the spectacular days of the Dutch police action, but also at the very beginning, in 1946, when Indian feelings so strictly limited the use the British government could make of Indian troops against the Indonesian nationalists—and Indian troops were a large part of the force with which Indonesia was taken over from the Japanese.

Indeed, almost all Indian attitudes toward the outside world are tinged by India's abhorrence of colonialism. Excepting England (and even this exception is only on the whole), India suspects all the European countries of colonial ambitions. This suspicion is fed by the continued existence on the coast of India of those foreign possessions which Mr. Nehru has described as "pimples" and which to India are magnified out of proportion because they are a reminder of colonial evil: Goa, Daman, Diu. Goa can be found on the map, the others are really microscopic; Daman has only six thousand inhabitants, Diu is an even smaller fishing village. Yet, while Britain and France have left the subcontinent, the Portuguese government is clinging to its possessions in India with dictatorial determination. Not only are these "pimples" a continuing exasperation to India, but they provide gold-, diamond-, and drink-smugglers with an answer to all their prayers. India loses considerable revenue because of the difficulty of policing the borders of these pockets; much of the Goa boundary runs through tiger jungle. The "pimples" are maddening, yet, faithful to her own preachings of negotiation and patience, India still wants to negotiate.

Apart from India's suspicion of Europe as an imperialist group of nations, India's interest in the European continent is as small as most Europeans' interest in India. Few Indians either rejoiced or disturbed themselves over the fortunes of EDC. The recovery of Germany, even the June 17 Berlin riots—all these vital issues are to India not even academic points. In Mr. Nehru's policy speeches the problems of Europe are hardly ever mentioned. India only began to follow developments in French politics when negotiations over Indochina and Pondicherry were initiated.

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In Indochina itself India's interest is recent and purely practical. So long as the war between the Viet Nam and the Viet Minh did not threaten world peace, so long as the horrors of the H-bomb had not been revealed, and so long as Pakistan was not a potential American base, Indians were disinterested and neutral. Against the Viet Minh's being anti-colonial, they set its being Communist. Against Bao Dai's being anti-Communist, they set his being a French stooge—an opinion nonetheless universally held for being inaccurate. The only point of Indochinese policy on which all Indians held strong views was the absoluteness of the Indochinese right to independence from France. It was only the danger of a war over Indochina being fought out in India's backyard that compelled India to take a "dynamic" interest; and that interest was twofold—to get a settlement which would avoid a war, and to let the Indochinese decide their future for themselves. Over Laos and Cambodia, where both the military situation and the desires of the people favored the Western line, Indian opinion and policy was on the Western side. In Viet Nam, where the military situation and, according to the American correspondents whose dispatches were printed in the Indian press, many of the people favored the Viet Minh, Indian opinion and policy leaned somewhat more to the Communist view, at least over the cease-fire and the timing of elections. But, as the French are leaving Indochina, India can no longer afford to remain a passive onlooker; from now on, it will feel responsible for the integrity of Laos and Cambodia.

## V

Indian relations with the United States have been one slow, superficial, and temporary process of disillusionment. In 1947, India had great faith in the United States. The Americans, like the Indians, had liberated themselves from the British, and during the long years of India's freedom movement much encouragement in words, if not in deeds, had come from the United States. It was therefore a shock for India to discover, once she became a sovereign nation, that India and the United States, both democratic countries, nevertheless do not talk quite the same language.

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Indians, like Englishmen, find American political habits and conventions somewhat incomprehensible. The Administration openly uses the press to further its policies; Senator McCarthy is permitted to investigate the Army; General MacArthur, while still a general, makes statements on policy; secrets regularly leak; the President, whether Truman or Eisenhower, is undermined by his own party. In India, as in England, such things are against the rules. The discovery that in the United States they are not was as puzzling as it was unexpected. Before independence, India's horizon was so largely England that little was known of the United States. America to India embodied all the liberties, all the equalities, all the freedoms; it was the America de Tocqueville had described so affectionately, the America of Lincoln and the log cabin. America was the ideal democratic state. Then came a series of pin-pricks. Some of India's darker delegates to the UN experienced, to their great surprise, a color discrimination of which they had been hitherto unaware. The first American diplomats to India, moreover, were not of the most successful; and whenever India tried to purchase from or negotiate with Washington, its delegates had to learn that American negotiators are not always backed by the Senate or by their own heads of department.

Perhaps the greatest shock of all to India was the discovery they thought they made that to many Americans the first principle of foreign affairs is "Who is not with us is against us." This attitude is considerably exaggerated in news-reporting, if only because its proponents are often so vocal. But in India, as in many other countries, it does a great deal of harm. People who are conscious of how much weaker they are materially than the United States begin to feel that it is dangerous to become too closely tied. Mr. Nehru, for example, has repeatedly said that he is deeply grateful for American aid, but would not like too much of it. This attitude, so sharply in contrast to that of Japan or Western Europe, is, as Mr. Nehru himself has made clear, the result of the Indians' determination to stand on their own feet, and not to jeopardize their new-found independence by tempting themselves; he who gets too used to aid may trim his policy in order to ensure its

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continuance without any pressure being put on him at all. Mr. Nehru's attitude is not primarily a criticism of the United States, but a recognition of the weakness of will to which all flesh is heir. This determination of Indians to keep the right to judge for themselves, by themselves, which they have so recently recovered, is the key to much of their policy. As Mr. Stevenson wrote during his visit to India,

> The more America presses India to join the anti-Communist front, the more Mr. Nehru will baulk. And what perhaps we have not fully realised is that the proud nations of Asia may perversely prefer suicide to even a suspicion of the Western domination which they had been fighting for so long. In India, colonialism and racialism are vivid memories and always associated with the West.[6]

McCarthyism, too, has done much to create in India the feeling that Americans conduct their government somewhat oddly, and that they have become hysterical about Communism. It must here be remembered that McCarthyism came to India primarily through American reports; the criticisms which are made in India are criticisms which have first been made in the United States. It was not, for example, Indians who first used the word "witch-hunt." But, whereas in the United States many think the Senator has been performing a useful function, in India nobody does. India's leading anti-Communist and, on the whole, pro-American commentator, Vivek, a writer of wisdom and restraint, wrote:

> Indians had grown up to regard the U.S. as the one non-imperialist great power, the champion of freedom throughout the world, the giver of aid and sympathy to all oppressed nations. While the pronouncements of the American government continue to reiterate the high theme of the right of all people to be free, compromise, temporising, the sacrifice of principle to expediency often appear to be gaining the upper hand in actual dealings with colonial nations.
>
> To Indians, the U.S., founded because of the need of man to worship as he desired, to speak as he thought fit, to enjoy liberty, had always seemed the natural home of all civil rights. They hear today that while the rule of law continues and the courts do justice between man and man and citizen and government, the intellectual atmosphere is often vitiated by persecution and fear, even in academic surroundings, while

[6] Adlai E. Stevenson, "India Will Not Go the Authoritarian Way," *Look*, reprinted in *Hindu*, June 30, 1953, p. 4.

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those responsible for such conditions sit in high places and receive respect.[7]

Indians have perhaps exaggerated the importance of Senator McCarthy; they certainly still exaggerate the chance of the United States starting a preventive war, or even how tough it is prepared to be in the cold war. Indians often attribute to American foreign policy the Machiavellian cunning Americans reserve for the British Foreign Office, whereas to this observer, the true explanation for the occasional odd appearance of American foreign policy to the outside world would appear to be an occasional confusion, uncertainty, even perhaps incompetence; but most Indians find it difficult to associate these failings with the United States. Moreover, it must here again be emphasized that the Indian picture of the United States comes almost exclusively from American or British sources. There are only two Indian press correspondents in America. Indian fears about the United States starting a preventive war, for example, come not from Russian or Chinese allegations, but from the Alsops' very reasonable discussions of the pros and cons of a showdown now; Indians are allergic to such discussions, however reasonable.

Yet another example of the way in which America's own phrases do the damage is "Asians fighting Asians." That President Eisenhower was in fact asserting the right of Asians to settle their own differences has since been many times explained; but the explanations have never caught up with the original remark, so that now, when the United States talks of SEATO, Indians tend to recall that Senator Ferguson wanted the ground troops to be allied, while the United States was to provide the ships and the airplanes. It is a plausible division of labor, but it is not an acceptable one, to India or anyone else in free Asia.

It is felt in India, too, that the American struggle against Communism is making the United States less and less restrained in its dealings with Asian countries. Thus, the refusal of the United States to extend economic aid to Ceylon because of Ceylon's shipments of rubber to China was noticed; India's exclusion from the Clemency Proceedings on Japanese War Criminals and its substi-

[7] "India and America," *Times of India*, May 19, 1953, p. 6o.

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tution, quite without warrant, by Pakistan caused bitterness. The suggestions of senior Senators that India should get no more aid because of her refusal to allow American aircraft carrying French troops to Indochina to use Indian airports, although this rule had been in force ever since independence, made vivid the most reasonable of India's fears about aid with strings. This Indian feeling that the United States nowadays is getting tough with its friends is not confined to American relations with Asia. Many Indians take the view of the British Labor Party about Anglo-American relations; still more believe the supersession of the newly elected government in East Pakistan could not have happened without the support of the American Ambassador in Karachi. The belief is presumably quite false, but it has nevertheless been widely regarded as a warning of the consequences of taking American military aid. It is, therefore, a measure of Mr. Nehru's deep determination to make good the democratic way that he continues to say that he will accept aid without strings, because, as Dr. Radnakrishnan, India's Vice-President, once put it:

> India is anxious for her internal consolidation and development, for her achievement, if successful, will demonstrate to the world that democracy can deliver the goods. If we succeed in building a welfare state through democratic processes, if we are able to build up an efficient and contented country, without the sacrifice of human and spiritual values, if we achieve victory for democracy, we will achieve a victory for democracy which will be more enduring than military victory. What we want today is not the American way, not the Russian way, but the human way. If we establish prosperity effectively in a non-Communist world, the prospects of peace will improve.[8]

That is why India had nothing but the deepest gratitude for the American wheat loan in 1951, and it is significant that in 1953, when Pakistan got a gift of one million tons of wheat, India felt quite pleased for its neighbor.

Indians are doubtful of American policy in Asia in yet another way. They feel that in some cases American support has been so extensive that the government which has been helped has been made so unresponsive to its own public that, in the long

[8] Toronto broadcast, June 1, 1953.

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run, American aid has not merely failed to avert Communism, but has positively paved the way for it. The outstanding example is Chiang Kai-shek; but Indians would apply something of the same reasoning to the French in Indochina, where they consider that the United States should long ago have insisted on an unequivocal declaration of Indochinese independence in return for its aid. By contrast, American policy in the Philippines has secured nothing but praise, and although Dr. Syngman Rhee is disapproved of, he has been treated with considerably greater respect since it became clear that if there is a puppet in the relations between him and the United States, it is the United States.

Perhaps the factor which causes the most irritation in Indo-American relations is something both countries have in common. Both love preaching, and this amiable weakness is exaggerated in the present context by the fact that it is so important to both countries that their preaching be heard. The United States wants India to see the cold war its way, for India is half of free Asia; if India goes, what could be held between Dhahran and Hong Kong? India, on the other hand, knows that there are only two countries in the world today which are big enough to decide between war and peace: Russia, on the one hand; the United States, on the other. India also knows that preaching to Russia would be a complete waste of time; that Russian politics are left to a few men who have carte blanche and whose minds are closed to world opinion. The United States, on the other hand, is a country which, as India is gradually growing to appreciate, cannot take one step without the consent of its elected representatives, who are themselves, in their turn, tightly bound by the wishes of their electorate. This, to India, makes it worth while to plead to the United States for peace and appeasement. The compliment is perhaps a wearing one; but it should be realized that it is a compliment. The best summary of India's attitude toward the United States is perhaps contained in the rather disillusioned private comment of one of India's most anti-Communist politicians, who argued that India, and not the United States, is the truly democratic country:

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> We in India believe in democracy and the right of the people to determine their form of government. America has become so hysterical that she now denies other people the right of self-determination. This, to me, has come as a sad revelation. We are in India strongly anti-Communist; we jail our Communists whenever we can; we have kept on the Preventive Detention Act, so that we could deal with them whenever necessary; this indicates our true attitude to Communism. America should ask for no more. Yet, this for Americans is not enough. They want our Prime Minister to pronounce himself so that, without achieving anything positive, he will annoy the totalitarian bloc. They are making a great mistake; all they will achieve is to make Mr. Nehru less condemnatory of his Communist neighbors in his insistence on underlining that he is nobody's stooge. This is most unfortunate, because what our Prime Minister says has an effect on other newly freed countries elsewhere and it also gives ammunition to the Communist parties in India. If Americans could only leave us alone, they would in fact see by our deeds that we are on their side. The reason why we talk so much and preach so much is that since we and America are in the same camp, it is important for both of us that we should understand each other.

It is to be noted that these last two sentences could equally have been said by an American, with only the two words "Indians" and "India" substituted for "Americans" and "America." Indians, like Americans, like to be liked, demand to be understood, get hurt when they are not, yet do surprisingly little to explain themselves to others in the others' terms.

Nevertheless, since both are free countries, when the facts change, opinions do change slowly with them, however poor the propaganda. There has been much less criticism of the United States in India as it has become clear how real is the attempt being made by American society to lower its color bar; so perhaps Americans are becoming less critical of Indian Untouchability, as they realize how much Indians are doing to try and get rid of it. It is significant of how far the two countries believe themselves to accept the same values that every time something which infringes these values in either country is corrected, relations between them improve. Americans warm to India when it has its first adult suffrage election; Indians warm to the United States when the Supreme Court declares segregation in schools unconstitutional.

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## VI

By the other colossus, Russia, Indian foreign policy is, as we have said, quite astonishingly little affected. India judges Communism not by what happens in Russia or Eastern Europe, but by what happens in China. India began full of sympathy for the "New China." Indians saw not the Communism, but the restoration of a great Asian civilization to its place in the world, after a hundred years of corruption, humiliation, and despair. They had had exactly the same sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek until Western journalists convinced them that his government was corrupt and dictatorial, that his troops would not fight, and that his American aid was embezzled. When China liquidated two million people, Indians began to have doubts, although an atrocity on this scale is so alien to Indian experience that it did not really penetrate their imagination. The taking-over of Tibet caused more doubts still, although most Indians considered China was within its legal rights and therefore resented the persistent suggestions of Western commentators that India should make this issue almost a *casus belli*. The process of disillusionment is continuing; that China negotiated so openly for the Viet Minh at Geneva brought back memories of colonialism to many. But disillusionment, however far it may yet go, will probably affect policy only a little; for Indian policy toward China is based not on sentiment, but on the facts as Indians see them. Talk of a four-hundred-year-old friendship, Asian culture, and Asian unity are of course mere rhetorical flourishes. The facts which Indians see are the following:

Asia, and especially India itself, is poor. In Asia the biggest danger of Communism is not, as in Europe, external aggression, but the risk that the people themselves will turn to the Communists. Therefore, the first priority must be not military expenditures or pacts—except non-aggression pacts, which it is hoped will reduce the need for arms—but the building-up of the economy. For the Indian government, this naturally means the Indian economy. For this building-up, every risk must be taken, from deficit financing to politeness to China; from stating that

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economic aid without strings will be welcome from any quarter to swallowing some pride when Senators bluster.

The measure of India's determination to withstand the onslaught of auto-Communism—Communism through the ballot-box—can be measured by the fact that American military aid to Pakistan has not led—at least, not yet—to the United States' being treated as an enemy, although almost every Indian considers Pakistan a much more immediate menace than China. Not only does China not threaten; most Indians believe it would not pay China to attack them now. Indians consider the future of Asia depends not on arms, but on whether their democratic planning or Chinese Communism can most quickly produce visible improvements in the life of the common man. This is to underestimate the importance of arms; but perhaps equally the United States does not fully appreciate the crucial importance of the success of India's Plans. If these Plans are to succeed, if India is to raise the standard of living of her people, Indians feel that they must have peace. Therefore, nothing must be done to provoke either the Chinese or the Americans into war. So India welcomes Western and Chinese concessions equally. Indians feel certain that if only the actual fighting could be stopped in Asia, China would turn inward to its own enormous task of development. And every Indian believes that China must be as eager as he is himself to emancipate his country from Western tutelage; Indians never forget that Russia is Western, China Asian. It is a difference to which, in the Communist context, they attach a probably exaggerated importance.

Furthermore, as Mr. Nehru repeats every time he touches the subject, Communist China is a fact, and Indians feel, like the British, that facts must be recognized, and that if they are not recognized, China will be made aggressive out of fear—and on the Indian border. This is why India has been urging the admission of "New China" to the United Nations. It is not a moral, but a realistic, urge. The Red government controls the mainland of China; China should be represented in the UN. Indians see no justification for Chiang Kai-shek's representing the mainland of China; they have no objection to his being there, as the repre-

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sentative of the island of Formosa. They recognize as a fact that Formosa is protected by the United States; they do not urge that it should go to Mao Tse-tung. The moral issue that China is still guilty of an unpurged aggression is to them not relevant. They do not see the issue as a question of whether China is sufficiently peace-loving to be admitted to the UN, but simply as a question of which government in fact represents a China that is already a member of the UN. Nor has India ever considered admission to the UN as a reward for being a good boy. The Indians never asked for Pakistan's exclusion after its aggression in Kashmir had, in Indian eyes, been established. India believes that it is necessary that all the bad boys should be there, too, so that they can be talked to. So India has always supported everybody's admission, not just China's. The reason for the insistence in the case of Red China is that it is so much bigger than, say, Ceylon or Nepal that its exclusion makes a major difference, whereas theirs does not. Moreover, Indians are not quite so clear as Americans or Englishmen that China committed aggression in Korea. They accept that the North Koreans did, and their government acted accordingly at the UN, but they are convinced that the Chinese intervened only because they were scared by General MacArthur's advance to the Yalu River. If China had had aggressive intentions, they argue, it would not have warned the UN through India of its intention to interfere if the Thirty-eighth Parallel was crossed. It may be said that aggression is aggression, even if it is proved that the aggressor thought he was acting in self-defense, but to that Indians reply by asking why the United States has never been prepared to label Pakistan an aggressor in Kashmir. Granted the Indian interpretation of Chinese intentions, the two cases are sufficiently parallel.

India does not want the Chinese to get scared in that way again. Indians do not want American military intervention in Southeast Asia, because they fear it might produce a Chinese counterintervention. But neither do they want Chinese intervention in support of Communist rebels and guerrillas on the Indochinese model. Hence the five principles of Mr. Nehru and Chou En-lai, which are in effect a careful balancing of a promise

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to China not to join an alliance against China, with a promise by China not to interfere in its neighbor's internal affairs. Were China to break its side of the bargain in any obvious way, Indian policy might change quite rapidly. To sum up: India's reaction to the emergence of a united, militarily strong, and aggressive China is guided by the facts of geography, India's own military weakness, and India's concentration on internal development. "Peace," Mr. Nehru has said, "is an emergent need for the recently freed underdeveloped countries of Asia."

In regulating its relations with China, however, India does not base its policy entirely either on Chinese promises or on its own need for peace. It also takes certain precautions. Indian troops are being posted all along the MacMahon Line, which separates Northeast India from Tibet. New roads are being built in the Kumaon Hills and on the Northeast Frontier. Police posts have been opened all along the border. India has made it clear that it considers that any aggression against Nepal would be treated as aggression against India. India gives as much economic, political, and technical aid to Nepal as it can, and is also improving communications in that Himalayan state. Bhutan's foreign relations are conducted by India. Sikkim has been half-absorbed. In the Northeast Frontier Agency between Assam and China, the Indian government has been increasing its control by extending its administration to tribes hitherto unadministered. Finally, in Kashmir, India need do nothing, since it has an army there large enough to cope with any but Soviet aggression.

India has been most widely criticized for accepting the "liberation" of Tibet without much protest. It is perhaps worth discussing that particular incident in more detail. Basically, it was a matter of India's accepting a situation it could not change. Mr. Nehru protested at the time, and if he has since emphasized Chinese rights, it is the natural self-defense of a politician who has been put in a position where he has had to accept a defeat; for, although the defeat was not vital, it left a bad taste in Indian mouths. Yet India had little option. Short of fighting a Chinese army which, India feared, would be backed by Soviet aid, there was little else it could do. Even taking the issue to the UN would

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have been only a gesture, and India's experience at the UN with Pakistan had, in Indian eyes, not been such as to encourage it to go there again. But the argument which seems finally to have weighed with Mr. Nehru against taking the issue to the UN was that it would only ensure that a hostile China would be driven back irrevocably to Russia, while the fate of Tibet would remain materially unchanged.

Nevertheless, whatever Mr. Nehru may on occasion have said in a flush of diplomatic enthusiasm, motivated by his genuine belief that agreement is always better than war, there are no doubts that his "affection" for China has been severely tried by the unconciliatory attitude which the Chinese exhibited during their negotiations over the Tibetan treaty. The months spent over the negotiations were due to China's lack of any desire to meet India halfway. The actual clauses of the treaty are what could be expected in the case of any country having to liquidate untenable and obsolete assets in a territory taken over by another power. The preamble by which Mr. Nehru sets such store is not substantially different from the friendly generalizations of many other preambles—after all, Russia and Great Britain are still allies and the wartime treaty between them has never been abrogated. India's satisfaction with the Sino-Tibetan treaty, therefore, needs some explaining. It may partly be that India has not yet had enough experience to realize how easily such preambles are torn up. India has never had to deal with either Hitler or Stalin. It may partly be that India wants to get a pledge of Chinese non-interference and non-aggression on the record. Many people in India have noticed how quickly the Chinese stopped confiding in the Indian Embassy once Sardar Panikkar left Peking, and Indo-Chinese relations can obviously not be allowed to rest on the personality of individuals. There must be something in writing.

## VII

Mr. Nehru genuinely believes in coexistence. But his preachings should be interpreted in terms of India's desperate need for peace rather than, as they too often tend to be, in terms of a su-

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perior Indian morality. The United States, in its formative years, was by an accident of history, geography, and science fortunate enough to be able to mold her thinking along purely moral lines. This explains why it sometimes has difficulty in understanding Mr. Nehru.

> Few men have dared to legislate as though eternal peace were at hand in a world torn by wars and convulsions and drowned in blood. But this was what Jefferson aspired to do. Even in such dangers he believed that America might safely set an example which the Christian world should be led by interest to respect and at length to imitate. As he conceived a true American policy, war was a blunder, an unnecessary risk, and even in case of robbery and aggression, the U.S.A., he believed, had only to stand on the defensive in order to obtain justice in the end.[9]

Mr. Nehru has a good deal of President Jefferson's attitude. But Mr. Nehru has no Atlantic Ocean between him and the forces of evil, and aerial warfare has shattered Jefferson's dream. Therefore, Mr. Nehru has in a realistic fashion set about strengthening those areas around him which, by their weakness, instability, and vacuums, might attract Communism. The stability of rice-eating India is linked to the stability of rice-growing Burma. So, India has entered into a rice deal with Burma which is more to Burma's advantage than to its own. India has forgiven Burma most of its debt and has accepted the rather raw deal that Burma has given its Indian landowners. Burma is the key to India's neutrality, just as Pearl Harbor was the key to America's intervention in World War II. Burma was until 1937 part of India; there are close cultural ties and political affinities between the two countries; but far more impelling to India is the simple fact that Burma, unlike Tibet, is on the Indian side of the Himalayas.

Again, Ceylon has not behaved well to its one million Indian settlers, who emigrated when both India and Ceylon were part of the same British Empire, and on whom the Ceylonese economy quite largely rests. These Indians have now been disenfranchised and the Ceylonese government is trying to push them out. Yet India, faithful to its belief in patience, negotiation, and peaceful methods, has refrained from using threats to coerce Ceylon into giving citizenship rights to people who have some-

[9] James Truslow Adams, *The Formative Years*, London, 1948, I, pp. 75-76.

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times as many as three generations on the island to their credit. Recently, Mr. Nehru entered into an agreement with the Prime Minister of Ceylon, and although every Indian considers that the spirit of the agreement has been repeatedly broken by Ceylon, Mr. Nehru continues patiently to negotiate.

Yet another example of how highly India rates stability among its neighbors is Malaya. Indians have no doubt that Malaya will become a Dominion in due course by the usual Commonwealth method of freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent; meanwhile, they leave the British to deal with the Communists and do not criticize unduly. Significantly, they only become critical when the Malay and Chinese parties, the UMNO and the MCA, become dissatisfied. As elsewhere, it is in such nationalist dissatisfaction that they see the real threat of Communism—not only for themselves, but for everybody else—and they are impatient with pleas that this or that territory is not ready for self-government, perhaps because their own experience of trusting the people has so far been hopeful.

India takes astonishingly little interest in Japan, except as a competitor for world textile markets. Every now and then there is a mild flicker of interest in whether Japan is really democratic, or whether it will soon assert itself against the United States. But in Mr. Nehru's speeches Japan hardly rates a mention, and the reasons for which India did not sign the San Francisco Treaty were based on general principles concerning Asian independence rather than on specific issues on which anyone felt strongly.

Fundamental to all Indian policies is the belief of Indian leaders in the democratic way of government. India's electorate has taken to politics with astonishing zeal. At the beginning of 1954, elections were held in the states of Pepsu and Travancore-Cochin. Ten per cent more people went to the polling stations than in the 1951 election, only three years earlier. Moreover, the people voted in numbers far larger than those taking part in any American Presidential election, and in Travancore-Cochin they defeated the government in power. Naturally, Indian leaders regard the ballot-box as a panacea for most ills. The difference between democratic India and democratic America is, therefore,

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one of means, not ends. This argument about means will perhaps never be settled. Indians see darker and lighter grays where Americans see blacks and whites. The United States has a vigilante tradition; India's tradition is non-violent. No Westerner can disillusion Indians about Communism and its methods; that must be left to the Communists themselves. It should not take them very much longer.

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# AMERICAN POLICY-MAKING AND THE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION

By ALEXANDER L. GEORGE

THE Korean War represented the first American experience with the problem of meeting local Communist aggression by means of limited, if costly, warfare. But despite the revulsion with that experience, and the "new look" at military strategy and foreign policy, it may not be the last. The character of recent weapons developments and the passing of our thermonuclear monopoly make it probable that in the future, as in the past, American policy-makers will be forced to consider the alternative of local conflict, with all its problems and risks, in determining how to respond to the threat or actuality of Communist moves in the peripheral areas.

In these circumstances, analyses of American policy-making immediately before and during the Korean War may well illuminate the perspectives and considerations relevant to this difficult and dangerous type of operation. Here, no more can be done than to examine the effect of strategic planning and estimates of Communist intentions and behavior on the decision to commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. This decision, and even the crucial decision to commit ground forces to eventual offensive operations against the aggressor, was made within a few days of the North Korean attack. Attention, accordingly, is focused on American policy reactions to the war in the first week or ten days following June 25, 1950.*

*When this study was originally undertaken, in the late autumn of 1950, only newspaper materials were available for research purposes. Accordingly, it was regarded as a pilot study which, while it could not yield definitive findings, might at least formulate specific hypotheses for testing in the event that more authoritative data became available.

Some months after the original version of the study was completed, the Senate held hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur. These hearings went into certain aspects of American policy in the Far East exhaustively, if also repetitively, and included the detailed testimony of some of the principal participants in the formation of the American reaction to the North Korean attack. Because the problem of validating an analysis of American policy based on newspaper accounts is of some interest in itself, an effort was made in this article to reproduce the essential points of the original study and to comment separately on the extent to which disclosures at the MacArthur

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Judging by contemporary newspaper accounts, the American estimate of Soviet strategic intentions for some time prior to June 25 included two important expectations. First, it was thought that there was no immediate danger of an armed attack upon South Korea, although some form of Communist action elsewhere in the world in the coming months was expected. Secondly, it was thought that the Politburo would not engage in overt forms of aggression which involved the risk of a general war for the present and for several years hence.

According to James Reston, the North Korean attack seems to have contradicted an important assumption held at the time by American officials, namely, that

> . . . while the Russians would continue trying to gain their ends by indirect aggression through the Communist parties, they would hesitate to use force, at least until they were at the top of their military strength, some time between 1952 and 1954.
>
> . . . The Korean Communists' attack has forced reconsideration of this theory . . . best guess here is that a speed-up in all military programs will now be ordered (*New York Times*, June 27, 1950).

Similarly, the Alsops reported:

> [Korea] has knocked the basic assumption underlying American policy into a cocked hat. This assumption was that the Kremlin was not now ready, and would not be ready for some years, to risk a world war. Yet the Kremlin has clearly and consciously risked a world war. This in turn means that Washington has been mistaken about Soviet capabilities and intentions (*Washington Post*, July 5, 1950).

The impressions derived from contemporary newspaper accounts were confirmed to a considerable extent by disclosures at the MacArthur hearings. According to Secretary of State Acheson, the possibility of a North Korean attack had been recog-

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hearings confirm or contradict impressions derived earlier from newspaper accounts.

For several reasons, which need not be elaborated here, the MacArthur hearings did not produce the ideal type of "inside" material with which to verify impressions gained from contemporary newspaper accounts. To the extent that validation was possible, however, it indicates that a surprising amount of reliable information about American policy calculations can be obtained from the columns of the better metropolitan dailies. Off-the-record background information can often be easily identified and distinguished from personal interpretation provided by the reporter. And the possibility of being misled by faulty reporting can be minimized by relying heavily on correspondents (like James Reston, Hanson Baldwin, the Alsop brothers) who are known to have good contacts in official circles. Finally, with several competent correspondents covering the same story, there is an opportunity to compare and check the information that is provided.

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nized for some time but was not regarded as imminent. Rather, the general view was that the Communists would continue past efforts to take over South Korea by means short of war.[1] And General Bradley's testimony, despite deletions by the security censor, conveyed the idea that policy-makers had been concerned over the possibility of Communist moves in other areas, and consequently had thought, at least initially, that the North Korean attack meant the Soviets were willing to risk a general war.[2]

## I. Interpretations of the North Korean Attack

If the events of June 25 had knocked the basic assumptions of American policy "into a cocked hat," what motivations and calculations were to be assigned to the North Korean attack? And how were broader Soviet strategic intentions to be interpreted? These questions not only were particularly urgent in the hours and days immediately following the attack, when decisions of crucial importance had to be made; they remained matters of analysis and speculation for months after the invasion of South Korea was launched.

### A. The "Diversionary Move" Interpretation[3]

The fact that American policy-makers had been alerted to the possibility of a series of Communist actions at various points throughout the world, but *not* to the attack against South Korea, may have encouraged some of them to suspect that the North Korean attack was a diversionary one. Thus, Hanson Baldwin wrote:

> The background of our intelligence reports at the time of the Korean invasion showed that the Communists in many parts of the world were

[1] *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignment to That Area, Washington, D.C., 1951, Part 3, pp. 1990-92. (Hereafter cited as *Hearings*, part and page.)

[2] *Ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 942, 954, 971. See also the testimony of former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, *ibid.*, Part 4, pp. 2585, 2630.

[3] A number of other interpretations of the North Korean attack than those which follow were noted in newspaper accounts. They are not discussed in this report since evidence was lacking that they were shared by American policy-makers or that they influenced the development of policy.

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> preparing a pattern of conquest for this summer, and Korea was only the first step . . . (*New York Times*, July 2).

This interpretation may have been held by some important military men—for example, General Omar Bradley. According to Drew Pearson's "inside" account of President Truman's meeting of policy advisers on June 25, General Bradley raised the question whether the North Korean attack was merely a diversion prior to the major Soviet blow, possibly against Iran (*Washington Post*, June 30, July 3).

If American policy-makers accepted the diversion interpretation of the North Korean attack, it followed logically that they would be reluctant to commit important American military forces to Korea because of the possibility that those forces might soon be needed elsewhere.[4]

### B. THE "SOFT-SPOT PROBING" INTERPRETATION

Probably derived from George Kennan's analysis of Soviet behavior[5] was the interpretation of the North Korean attack as a "probing" of a "soft-spot."

The first indication that this thesis was being entertained and would influence policy came in a report on President Truman's attitude as he was leaving Kansas City for Washington on June 25.

> It was understood that the President . . . planned to be as decisive as possible, within the framework of United States foreign policy. This policy is based on meeting the Soviet Union's moves everywhere possible by creating situations of strength (Anthony Leviero, *New York Times*, June 26).

And, it was reported (Albert Friendly, *Washington Post*, June 28), "The State Department consensus is that the Korean attack is another bit of 'feeling out,' of probing for soft spots."

After a month's time in which to consider the question of Soviet intentions, some officials in the United States government, said to be experienced in dealing with the Russians, were reported to hold the following views:

[4] James Reston reported in this vein in the *New York Times*, June 28, 1950, and, more explicitly, in *ibid.*, July 23.

[5] "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), pp. 566-82.

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> They concede the Russians have, by resorting to armed aggression, consciously adopted a much more risky and defiant policy. . . . But they are still of the opinion that the Russians were trying for a quick and easy victory in Korea and that they were not trying to get us off balance in order to start a major all-out war (James Reston, *New York Times*, July 23).

### C. THE "TESTING" INTERPRETATION

Many newspaper accounts attributed to American policy-makers the view that the North Korean move was intended to test the will of anti-Communist countries to resist open armed aggression by Communist forces. The implication was that if the anti-Communist forces failed to resist, then further Communist aggressions would quickly follow elsewhere in the world. In this respect, the testing interpretation differed from the "soft-spot probing" thesis, which did not imply such dire consequences if the non-Communist powers failed to resist the Korean aggression.

The unique implications of the testing interpretation stemmed from the fact that certain American policy-makers were disposed to view the North Korean aggression in terms of Hitler's early unopposed aggressions. The naked military character of the North Korean attack and the fact that it involved a sudden, massive employment of official armed forces across a clear-cut territorial boundary appear to have been responsible for calling to mind the historical parallel.

Thus, the *New York Times* correspondent Jay Walz reported on June 26 that sources close to top American policy-makers

> . . . were certain that the North Korean attack was being viewed as a test of the countries, including the United States, that are standing up against Communist expansion. In such a light, the march across the North-South Korean border would appear similar to the attacks that Hitler used to make to feel out the opposition.

The Alsops (*Washington Post*, June 28) quoted one of the men who took part in the crucial policy deliberations at Blair House as saying, "This attack on South Korea is an event like Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland."[6]

[6] Cf., in a similar vein, Arthur Krock, *New York Times*, June 28, 1950; Albert Friendly, *Washington Post*, June 28; and John Foster Dulles, speech of July 1, reported in *New York Times*, July 2.

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### D. THE "DEMONSTRATION" INTERPRETATION

An important addition to some versions of the testing and "soft-spot" interpretations was the hypothesis that the Soviets hoped to make of Korea a demonstration of their own strength and of Allied weakness which would have world-wide repercussions. Thus, the Alsops held that the Soviets hoped by such a demonstration to soften up other areas and weaken the position of anti-Communist leaders in the Far East and Western Europe (*Washington Post*, June 28). Later they added that Korea was only the first in a series of Soviet demonstrations of Russian strength and American weakness designed to lead to the crumbling of the Western will to resist (*ibid.*, July 3).

### E. "SOVIET FAR EAST STRATEGY" INTERPRETATIONS

Some American policy-makers examined the motivation of the North Korean attack within the strategic context of clashing Far East policies and interests. Here the question of Soviet intentions assumed a more complex character, for such interpretations imputed to the Soviet-inspired North Korean action certain defensive calculations. This stood in marked contrast to interpretations which made the simple assumption of Soviet aggressive expansionist tendencies and which regarded the North Korean attack as a sign of Soviet initiative in Far East affairs.

A leading interpretation along these lines was offered by John Foster Dulles, then in charge of the State Department's preparations for a Japanese peace treaty. His thesis was that the North Korean attack was motivated in part by a desire to block American efforts to make Japan a full member of the free world. The attack was a strategic move to place Japan "between the upper [i.e., Sakhalin] and lower [Korean] jaws of the Russian bear." And, more broadly, the Communists hoped that the Korean invasion would dislocate plans being developed by the United States for positive and constructive policies to check the rising tide of Communism in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, the attack had also been ordered because the Communists could not tolerate the "hopeful, attractive Asiatic experiment in democracy" that was under way in South Korea and which they had been unable

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to destroy by indirect aggression (speech of July 1, *loc.cit.*).[7]

The MacArthur hearings contained very little on the interpretations given the North Korean attack at its inception. The diversion interpretation was clearly implied in General Bradley's remarks, thus confirming the attribution of such views to him by newspapermen at the time. General Bradley was also able to recall, though with some difficulty, that the historical parallel with Hitler's early aggressions was also in "the back of our minds."[8] Johnson's statement of the reasons for entering the Korean conflict possibly implies the testing and demonstration interpretations.[9]

## II. Problems Raised by These Interpretations

In important respects, these several interpretations of the significance of the North Korean attack did not constitute a clear-cut, unambiguous view of broader Soviet strategic intentions. Their conflicting elements, it may be noted, centered precisely on the questions of major relevance for developing an American policy reaction to the North Korean attack: Did the attack signify Soviet general war intentions or, at least, a greater readiness to risk such a war? Was it part of a plan for a series of Communist aggressions? If so, how rigidly determined was this plan? How important was Korea to the Politburo? What conditions and means would be required to force a Soviet withdrawal from the Korean venture?

The diversion and "soft-spot probing" interpretations assumed different answers to the question of whether the Politburo wanted or was ready to risk a general war. The expectation of a series of Soviet moves, in the diversion interpretation, implied a Soviet willingness to take very great risks. In contrast, the "soft-spot probing" thesis minimized the possibility that the Politburo was bent on general war or that it was consciously taking serious risks of general war.

Both the diversion and the testing interpretations held that

[7] Similar interpretations were reported by Lindesay Parrott, *New York Times*, June 26, 1950, and James Reston, *ibid.*, July 23.

[8] Cf. *Hearings*, Part 2, pp. 954, 971.

[9] *Ibid.*, Part 4, p. 2585.

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Moscow had plans for a whole series of aggressive actions in the coming months. But, in contrast to the diversion hypothesis, the testing theory did not regard the schedule of Communist actions as rigidly determined. Rather, it held that if the free nations reacted firmly to the North Korean aggression, the USSR would refrain from other moves that had been planned.

The testing interpretation differed significantly from the "soft-spot probing" thesis in implying that if the free world did not oppose the North Korean aggression, Stalin, like Hitler, would be led into further, more dangerous adventures. (The historical parallel with Hitler was an important element of the testing interpretation.) In contrast, Kennan's "soft-spot probing" thesis holds that Soviet leaders are not carried away by local successes into risky adventures.

Most versions of the testing, "soft-spot probing," and demonstration interpretations were *generalized* estimates of Soviet intentions and lacked a specific evaluation of Soviet strategy in the Far East. This omission was serious insofar as it might have led to oversimplification and underestimation of the Soviet conception of its interest in regard to Korea. Was the underlying Soviet intention in this instance no different from that present in any other Soviet probing action? Strategic analyses which placed the North Korean attack in the specific context of Far Eastern developments implied otherwise. They portrayed the Communist move in Korea as a *response* to certain American policies and as an anticipation of a forthcoming American initiative, namely, some sort of arrangement with Japan which would increase her independence and strength.[10] An important implication of such strategic analyses, it would seem, was that the general objective aimed at by the Politburo in the Far East was important enough to rule out a retreat except under considerable pressure.

Thus, the various interpretations noted above not only attributed different intentions to the Soviet move in North Korea, but also contained different implications for American policy efforts to induce a Soviet withdrawal from the Korean venture.

[10] A parallel might have been drawn with the Soviet blockade of Berlin, probably also intended to forestall, if possible, an Allied initiative—the unification of Western Germany.

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However, there was no indication during the MacArthur hearings that policy-makers had been conscious of an important divergence in their interpretations of the North Korean attack.

## III. Reversal of the American Strategic Plan for the Far East

Both contemporary journalistic accounts and the MacArthur hearings amply confirm the extent of American unpreparedness for the contingency which arose on June 25. More serious than the intelligence failure and the resulting tactical surprise was the fact that strategic and foreign policy planning had not foreseen the course of action which the United States actually took in response to the North Korean aggression. This was most dramatically indicated by the abrupt reversal, after June 25, of the basic American strategic plan for the Far East. At the time of the attack, American strategic planning did not call for employment of US forces for the defense of either Korea or Formosa.[11] Nor, evidently, had the strategic plan foreseen any contingencies which might have to be met by an extension of American military commitments in the Far East. Not only was the decision to commit US forces to aid South Korea taken entirely *ad hoc*, but the major policy decision of June 27, neutralizing Formosa and giving the impression of "drawing the line," was also an improvisation in strategic planning.[12]

[11] This came out most clearly and in considerable detail during the MacArthur hearings (*Hearings*, Part 1, p. 242; Part 2, pp. 753, 930, 932, 966; Part 3, pp. 1671ff., 1681, 1740, 1763, 1818, 1821, 2054; Part 4, pp. 2574, 2575, 2593, 2597ff., 2697). But the essential facts, particularly the reversal on Korea, were reported at the time as well. (See, for example, Ferdinand Kuhn, *Washington Post*, June 27, 1950; the Alsops, *ibid.*, June 30.)

[12] At the hearings, Louis Johnson recalled that at the initial policy meeting of June 25 at Blair House, he had called upon each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the Secretaries of the defense establishment to present their views individually. "Since the Joint Chiefs had no recommendations to make . . . A major portion of the evening was taken in individual, unrehearsed, and unprepared and uncoordinated statements of the several Chiefs and the Secretaries." Just before the meeting adjourned, Johnson recalled, he said to the President: "There are two things I haven't discussed with the Secretaries and the Chiefs; I should like to do so and will do unless you order me not to. . . ." The first was a proposal that the Seventh Fleet be ordered to move from the Philippines toward the area of conflict. The second was a proposal to transfer American jets to a base closer to Formosa. Both suggestions were approved. The decision to deneutralize Formosa was not made, however, until the following day. (*Hearings*, Part 4, pp. 2580-81, 2621.) Secretary Acheson and Johnson differed in some respects in recalling how the decision to deneutralize Formosa was made. (See, for example, *ibid.*, Part 3, p. 2055; Part 4, pp. 2614-15.)

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That American strategic planning for this area prior to the North Korean attack had contained important gaps was clearer in some respects from disclosures at the MacArthur hearings than from contemporary press accounts. The full significance of former Secretary of Defense Johnson's statement that there had been no war plan for Korea,[13] however, emerges only when the American policy reaction to the Korean attack is seen in the context of such strategic planning for the Far East as had taken place.

The importance to American security of various areas in the Far East had been carefully considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the civilian policy-makers in the twelve to eighteen months before the attack. Planning decisions as to the use or non-use of US military forces to ensure the defense of these areas had been made in terms of their strategic importance to the security of the United States. From such a standpoint, Korea was clearly not of strategic importance.[14] If South Korea came under military attack, therefore, the United States would not act directly with military force in South Korea's defense, but, rather, the matter would be considered under the United Nations.

Was it foreseen, during the period of strategic planning preceding the North Korean aggression, that it might become desirable or necessary to commit US military forces to the defense of South Korea under the aegis of the United Nations? There is no indication of this either in contemporary newspaper accounts or in the MacArthur hearings. Employment of US forces in the defense of South Korea had been ruled out on the grounds of its low strategic importance to American military security. Evidently no thought was given to the possibility that *other considerations* might require such a commitment. And yet it was precisely these other considerations which became paramount in the days following June 25. It is not without significance that the

[13] *Ibid.*, Part 4, p. 2671.

[14] As for Formosa, its strategic importance to the United States was rated appreciably greater than that of Korea. The official position was that it was not in the interest of the United States to allow Formosa to fall into the hands of a hostile power. However, because of the limited military capability available to the United States during this period, strategic planning ruled out the use of US military forces in order to achieve this objective. Reasons for the reversal of this policy on Formosa will not be discussed in this article.

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initial decision of June 26 (announced the following day) to use US air and naval forces to help the South Koreans was taken on the initiative of the State Department. As Louis Johnson recalled, "The military neither recommended it nor opposed it," although they did emphasize the "difficulties and limitations" of such an action.[15]

It is true that Secretary of State Acheson, as he recalled at the MacArthur hearings, had intimated in a major policy speech of January 15, 1950, that any attack upon South Korea would be dealt with through the United Nations. But while the obligations of the United States by virtue of its membership in the UN may really have been seen as including the possible use of US military forces as part of UN action on behalf of South Korea, there is no indication that the military implications of such an "obligation" or "commitment" were taken into account in American strategic planning.

During the MacArthur hearings, some of the leading participants in the decision to commit US forces to the defense of South Korea occasionally implied, in attempting to explain this step, that Korea was of political, if not strategic, importance. The clearest intimation that the relationship of the United States to peripheral areas rests upon factors other than their strategic importance to American security was given by Secretary of State Acheson.[16] But the fact that strategic and military planning for Korea had not been based upon this broader conception was not explicitly brought out in the course of the lengthy hearings.

What were the unforeseen considerations which led American policy-makers to reverse strategic plans and commit military forces to the defense of Korea? Clearly, this reversal was not motivated by a sudden discovery of the importance of Korea to American military security.[17] Rather, the decision to oppose the North Koreans was motivated by a fear of the consequences of

[15] *Hearings*, Part 4, pp. 2581, 2584f.

[16] According to Secretary Acheson, although Korea was not of "strategic importance" to the United States, the American action in Korea was "motivated by the security of the United States, because the whole question of collective security is one of the bases of our own security . . ." (*ibid.*, Part 3, p. 1818).

[17] This was explicitly acknowledged at the hearings by General Bradley (*ibid.*, Part 2, p. 1110) and also implied by Secretary Acheson (*ibid.*, Part 3, p. 1818).

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inaction and was influenced by considerations which stemmed from uncertain interpretations of broader Soviet strategic intentions behind the North Korean attack.

In the first place, by acting in Korea, American leaders hoped to deter the Soviets from launching other local aggressions and, thereby, to make a general war less likely.[18] (Both the diversion and testing interpretations of the North Korean attack appear to have been influential in this respect.) Secondly, American leaders feared that failure to oppose the North Korean aggression would markedly weaken (a) the prestige and position of the United States in the cold war; (b) the United Nations and the principle of collective security; and, therefore, also (c) the forces of opposition to Communist expansion throughout the world.[19] (The demonstration interpretation was particularly relevant in this respect.)

## IV. Evaluation of the American Decision

In evaluating the policy decision to employ American forces in the defense of South Korea, three questions can be raised.

(a) Did a tendency to view the North Korean aggression in terms of an historical parallel with Hitler's early aggressions lead American policy-makers to exaggerate some of the negative consequences of not opposing the aggression against South Korea?

Our evidence suggests that in the crisis engendered by the North Korean attack, certain leading American policy-makers (President Truman and perhaps Secretary Acheson as well) took their bearings to some extent from the testing interpretation, which made use of the historical parallel with Hitler. Contemporary newspaper accounts are not sufficiently detailed to enable one to judge precisely in what sense the historical parallel with Hitler's aggressions was perceived. The possibility cannot be

[18] See General Bradley, *ibid.*, Part 2, p. 890.—As Hanson Baldwin noted (*New York Times*, June 28, 1950): "A Communist program of conquest during the summer months, in which Korea was to have been the first step, may have been blocked by the United States decision to aid South Korea with armed force. This is the hopeful opinion and belief of leaders of the United States government. . . . It was felt that if South Korea were allowed to succumb, without actual United States armed aid, to Communist aggression, other acts of conquest or provocation would soon follow."

[19] There is considerable material in the *Hearings* on reasons for employing US forces in Korea. See, especially, Part 2, pp. 958, 1110, 1490, 1504; Part 3, p. 1818; Part 4, p. 2585.

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excluded, however, that Soviet aggression in Korea was incorrectly viewed by some policy-makers in the image of Hitler.[20] To the extent that this was the case, the testing interpretation of the North Korean attack may have blurred in the minds of policy-makers an important general principle of behavior attributed to the Politburo in Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."

The testing hypothesis, as has been noted, implied that nonopposition to the North Korean attack would embolden the Kremlin to proceed with further aggressions, already scheduled, which would surely plunge the world into war. For, just as Hitler's early unopposed successes whetted his appetite and led him later into an imprudent underestimation of his opponent's will to resist, so the Politburo's overt aggression in Korea might set off a similar cycle. This reasoning, however, would be difficult to reconcile with Kennan's thesis, which emphasizes the principle of caution in Soviet behavior. Rather, according to Kennan (and other specialists on Soviet behavior[21]), Soviet leaders would feel themselves under a compulsion in such a contingency—unopposed and easy success in the Korean adventure—to adopt an attitude *exactly opposite* to that anticipated by the "testing-parallel-with-Hitler" hypothesis. They would, in other words, tend to estimate their new advantages soberly and restrain any tendency to be carried away by success into risky adventures.

The testing hypothesis could have validity (assuming the Kennan-Leites thesis to be correct) only insofar as it forecast, in the event of successful Communist aggression in Korea, a weakening of the democracies' will to resist and the emergence thereby of new power vacuums elsewhere in the world. That such consequences were feared by American policy-makers seems

[20] At least one commentator, Walter Lippmann, explicitly warned against acting on the simple stereotype that Stalin was another version of Hitler. He noted that "as yet there is nothing to indicate that in the Korean affair the USSR has departed from its policy, which has been to expand the Communist sphere by the use of satellites without committing and engaging its own armed forces. . . . It has been a policy quite different from Hitler's—a policy of very shrewdly calculated risks . . . by which the profits can be very big though the losses are limited" (*Washington Post*, July 3, 1950; cf. also his column, July 4).

[21] See, for example, Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe, Ill., 1953, pp. 47-53.

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clear enough, but it is difficult to disentangle this legitimate concern from the further, more questionable, anxiety that Soviet leaders would become afflicted with the same imprudence which led Hitler to blunder into war.

To the extent that this dubious assumption about Soviet behavior influenced the American policy reaction, it served to strengthen motivation for meeting force with force in Korea. To the extent that the testing interpretation took precedence over the "soft-spot probing" thesis, it led to an exaggeration of the negative consequences of an unopposed Communist success in Korea. The result may have been to leave American policy-makers with a feeling that they had less freedom of action in responding to the North Korean aggression than was actually the case.

The decision to employ US forces to aid South Korea raises a further question: (b) Was there a military alternative to American involvement in a ground war in Korea? Could the United States have accepted the military loss of South Korea and attempted to minimize its demoralizing consequences upon the free world by other means?

The character and development of the Korean War were determined to a considerable extent by the decision to use US ground forces to stem the advancing North Koreans and, eventually, to roll them back. This step was taken on June 30, only several days after the earlier decisions to employ US air and naval forces to assist the South Koreans. Since the question whether US naval and air forces can be employed in local wars without risking involvement of sizable ground forces continues to concern American policy-makers, it is useful to examine the development and background of the key decision of June 30.

In the MacArthur hearings, this decision is represented as having been taken, and its timing determined, solely in response to the necessities of the rapidly deteriorating military situation in Korea.[22] The exact sequence of events leading to the decision,

[22] However, there is some reason to believe that the reassuring picture of Soviet intentions, gleaned from the reply on June 29 to an earlier State Department note, made it somewhat easier for American policy-makers to take the fateful decision of June 30 to commit ground combat troops. Concern over the possibility of Soviet intervention in the

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however, is difficult to reconstruct from the piecemeal, fragmentary disclosures made during the hearings. A June 25 directive to General MacArthur authorized him to "take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands," an event which might have interfered with efforts to evacuate American nationals.[23] On June 29, use of Army combat and service troops was explicitly authorized "to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan." This authorization, too, appears to have been limited to the purpose of ensuring evacuation.[24]

The idea of using US ground troops in offensive operations against the North Koreans was initiated by General MacArthur on June 30.[25] This was General Bradley's testimony,[26] and it was supported by Louis Johnson.[27] There is some question whether American policy-makers, in immediately accepting General MacArthur's recommendation that US combat troops be used to hold the line, went so far as to approve at this time his recommendation of a build-up for offensive ground action.[28] Johnson stated quite positively that the Defense Department interpreted the Administration's decision of June 30 as accepting General MacArthur's recommendations fully, that is, it constituted a policy

Korean War appears to have been one of the factors which influenced earlier American decisions to limit the operation of US forces to South Korea. (See General Marshall's testimony, *Hearings*, Part 1, pp. 535-36; see also newspaper accounts at the time, especially Drew Pearson, *Washington Post*, June 30, 1950, and Harold Hinton, *New York Times*, July 1.)

[23] *Hearings*, Part 5, Appendix K, p. 3192; also General Bradley, *ibid.*, Part 2, p. 1011.

[24] General Bradley, *ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 1011, 1112, 1121f.; General MacArthur's testimony is less clear-cut on this point: see *ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 231, 235f.

[25] Following a personal reconnaissance of the battlefield, General MacArthur reported immediately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (early morning of June 30, Washington time) on the condition of the South Korean Army. According to General Bradley's testimony, General MacArthur indicated in this report that "the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. Accordingly, he stated, if authorized, it was his intention to move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions from Japan for an early offensive action in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces" (*ibid.*, Part 2, p. 1012). General MacArthur's recollection of his report to the JCS appears faulty in holding that he recommended use of US ground troops for the purpose of holding a bridgehead at Pusan (*ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 235f.).

[26] *Ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 1011, 1121f.

[27] *Ibid.*, Part 4, pp. 2609f.

[28] See Admiral Sherman's testimony, *ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 1650f.

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decision for eventual ground action to clear South Korea.[29] The directive issued to General MacArthur on June 30, in response to his recommendation, stated (as paraphrased at the hearings) merely that "the limitation on the employment of Army forces imposed on June 29, 1950, was rescinded."[30]

The official statement made public on June 30 by President Truman, it was recalled to Louis Johnson while he was testifying, announced merely that General MacArthur had been authorized "to use certain supporting troops." Johnson, in reply, intimated that for security reasons it had been considered unwise to advertise the plan for a build-up for eventual offensive action.[31]

It appears, then, that ground combat forces were committed initially in order to stem the North Korean advance, which the South Korean forces were unable to do. It was not a question, at this time, of preventing the total defeat of the South Korean Army and an overrunning of the entire Korean peninsula. But the decision to give ground assistance to the South Koreans appears to have been accompanied, at the same time, by a separate decision determining subsequent American military strategy for fighting the Korean War by means of a ground offensive. There is no indication in the materials examined for this study that the possibility of an alternative military strategy was considered at this time, that anyone proposed either that US ground forces not be committed at all, or that they be used only to stabilize a line or hold a bridgehead. Nor is there any indication that the possibility of accepting the military loss of the South Korean peninsula was considered, together with an exploration of alternative political and military policies for minimizing the demoralizing consequences of such a course upon the free world.

Evidently the tendency for an initial employment of US ground forces to take on the character of an irreversible commitment was not foreseen. Despite the traditional military view that sizable US ground forces should not become involved in war on the Asian continent and a concern lest American troops be needed elsewhere in the world, American policy-makers were

[29] *Ibid.*, Part 4, p. 2610; see also General Bradley, *ibid.*, Part 2, p. 1112.
[30] *Ibid.*, Part 5, Appendix K, p. 3192. [31] *Ibid.*, Part 4, p. 2610.

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to find themselves committing increasingly larger forces to the Korean theater.[32] Disclosures at the MacArthur hearings amply confirm that, when taking the initial decision to employ US ground forces to halt and throw back the North Korean aggressor, American policy-makers did not attempt to calculate and did not foresee the size of the force that would be eventually required for that purpose.[33] Thus, it was not known, when initially small forces were committed, that increasingly larger commitments would become necessary. Otherwise, it might be expected that American leaders would have begun earlier to search for alternative military strategies for fighting a local war in Korea or that they would have considered whether acceptance of the probable military loss of the Korean peninsula was not preferable to fighting a large-scale ground war. In the last analysis, the magnificent forging of a military strategy for defeating the North Koreans was an improvisation. American strategic planning not only had not foreseen military involvement of US forces, but it had, up to this time, not really considered the general question of viable military strategies for limited, local wars.

Finally, it may be asked: (c) To what extent were alternative policies considered for purposes of deterring further Communist aggressions?

As has been noted, the desire to discourage Communist moves elsewhere in the world was evidently an important motive for employing military force in direct opposition to the North Korean invader. Another important move to the same end was the June 27 decision to employ the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from invasion and to give increased military aid to Indochina and the Philippines. In time, the Korean attack was to strengthen other American cold war policies as well—such as increased rearmament and mobilization at home and the decision to rearm Germany—but there is no evidence that such steps were considered as *alternative* means of deterring the Soviets in the first few days following the North Korean attack, when the basic policy decision of military intervention was being made. Availa-

[32] On this point, see particularly Admiral Sherman's testimony, *ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 1650f.
[33] *Ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 393f., 601, 607; Part 2, pp. 948, 1650f.; Part 4, pp. 2610, 2632.

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ble materials simply do not indicate whether in these days consideration was given to the possibility of not intervening in Korea and of seeking to deter further Communist aggressions elsewhere by any other policy means.

## V. Objectives and Means in American Policy Calculations

Korea provided an excellent illustration of some of the policy dilemmas which may arise when American leaders are forced to deal with Communist aggression in peripheral areas. Particularly evident was the problem of relating objectives and means in formulating a policy reaction to the North Korean attack. American policy-makers did not share a firm and clear-cut view of Soviet strategic intentions behind the North Korean attack. They were therefore forced to act while remaining uncertain as to some of the possible dangers in the situation. Specifically, this meant that they were being guided by several objectives, the implementation of which was not smoothly integrated. They wished to induce a more or less *immediate retreat* or withdrawal on the part of the Communists from the Korean adventure. They wished to *contain* Communist aggression in Korea. They wished, also, to deter the Soviet Union from launching other local aggressions elsewhere. One might add that, in acting in Korea (containment objective), they hoped to avoid provoking Soviet intervention. There is some reason to believe that the means chosen to implement certain of these objectives (deterrence and avoidance of Soviet intervention) prejudiced to some extent the achievement of a Communist retreat or withdrawal.

American policy-makers appear to have hoped, initially, that limited force commitments on behalf of South Korea might succeed in bringing about an immediate, voluntary withdrawal of the North Korean forces back to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. As spelled out in the first resolution of the United Nations Security Council on June 25, the objective was to secure a cease-fire and a withdrawal of North Korean troops to the border. Similarly, the American note of June 27 to the Soviet Union contained a

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request that it "use its influence" with the North Koreans to this end.

What was the basis for the expectation or hope that the initial American policy moves of the first few days might succeed in inducing a withdrawal? Contemporary newspaper accounts give a more detailed picture on this score than do disclosures at the MacArthur hearings. This hopeful expectation was evidently derived from the testing interpretation of the North Korean attack, especially that aspect of it which regarded the Communist move into South Korea as an "asking-of-a-question" type of action. The major American decision of June 27, announcing US air and naval support for the South Koreans and "drawing the line" with respect to Formosa, was regarded as giving the answer to such a question.

> If this estimate of the situation is correct, the Russians will let the North Koreans fall back to their border, the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and, in their own propaganda, dismiss the affair as something initiated by the North Koreans, independently and without Russian responsibility (Albert Friendly, *Washington Post*, June 28, 1950).

Similarly, the Alsop brothers reported the American policy-makers' hopeful expectation:

> The purpose of President Truman's decision [of June 27] . . . is simply to persuade the Kremlin that the United States means what it says. It is hoped that the Kremlin, convinced that the United States means business, will soon call off its puppets (*Washington Post*, June 30, 1950).

The Soviets declined to intervene in the Korean situation (Soviet reply of June 29 to the American note), and the advancing North Korean forces did not respond to the suggestion that they return to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. The initial effort to secure a withdrawal or retreat, therefore, was quite unsuccessful.

Accordingly, within a few days, American leaders evidently accepted the fact that the initial withdrawal objective was no longer within the realm of immediate or easy accomplishment. With the commitment of US ground troops to Korea on June 30, policy calculations began to emphasize direct military pressure as a means of inducing withdrawal.[34] With this develop-

[34] There is some reason to believe that the earlier optimistic expectation of a quick, "voluntary" withdrawal may have also attended the initial commitment of small US

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ment, measures aimed at securing withdrawal began to resemble the more familiar containment strategy. The expectation of a withdrawal now appeared to wait upon the creation of a position of military strength in Korea itself. This more realistic conception of the policy prerequisites for realizing the withdrawal objective was reflected in some newspaper accounts: "The hope persisted [in official quarters] that the Kremlin would keep the conflict localized and would call it off *in the end*" (Ferdinand Kuhn, *Washington Post*, July 1, 1950; italics added).[35]

What conclusion can be drawn from the failure to induce an immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel? According to the Kennan thesis and similar formulations by other specialists on Soviet affairs, the Politburo withdraws or retreats only in the face of strong, determined resistance, not in response to merely a polite diplomatic request. But this statement of the prerequisites for inducing a Soviet retreat is a general hypothesis. As such, it does not furnish a blueprint for policy calculation and action in any specific situation. The *degree of strength* that will deter the Soviet Union from probing a "soft-spot" and the *degree and manner of resistance* which will induce it to withdraw its tentacles are questions which require contextual analysis. The policy utilization of the retreat hypothesis requires estimates of a more specific character, which this thesis itself does not provide.

It is obvious, of course, that the United States and the United Nations in the first days after the North Korean invasion did not induce a withdrawal to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. The simplest explanation for this failure is that the amount of pressure exerted was insufficient. The UN cease-fire resolution of June 25, the announcement of US air and naval support on June 27, the announcement that "certain" US ground forces were being sent to the South Korean battlefront—all these measures evidently

ground forces to the battlefront. Some American leaders may have believed that the North Korean forces would be withdrawn from South Korea upon their first contact with US forces because Soviet leaders did not want a direct clash with them. (The writer remembers having seen newspaper reports to this effect at the time, but has been unable to locate them for citation here.)

[35] See also Kuhn, *Washington Post*, July 8, 1950, and the account of Secretary Acheson's press conference, *ibid.*, July 13.

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did not constitute a great enough leverage to induce immediate withdrawal from the Korean venture. The American diplomatic request to the Soviet Union on June 27, it may be remarked, contained no threat of further pressure and must have been quite ineffectual from this standpoint.[36]

It may be useful to consider in some detail the impact of the deneutralization of Formosa, a step taken to localize the conflict (the deterrence objective), upon the simultaneous policy objective of inducing an early withdrawal to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. One may speculate whether the deneutralization of Formosa at this early stage of the Korean War did not drastically alter the Politburo's estimate of the strategic significance of the Korean conflict and place withdrawal of the North Koreans in an entirely different tactical perspective. If we assume that the Soviets moved into South Korea under the impression that the United States had given up this area and, further, that the Soviets were surprised by the American decision to intervene, then the American policy reversal on Formosa might well have seemed to the Politburo evidence of a calculated plan to invite the North Korean attack in order to use it as a justification for putting into effect a far more vigorous Far Eastern policy. Such a Politburo image of devious American policy calculations—moreover, one possibly accompanied by expectations of further "aggressive" steps by the United States in the Far East—would have led Soviet leaders to view their interests in the Korean War in a much broader framework than they had when they ordered the North Koreans to attack. The stakes must have been seen now to be much larger than merely the question of control of South Korea. Faced overnight by what seemed to them an increasingly "aggressive," and potentially dangerous, American policy in the Far East, the Soviets now might well have regarded their main objective in the area as that of deterring this development. The

[36] According to Albert Warner, whose account was said to be based on interviews with "top participants" in the Blair House meetings, "Nothing was expected of this gesture. . . . It was an indirect assurance of the limited American military objective. It would also give Russia an opportunity to retire gracefully from the chessboard in case it was sufficiently moved by the show of American determination" ("How the Korea Decision Was Made," *Harper's Magazine* [June 1951], p. 104).

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initial policy of advance into a peripheral power vacuum may have been speedily transformed into a major defensive effort to oppose what were regarded as American plans for expansion in the Far East.

If this analysis of the Soviet interpretation of the American policy reaction is correct, then the American objective of inducing an immediate withdrawal to the Thirty-eighth Parallel was considerably complicated by the means chosen for simultaneously pursuing the broader deterrence objective. Deneutralization of Formosa by the US Seventh Fleet, while undoubtedly a manifestation of strength and determination, and however necessary, probably had little value as pressure to induce an immediate withdrawal from the Korean venture. It may actually have made more difficult the realization of this objective.

The withdrawal objective may also have been prejudiced to some extent by an undue American concern over the Politburo's interest in its prestige. Possibly in line with Kennan's thesis on this point,[37] American policy-makers were most careful to give the Politburo a chance to withdraw graciously. This impression is derived from many contemporary newspaper accounts; there is little on the matter in the MacArthur hearings. Numerous commentators noted the unwillingness of official American spokesmen to charge the Soviet Union with direct responsibility for unleashing the attack. President Truman's early decision not to accuse Moscow of having supplied material aid for the North Korean invasion was designed, according to Arthur Krock (*New York Times,* June 28, 1950), to permit the Soviets an opportunity to disavow responsibility or active interest in the aggression and, further, to accept the American diplomatic invitation to bring about a withdrawal of the North Korean forces. Similarly, in an article entitled "Soviet Face-saving Made Still

[37] Kennan has written: "While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. . . . it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige" (*op.cit.,* pp. 575f.).

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Possible" (*Washington Post*, June 29, 1950), Ferdinand Kuhn reported that Secretary of State Acheson in his press conference had refused to say a word which would connect Soviet Russia with the North Korean invasion, a caution which President Truman had also observed in his statements of June 26 and 27, and the UN Security Council in its resolutions of June 25 and 27.[38]

The question may be raised whether this marked concern for Soviet prestige may not have been interpreted by the Politburo as one indication (among others) that a total withdrawal from the North Korean venture would *not* be necessary. It is interesting to speculate upon what the Politburo reaction would have been, had the United States and the United Nations held it more directly responsible for the North Korean attack or, at least, for bringing about an immediate North Korean withdrawal to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. That the Politburo was ready to do so, if need be, was indeed inferred by some observers from the initial Soviet propaganda explanation for the outbreak of Korean hostilities, namely, that South Korean forces attacked first and were driven off and pursued by North Korean forces. Only several days later, when it may have become clear to the Politburo that a total withdrawal would not be necessary, was the Korean "civil war" theme introduced by Gromyko (*New York Times*, July 4, 1950). This shift in the Soviet line constituted an entirely different legitimization of the North Korean action. The "civil war" thesis was, it may be noted, less conducive to the idea of a Soviet-inspired withdrawal of North Korean forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

The policy of not implicating the USSR directly may have been motivated by more than an estimate of the importance of the prestige factor in Soviet policy. At the time an American policy reaction to the North Korean attack was being formulated, it will be recalled, some American officials seriously feared that the Politburo might be embarking on a series of aggressions. The non-hostile and "correct" American approach to the USSR might, indeed, have been exaggerated by a conscious or unconscious desire not to provoke the Politburo into further aggres-

[38] On Secretary Acheson's press conference, see also *New York Times*, June 29, 1950.

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sions.[39] And, consequently, American cooperation in Soviet face-saving may have taken an exaggerated form which inadvertently undermined the objective of securing an immediate Communist withdrawal in Korea.

In any event, the Korean case raises anew the question, on which there appears to be some disagreement among specialists on Soviet behavior,[40] of the importance of the prestige factor in Soviet policy calculations. In this and other respects, Korea may point to a more general danger inherent in conflicts over peripheral areas. Local wars may get out of hand as a result of interaction between rival policies based on incorrect estimates of each other's intentions. Unless each side correctly estimates the other's intentions and correctly calculates the impact of its actions upon the opponent's image of its intentions, conflicts in peripheral areas may take a course initially undesired by both sides.

[39] According to Albert Warner (*op.cit.*, p. 104), one objective of the American note of June 27 to the USSR was to reassure it indirectly of the limited American military objective in Korea. One journalist, reporting the State Department's detailed refutation of the charge in the Soviet reply to the effect that the UN action in Korea was illegal, noted: "This was a good sample of the official mood yesterday, and of the effort to keep diplomatic dealing with Moscow 'correct' and unprovocative" (Ferdinand Kuhn, *Washington Post*, July 1, 1950).

[40] The prestige factor appears to be assigned little importance in Nathan Leites' analysis of the conditions under which the Politburo considers retreat. See Leites, *op.cit.*, pp. 497-500, 537, 458-60.

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# TRENDS IN AERIAL DEFENSE

By ASHER LEE

IN a speech made in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1949, Sir Winston Churchill said, "For good or ill, air mastery today is the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary, must accept a subordinate rank." This statement comes from a figure of world repute whose strategic instincts are steeped in naval tradition. It has been echoed by President Eisenhower in recent speeches and Eisenhower is a General of the Army. We can therefore take it that modern air weapons are supremely important for all major aspects of contemporary strategy and politics. The big questions are these: In an age when atomic and hydrogen bombs have demonstrated that they can devastate cities and military and naval targets in a way never before experienced, would the heavy bomber and long-range rocket inevitably get through and shatter air defense? Or could prohibitive losses be inflicted again and again on the raiders so that the scale of attack dwindled? And, furthermore, could the United States or the USSR, militarily or economically, sustain a long-range atomic or hydrogen bomb and rocket air offensive? These are indeed $64 questions which are likely to be unanswerable for several years to come.

Because of these uncertainties, world statesmen will hesitate to throw down the military glove and start a third world war. Air attack and air defense are probably more finely balanced today than at any other stage of the past forty years of military aviation. Seversky put it this way: "Every important new weapon disturbs the offensive-defensive equilibrium and soon generates a corrective in a continuous seesaw."[1] It also produces a seesaw of current American opinion. Two fairly authoritative books which were published in the United States around 1950 offered contrasting views. From Professor Louis Ridenour, an authority on radar, came this thought: "There is no defense against the

[1] Alexander P. de Seversky, *Air Power: Key to Survival*, London, 1952, p. 223.

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atomic bomb, there can be no effective interception of the bombing aircraft despite radar screen, guided missiles and supersonic fighters."[2] And from Dr. Vannevar Bush came the opposite view: "Great bombers are essentially fragile instruments, relatively lumbering in their flight and incapable of surviving modern defensive action. Penetration of hostile skies has become an appalling task for any bomber fleet."[3]

Certainly the position is highly conjectural. Radar-guided missiles favor the defense, as Lord Trenchard (the creator of British air power between the two world wars) has pointed out, because radar control is more effective at short range and rocket and jet fighters have a speed advantage over raiding bombers. But the long-range high speeds and new operational heights of the modern jet bomber, such as the American B-47 and B-52, or the Soviet four-jet designed by Tupolev, Gurevich, and Victor Ilyushin, or the British Canberra, Vulcan, and Valiant jet bombers, make the air defense task very difficult. Heavy bomber attacks can now be made from a wide range of bases thousands of miles away against any target in the world. The possibilities of tactical surprise and flank attacks are endless. To devise a concentrated air defense scheme with an efficient radar early-warning system, rocket and jet fighters, and air-launched and ground-launched missiles, which can police a whole continent such as the United States and Canada or the USSR, is beyond the economic resources of any world power, taking its other military commitments into account. This means that some targets and target areas can be defended and others cannot.

Never before in the history of military aviation has it been more difficult to assess whether an attacking force of bombers and fighters could win air superiority and beat down the fighter gun and rocket defenses of the enemy. The weather could be as decisive at some stages as radio and radar equipment, particularly if the heavy bombers used the tempting short route across the North Pole to fly from the United States to the USSR or from Russia to North America. Flight refueling is an efficient way of

[2] Louis T. Ridenour, *One World or None*, New York, 1949, p. 222.
[3] Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, New York, 1949, p. 489.

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increasing range during peacetime maneuvers, but would it stand the test of war if the refueling were carried out, as it often must be, within range of enemy aircraft? And who can say how many heavy bombers would be required to make an air offensive successful? How many fighters and guided missiles and rockets and guns would be needed to defend the USSR? The mathematics and statistics of air power requirements were only partially developed during World War II. With all the complications of the new weapons and new air factors which have arisen in the last ten years, who can now be bold enough to essay the higher mathematics and logistics of the atomic and thermonuclear air power age? What air seer could predict the number of atomic bombs and bomb-carrying planes which would have to be made in the United States or the USSR so that decisive damage could be caused to key Soviet or American cities? It surely depends on the constantly varying effectiveness of local strategic air defense. If fifty heavy bombers were to start from the USSR or the United States this year or next year and we knew their exact objectives, is there anyone who could say what percentage of these bombers would get through? They might fly over a route along which they were quickly identified hundreds of miles from their target by reconnaissance aircraft or surface ships equipped with special radar search equipment. A serious lapse in wireless security, which incidentally was no infrequent occurrence in World War II, could mean that the air defenses would be alerted even sooner. In 1940, British Blenheims raided a target in Denmark and nearly the whole squadron engaged in the operation was shot down. Subsequent intelligence showed that this was due mainly to the fact that they did not maintain wireless silence. German fighters therefore had several hours' warning of the approaching bombers and were brought in to intercept them from Norwegian, German, and Dutch bases. The number of varying elements in the interception of a bomber raid is legion. The skill of a telephone operator or a weather predictor, the servicing of a radar set or an aircraft engine flown by a squadron commander, can influence the entire local defense situation. There are, of course, official predictions of bomber

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penetration made by the military experts of all the major air powers of the world. But can they have any validity? Who can tell what standards of radio security the raiding bombers would have, how efficient the early-warning system would be, to what extent electronic devices such as jamming and other interference devices would confuse the defenses, whether false electronic pulses on the bombing cathode-ray tubes, supplied by an interfering signals organization, and fake radio traffic, fake oral weather reports, and other hostile devices could divert bombers or fighters and so make their operation ineffective? To be a passionate advocate of the bomber versus the defensive fighter or rocket or gun, or to entrench oneself in the opposite viewpoint, is to blink at a large number of variables and imponderables in future air warfare.

The techniques of both air-bombing and air-fighting were primitive in World War I and were not very highly developed between the two world wars. The largest single new factor that affected the air defense situation was the advent of radar in the 1930's. It can be said that, from then on, the efficiency of radar detection equipment, allied to the radio telephone, was the biggest single factor in the development of air defense weapons—searchlights, guns, and fighters. World War II air defense operations bore out this contention and, furthermore, saw the introduction of radio countermeasures, some use of jet and rocket fighters, and the experimental use of radio-guided missiles. The latter were successfully launched by the Luftwaffe for bombing purposes only. The two bombs were the Henschel 293 radio-guided wing bomb and the heavier rocket-type FX-1400, fitted with vanes. These two German radar bombs were used effectively in 1943 against British Atlantic surface vessels, American fighting ships off Salerno, and finally, with ironic success, against the Italian battle fleet when it was escaping from its German allies to the safer confines of Malta. Germany also produced a range of defensive radio-guided missiles but was never able to bring them into operation, largely because of Allied bombing. One or two of the experimental missiles, such as the HS-298 air-to-air projectile with a target range of about a mile and a half, and

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the Schmetterling (Butterfly), the ground-to-air missile with a planned operational ceiling of over 45,000 feet and an intended radius of action of from ten to fifteen miles, were very promising prototypes; they showed that the Luftwaffe was well ahead of the rest of the world in 1945 in developing the air defense weapons of the coming air age.

Although the use of jet and rocket fighters and guided missiles was not really developed in World War II, it is possible to draw from the air campaigns of 1939-1945 almost the full gamut of air defense lessons which would apply in the event of future air campaigns. Perhaps the greatest lesson is that it is futile to generalize about the effectiveness of air defense against bombing attack. British aircraft carriers were able to strike brilliant blows at the Italian fleet in Taranto in November 1940 because Italian Fiat and Macchi fighters were obsolescent and the early-warning system of the Italian Air Force was almost non-existent. (Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister of the time, noted in his diary that on the day of the raid aircraft defense was "scarce.") The vast American carrier force of 1945 could cock its snoot at the Mikado and operate relatively unmolested against the Japanese mainland because the Japanese air defense system was weak and its radar units patchy and ineffective. It may be important to add that the Japanese language, like other Asian tongues, is highly unsuited to radio telephone conversations, on which fighter tactics hinge. It is much easier to say things like "Roger" or "Angels 5" in cool Anglo-Saxon English than in the high-pitched squeak of Chinese, Japanese, or Korean. In this respect, the NATO or UN pilot has a permanent advantage over some of his Asian counterparts. The phonetic difficulty of Communist Chinese pilots talking to each other in the skies over the Yalu River was one reason why the power plants were badly defended in the last two years of the Korean War.

But these World War II air defense situations over Japan and over Italy were not at all relevant to the general problem. There were only two instances during the war of countries building up air defense to a degree of perfection which thoroughly tested the raiding bombers in a sustained air campaign. First, there was

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the defense of Great Britain, especially in the summer of 1940 and during the V-1 and V-2 attacks of 1944-1945; and then there was the German attempt to build an air defense system in Western Europe from 1941 to 1945. Neither the United States nor the USSR was ever faced with the threat of bombing power on any substantial scale. Japan's air defense was never better than second-rate. Her army and navy fighter squadrons were never fully coordinated; her radar and early-warning system were not good, although she used nearly all the modern devices—radar, radio telephone, and wireless, including a group of vessels, far out to sea, of a type which might usefully be incorporated into the modern American early-warning system. Italy put up only token air defense and the Germans neither encouraged the Italians to build a modern air defense system nor helped them, except on a small scale, with fighters and radar from their own factories.

Air defense in the Battle of Britain was crucial and paramount. The raiding Luftwaffe squadrons suffered heavy punishment but failed to achieve their objective, that of preparing for Operation Sea Lion, the German invasion plan. The Royal Air Force air defenses triumphed. And yet the main tactical air defense lessons of that vital air battle of the summer of 1940 are now largely obsolescent, because of the extraordinary progress in air weapons and equipment made in the fifteen years that have followed. In the first instance, the Battle of Britain did not involve any really heavy and heavily armed strategic bombers. The German Air Force bomber units of 1940 only operated twin-engined Dorniers, Junkers, and Heinkels of medium bomb-carrying capacity. And almost all the bombs and mines they carried weighed only a ton or less. Although the radius of action of the raiding bombers was sufficient to take them to any British target, the number of escorting fighters available to the Luftwaffe was inadequate. When the RAF took the initiative in 1941 and 1942 and carried the air battle back across the Channel into France, it soon found that three or four escorting fighters to each bomber to provide close escort, top cover, and rear support were necessary against strong German fighter defense backed by efficient radar, radio communications, and anti-aircraft fire. At no stage in the Battle

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of Britain could the Germans rely on this degree of fighter escort except for isolated small-scale raids. The Luftwaffe's serviceable strength in single-engined fighter units was in fact less than the serviceable strength of the German bomber units for most of the campaign, so that local fighter escort of even two fighters to one bomber was problematic. Moreover, Luftwaffe fighters could not escort German bombers at all to many of the vital target areas. Germany could not, for instance, operate any day bombers with safety against the important Rolls-Royce aero-engine plants in the center of Britain.

In the Battle of Britain, radar was used extensively for the first time. Here, clearly, was the key to modern air defense. With the advent of radar, it was possible to use fighters economically. It was no longer necessary to have standing patrols and the defending squadrons could now be concentrated at the key point of the air battle. With radar, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns could be used more effectively. Until then, they had involved an expensive effort for the results they achieved. Now they could engage raiders more easily and regularly. In 1940, the Germans had little or no operational experience in the use of radar, although they did have radar equipment. Had they been radar-conscious, they would probably have had the sense to fly their raiding bombers at a level below the height at which the British radar screen functioned. The whole outcome of the battle might have been different had they made this single tactical move. Radio countermeasures and the use of feints and deception were in their operational infancy in 1940. It was apparent in later campaigns between bombers and defensive fighters and guns how vital these electronic factors could be, especially in the 1943-1944 Anglo-American air attack on Germany and in the Luftwaffe attacks on Britain in the last year of the war.

In 1941 and 1942, when the Luftwaffe made its fighter bomber attacks in daylight at treetop height, British radar was much less effective than in the Battle of Britain. And in 1943, when the Germans began to use fast twin-engined fighter bombers like the Messerschmitt 410 and the FW-190 single-engined bomber for night attacks, and added jamming devices to the already difficult

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problem of intercepting a small number of high-speed low-flying raiders, British air defenses again found themselves severely stretched and faced with new problems. The small size of the visual break which appeared on the radar tube made height and speed and direction estimates very difficult. And when the Luftwaffe dropped the squares of metallized paper called "Window" in 1944, the defending radar operators were further confused. The British defenses reacted sharply to the new difficulties. Searchlights were made to illuminate their targets at all operational heights up to 25,000 feet, a height previously considered well beyond their reach. The Americans helped out by providing a new automatic fuse-setter and although the British Ground Control Indicator Stations were badly affected by German "Window," the radar control for searchlights and guns was frequently immune to its interference. The establishment of local operation rooms, each with its own complete plotting and early-warning system, with a compact radius of eighty miles, also improved the defense situation and there was more imaginative flexibility in the liaison between the RAF Fighter Command and the British Anti-Aircraft Command.

But the air defense of Great Britain from 1941 to 1944 did not provide a major test from which many contemporary tactical air lessons can be drawn. A local operations room with a radius of action of eighty miles would now have to deal with raiders flying at 600 or even 700 miles per hour and not 350-400 miles per hour, as in 1943 and 1944. The nature of radio countermeasures is more complicated and potent in the present air age. Bomber aircraft of the future will not simply drop strips of metallized paper, but will operate powerful airborne jamming stations and other electronic equipment designed to hamstring the use of radar and radio-guided defense weapons. The raiders will also use radio-guided bombs which can be launched at any given moment and many miles from the target area. The defenders must nowadays be ready to intercept a guided bomb as well as a manned or unmanned bomber aircraft.

The last year of World War II saw the emergence of a new defense weapon which temporarily tilted the balance more in

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favor of air defense and more especially in favor of anti-aircraft fire. The United States, which then had no serious air defense problem of its own, put its technical and productive resources at the disposal of Britain in the battle against the German robot flying-bomb and the more menacing V-2 long-range rocket. American factories produced the new radar proximity fuse based on research by the British firms of A.I.M. and Pye Radio. This fuse enabled the shell to explode automatically when it met the electronic pulse sent out by raiding planes or pilotless missiles. It therefore nearly always exploded within lethal distance of the raiders. It gave anti-aircraft gunnery a great boost and anti-aircraft gunners an optimistic impression of their own shooting abilities. The initial production problem was to make a small radio valve to go into the fuse which was robust enough to stand the recoil of the gun. The problem was solved and in the space of three months the entire British air defense situation was revolutionized. General Sir Frederick Pile, Chief of British A.A. Defense, reacted with enthusiasm to the new anti-aircraft successes and wrote of that phase of the defense campaign against the flying bomb, "It was quite obvious that already we were in sight of the complete defeat of any personal controlled aircraft," and he went on to say, "We learned more in eighty days [in 1945] than in the previous thirty years."[4]

The operational use of the radar proximity fuse in anti-aircraft defenses at the end of World War II certainly marked the beginning of a new phase in tactical air defense. But General Pile's optimism might have been more measured. There was another side to the picture, as Pile himself relates in his book. Flocks of birds and clouds which showed movements on the cathode-ray tube similar to those of incoming enemy aircraft sometimes set the trigger-happy gunners firing prematurely. And so the scientific genius of the proximity fuse was sometimes wasted on empty skies. Royal Air Force Chief Bomber Harris complained, too, that some were wasted on his bomber squadrons returning raggedly from their perilous raids over Germany. In reply to his complaint, General Pile pointed out that British bombers flew

[4] General Sir Frederick Pile, *Ack-Ack*, London, 1949, p. 340.

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over prohibited gun-defended areas and failed to fire the agreed recognition light signals. The recognition of friendly bombers is a permanent problem of modern air defense.

The battle of the flying bomb was, of course, directly relevant to future problems of air defense. Both Russia and the United States are today making flying bombs, and so air defenses everywhere in the world may be required to deal with them one day. As the Germans launched many hundreds of them from Heinkel bombers after the autumn of 1944, it is a reasonable prediction that Russia or the United States may also fire them from aircraft and that they will be more accurate and more menacing weapons than the German V-1 flying bomb. ("V" stands for the German word *Vergeltungswaffe,* meaning "revenge weapon.") In fact, the warhead of the V-1 housed only about a ton of high explosive. Its maximum speed was only about 360 miles per hour. It was not a guided missile. It kept to a constant course and height by means of a robot pilot. The height was awkward at first for anti-aircraft fire and the speed was slightly in excess of that of the British fighters of the day. But the V-1 could be caught by diving toward the bomb from a higher altitude, and the gunners were soon adjusted and the shells fused to match the V-1's flying habits. Defense against robot bombs will be much more difficult in the future and we cannot expect that only 20 to 25 per cent of the missiles launched will get through, as was the case in V-1 launchings against Britain and Belgium in the last year of World War II.

If the radar fuse had temporarily tilted the scale in favor of the gunners, the advent of the German long-range rocket as an operational weapon in September 1944 again changed the whole air defense situation. Sir Winston Churchill's first statement on the subject was made in the British House of Commons on November 10, 1944. It was laconic and uncommunicative. He said, "For the last few weeks the enemy has been using his new weapon, the long-range rocket, and a number have landed at widely scattered points." Behind this short statement may have been the announcement of the most revolutionary advance in modern air warfare. It would be idle to assess the military im-

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portance of the 4,300 German V-2 rockets fired between September 1944 and the end of World War II and take it as a criterion of the importance of future long-range rocket operations. The German V-2 rocket had a warhead of only one ton of HE explosive. It lacked accuracy. Even a large city like London was missed by nearly 40 per cent of the rockets fired at it across the English Channel. The V-2 burned eight and a half tons of expensive liquid oxygen and alcohol. It had an effective range of only about 250-300 miles. But the German V-2 set modern air defenses a problem which may never be solved. Here was a raiding target flying at over 3,500 miles an hour—that is, about five times the speed of sound. Even enthusiasts of air defense remain pessimistic about the possibilities of dealing with this new form of air warfare. Radar in 1945 was designed to detect and track aircraft flying at heights up to 30,000 feet. The 1945 German rockets flew at ten times this height. Since then, both Russia and the United States have developed special two-stage long-range rockets which can fly at more than twenty times this height. Meantime, although the maximum height detection of modern radar has increased, it does not seriously alter the basic situation. With efficient radar and intelligence, the defenses might have five or ten minutes' warning of some of the rocket launchings, but they would be unlikely to be able to follow the track on the radar screen for most of the time after launching, and even with an array of guided missiles, the defense problem against the rocket is enormous and perhaps insoluble.

Long-range rockets can now be put into large-scale production, with speeds in excess of 3,500 miles per hour, and probably over 4,500, with a range of at least 500-600 miles and an operational height of 100 miles. It is against such missiles that effective air defense methods have got to be revised. In the early months of 1945, British and American mathematical scientists did tens of thousands of sums predicting the point of fall of rockets and then calculated methods of firing at them so that shells and guided missiles could burst in their path before they reached their target. The optimists predicted that 10 per cent of the rockets would be blown up in the air and the pessimists said that

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only 3 per cent would be intercepted. Is there any reason for greater optimism in the present-day situation? Not really, for the scientists of 1945 were taking radar-guided anti-aircraft fire into account. A long-range rocket can be launched from a mobile tower put up on any piece of solid ground from fifty to seventy-five feet in diameter, and an atomic warhead long-range rocket is now a production reality. It is difficult to see how there can be any practical air defense against these except by large-scale attacks on the centers of production and assembly. Incidentally, mass-produced long-range rockets are much cheaper for many operations than bombers, when one takes the expense of crew-training, hangars, airfields, runways, and modern aircraft into account. They have come to stay in the battery of modern air weapons. They constitute an air force which is never grounded because of bad weather. They will gain in accuracy as some form of radio or automatic control for them is devised. They are, however, no substitute yet for the modern long-range bomber, which can strike at targets thousands of miles from the take-off point.

It is, of course, possible that modern defensive guided missiles will eventually be faster than modern long-range rockets, and the radio control of short-range defensive missiles will always be more accurate and reliable than long-range radio control. But it is difficult to see how an effective early-warning defense system can be built up against rocket launchings. Airborne radar can increase the detection height by perhaps ten to fifteen miles, but it cannot penetrate to the stratospheric heights at which the rocket travels. Guided missiles need early-warning help and defenders need to know the correct moment of launching. Although modern radar can detect meteorites, it cannot yet provide accurate information on the height, speed, and direction of stratospheric long-range rockets, and without such information the guided defensive missile will always be handicapped.

There is one form of simple defense against rockets which may yet prove to be the most effective and most economical. This is by intruder operations—the offensive use of fighters and perhaps fighter bombers to fly over enemy territory and do every-

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thing possible to reduce the scale of rocket or bomber attack. In World War II, the value of intruder operations was constantly underestimated by both sides. The Germans formed the first intruder fighter unit by refitting a squadron or two of bombers with a new nose, supplying the aircraft with 20 mm. cannon, and attaching them to a formation of night fighters for training. They were then sent on a nightly prowl over southern England in the winter of 1940-1941 to see what nuisance they could create by attacking balloon barrages and bombers taking off from or returning to airfields. Considering the small number of planes used, they quickly proved their worth. Before long, they were transferred to Sicily, and they continued their intruder operations successfully against Malta in the spring of 1941. But the results achieved were seldom apparent to the Germans, and in particular to Hitler. Dislocation and reduction of bomber effort achieved by this method is difficult to measure at the time. Hitler intervened personally and the German intruder unit was diverted to routine convoy escort duties and reconnaissance work in the Mediterranean. By 1942, it was defunct as a regular fighter intruder unit.

In the winter of 1944, German plans for the use of intruders were revived as part of a major policy to keep down the scale of attack of British night bombers over Germany. But like most German air plans at this time, the large-scale intruder operations were watered down to one or two moderate operations. These showed clearly, however, that intruders could cause major dislocation to a night bomber effort. The Royal Air Force also operated a small number of intruder fighters over France and the Low Countries, but here again the extent of the dislocation to the German bomber effort was not apparent at the time. Indeed, the intruder aircraft were not really tried out until the scale of German bomber attack against Great Britain had greatly declined, following the heavy raids of the winter of 1940-1941. The Royal Air Force made no use of intruder tactics against V-1 or V-2 launchings either by day or by night. It would have been of great tactical interest to have seen how far round-the-clock intruder work would have reduced the scale of these launchings.

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Obviously, the pilot chosen for intruder work of this kind must be in the top flight and there must be first-rate up-to-date intelligence about the launching sites to be attacked. Ordinary bombing must inevitably be intermittent. Round-the-clock bombing, as it is called, means bombing by day and night, not attacking from hour to hour. A strong force of intruder fighters, however, timing and planning their work closely with bomber reconnaissance operations and special intelligence, might achieve much to reduce the scale of enemy rocket launchings. Air-launched rockets and those fired from submarines would, of course, be immune to intruder operations. But the bulk of military rockets are likely to be fired from terra firma in the foreseeable future.

The future scale of attack by long-range rockets from ocean-going submarines is very difficult to anticipate. Clearly, the main job of the submarine must always be to attack merchant ships or naval surface vessels. But the Russians have been carrying out firing trials of large rockets from submarines training in the Eastern Baltic for the last two or three years. Quite clearly, it might be easier for a Soviet submarine to penetrate New York or San Francisco harbor than for a Soviet long-range bomber to cross the heavily defended air approaches to these targets. And in the same way, American submarines might be able to attack factories in coastal towns like Riga and Leningrad, which make electronic equipment, much more easily than B-47 or B-52 bombers, which would be hunted hard by Soviet jet and rocket fighters, as well as by guided missiles, especially during the last half-hour of the journey to the target area.

It seems, therefore, that some new form of coastal air defense is required to complete the national defense pattern of the future. The British have already designed a plane, the Seamew, which fits these needs, and the modern helicopter in this special anti-submarine role may well be vital. The helicopter or plane could operate against rocket-firing submarines when airfields under atomic air attack were out of commission. Quite clearly, flying boats would also be invaluable in this anti-submarine air defense role, especially as they can now take off and land in fairly rough water. It is of interest, therefore, that both British and American

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aviation have recently restored the flying boat to favor. In the first jet decade after World War II, there was little or no production of flying boats. But now the United States has ordered series production of the four-jet Tradewind and the British Overseas Airways Corporation has ordered a few six-jet Princess flying boats. This belated engagement of flying boat production may reap useful dividends when the atomic-powered aircraft engine is perfected in the next year or so. The problem of shielding the air crew from the effect of the gamma rays given off by nuclear reaction is probably easier to solve in the more spacious interior of a flying boat than in the restricted quarters of land-based planes.

The battle against submarines would be the focal point of any future world struggle between the East and the West. America is committed to the strategy of operating overseas and so to fetching and carrying in ships. Transport aircraft are no substitute for shipping or, indeed, rail and road transport. The air protection of ships and the air attack on submarines would be at least as important as the strategic attack on the enemy and the strategic defense against the enemy. To what extent the enemy could switch his submarine from attacks on surface ships to long-range rocket attacks in a future struggle must be a matter of military conjecture. How well the American navy and air force could divert anti-submarine air forces from attack in ocean operations to defensive coastal work against submarine-launched rockets is equally problematic. No doubt the American National Security Council is aware of this defense difficulty and will eventually establish a satisfactory rationale for air and civil defense programs.

Helicopters have another important role to play in the American civil defense sphere. Within a year or so, the United States will be wide open to Soviet air atomic attack, for no modern system of air warning and air interception can deal completely with modern attacking bombers and rocket missiles. In the event of war, road and rail transport might well be out of action for long periods and the wounded would have to be moved to hospitals. Civil defense must develop its own helicopter arm. Middle-

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aged pilots of World War II whose skills are in mothballs must be persuaded to be weekend helicopter pilots. The business of war is both killing and saving lives and a civil defense helicopter arm would make American hospital services more pertinent under the devastation of atomic or hydrogen bomb attack.

But the pattern of attack and defense is always changing in aviation and much depends on what local resources can be spared to do the job in hand. Sometimes it is lack of numbers and resources more than anything else which decides the battle for air superiority and not strategy, tactics, or the state of air weapons. When the RAF first attacked Germany in 1939, the force it used was so small that it scarcely deserved the label of a Bomber Command. Until 1942, the raiding forces from Britain were quite unsubstantial and the German air defenses were not really tested. The Royal Air Force had less than fifty four-engined bombers available and the United States Flying Fortresses were not yet in the field. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Luftwaffe was overconfident and even lackadaisical about exploiting all the various aspects of modern air defense. The German Air Force was built and briefed to attack, not to defend. It was slow to develop the use of night fighters and relied at first on anti-aircraft fire as a major barrier to night and day bombing. Its early-warning system and outer fringe of some three hundred Messerschmitt 109's and 110's were more than adequate to defend Germany from the lightweight attacks of air forces in the west.

But from 1942 onward, Germany had a full-scale defensive commitment in Europe and encountered problems similar to those which the Soviet Union may encounter, because the USSR also has to defend a large part of Europe from air attack. The radar and early-warning system was patchy. In Holland and western Germany it was efficient and effective. But in Denmark, Norway (where the hilly terrain makes the use of radar difficult), Romania, East Prussia, and Poland, the air defense system was looser and took time to perfect. The standards of radar operators were often inadequate, which explains why Anglo-American attacks from southern Europe or feints via the Baltic frequently

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suffered less from German fighters and anti-aircraft fire. Both the United States and the USSR have the similar problem of defending a large land mass. Dilution of standards and dilution of effort are inevitable. Up to 1942, Germany was able to use 10,000 anti-aircraft guns equipped with radar and manned by first-class crews to defend west and northwest Germany. Thereafter, some of the guns had to be dispersed to eastern Germany, Austria, and the Balkans to defend the Greater Reich from a round-the-clock assault which might come from almost any point of the compass. Unskilled factory hands, prisoners of war, youthful non-technical Nazi fanatics were all impounded into the general air defense scheme of Germany. This dilution of standards and dispersal of resources must remain one of the great air defense headaches today of both the USSR and the United States. In which areas would the elite guards—Mig 15 and Mig 17 jet units—be operated? Near Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Baku, or Sverdlovsk? And what about the metropolitan air defenses of China? How much of the Soviet air effort would be diverted to this aim and to what purpose? Even the concentrated Communist attempt to defend the power plants near the Yalu River failed ignominiously for nearly two years of the Korean War.

It was the year 1943 which perhaps provided the most interesting duel in tactics and guile between attacking bombers and defending fighters over Germany. Strategically, the situation was interesting, too, for in that year over 60 per cent of Germany's anti-aircraft guns, over 70 per cent of her anti-aircraft personnel, and a quarter of the total operational strength of the Luftwaffe were pinned down in strategic defense, when much of this was urgently required to support the German armies in Africa, Sicily, Italy, the Ukraine, and White Russia. This strategic lesson remains. The Red Army must also give up some of its close air support and artillery support in the field, if the air defenses of the USSR and its satellites are to be adequate. Russia will have to make fewer Tupolev and Ilyushin twin-jet tactical fighter bombers, so that there are enough Mig and Yak jet and rocket fighters to man the enormous Communist air defense area.

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At the tactical level, many air lessons from the 1943 air battles over Germany have survived. To listen to radio telephone conversations, to transmit and obey accurate instructions, is the basis of fighter control. But the enemy can monitor this traffic, analyze it, and even falsify it by sending out a rival version of the words on the same frequency. All this was true in 1943 and is still true more than a decade later. So long as fighters have to talk to a ground control, the code language they use can be only thinly disguised. This means that radio telephone traffic in war will nearly always be subject to radio countermeasures. Its efficiency as a form of ground control of fighters is quite unpredictable therefore. The jamming of German ground-control stations, radar-sighted guns, and airborne radar for interception by raiding British bombers in July 1943 also marked a vital dateline in the assessment of the efficiency of modern air defense weapons. Interference by "Window" had an immediate effect on the efficiency of German air defenses, which were at a high pitch at that time. The radar-controlled searchlights sometimes waved helplessly in all directions, gunfire was inaccurate, and German ground-control stations could not help German night fighters as much as they wished. The losses of the British raiders dropped, and the whole system of air defense which the Germans had built up so methodically was thrown into confusion. However, the Luftwaffe reacted with energy and promptness. More single-engined fighters were thrown into the battle, fighters were used to drop flares over and near the target and along the bombers' route, running commentaries were broadcast to the fighters, giving the height, direction, and location of the incoming bomber stream. The British replied by jamming the commentaries of the German controllers and giving false landing instructions and weather reports to the German fighters. All this shook the confidence of the German air crews and frequently made enemy controllers lose both temper and efficiency. So long as defending fighters use the radio telephone for air-to-ground communication, they must expect this kind of interference with their voice traffic.

The situation in daylight bombing over Germany was, of course, less complicated, especially in clear weather. Then radio

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countermeasures and electronics played a smaller role. The long-range escort fighter was the key to the defense situation. But the 1943 operations against Augsburg, Regensburg, etc., showed that unescorted deep penetration raids in conditions of good visibility and in daylight are always likely to be costly affairs for the unescorted raiding bombers of the future. The B-29 raids against Japan are no criterion of probable future air defense in daylight. The B-17 raids against Germany in 1943 were. Until there were abundant long-range Lightnings, Mustangs, and Thunderbolts to protect the raiding B-17's (i.e., into the spring of 1944), the continuance of the American daylight bombing of Germany was in the balance. Indeed, had the Luftwaffe stepped up its fighter production sooner—for instance, in 1941, when it had to fight a three-front air war in the west, the east, and the Mediterranean—the daylight air battle of Germany might have ended in victory for the defenders. This would certainly have happened if the production of the twin-jet Messerschmitt 262 had been started earlier, as it could have been. This jet fighter was only available in small numbers even at the end of the war. But even then the 30 mm. guns and top speed of only 500 miles per hour caused dismay in the ranks of both British and American raiders in 1944 and 1945. The rocket fighters of the Luftwaffe were also underdeveloped, and although the Me-163 rocket squadrons were operational for nearly a year, they rarely achieved success. The Me-163 was formidable in performance, but even more formidable to fly with any degree of safety. It had a top speed of 550 miles per hour and could climb to 30,000 feet in just over two and a half minutes. But it needed long unbombed runways and elite pilots to operate freely, and these were not available to the Luftwaffe in the last year of the war.

At the same time that the Luftwaffe formed jet and rocket fighter squadrons in 1944, it also made an attempt to develop push-button air defense in the form of some radio-guided missiles launched either from the ground or from aircraft. There were the Schmetterling (Butterfly) and Wasserfall (Waterfall), both ground-launched, and the air-to-air HS-298. Then there were the Rheintochter, Feuerlilie, and X-4, all experimental radio-

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controlled missiles. But despite the Luftwaffe's operational experience with radio-guided bombs like the HS-292 and the FX-1400, the guiding system it devised did not function satisfactorily, and it had to resort to other stopgap devices, such as the building of a radar-guided piloted rocket fighter, the Bachem Natter (Viper), which took off vertically, required no runway, housed more than thirty rockets in the nose, climbed above 35,000 feet per minute, and had a top speed of over 600 miles per hour. This rocket fighter never came into Luftwaffe squadrons and killed many pilots in the testing stage.

In fact, neither over Germany nor over Britain was air defense able to use the latest defense weapons in large numbers. World War II ended with no large-scale use of jet fighters, rocket fighters, or guided missiles to help the defenders, and so the best tactical use of these current and future weapons is still a matter to be learned about. Although experience in the large-scale use of jet fighters was obtained over Korea, the standard of Communist pilots' tactics was inadequate and their use of radio control and air-to-ground communications was not up to the standard to be expected from the main Soviet air defenses. Moreover, the United Nations were able to escort their bombers to all the Korean targets. This situation would not exist in the case of most bombing raids against United States or USSR metropolitan targets.

What then is the new position in air defense in an age of supersonic weapons of mass destruction, delivered by aircraft of ever-improving performance and rockets of ever-increasing range? It is first and foremost that the defense can ill afford to make mistakes. To allow a small diversionary raid or a single armed reconnaissance plane to get through was only a minor miscalculation in World War II. In a third world war of hydrogen and atomic explosives, which both America and Russia now possess, it could mean a major catastrophe. One bomb made in this decade can have the effect of several thousand of the bomb loads of the B-29's which operated against Japan. In World War II, it was reckoned that if any air defense system could inflict average losses in excess of 5 per cent of the attacking bomber force, the air campaign would be slowed up. And in the face of a repeated

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loss of 10 per cent, a bomber force could not be kept up to effective strength. This was due to the difficulties of crew and aircraft replacements. But nowadays a figure of 5 to 10 per cent attrition is too low a target for an air defense system to aim at. With mass destruction weapons, tremendous damage and casualties can be inflicted in all too short a time. If air defense is going to neutralize nuclear and hydrogen weapons before they achieve decisive results, then it must inflict even more than 25 per cent casualties on the raiders in certain operations. Can this be done? It seems doubtful. The advent of jet bombers is not the main factor, despite their high speeds and high-altitude performance. Jet and especially rocket defensive fighters should be able to outspeed them and intercept them with the help of a good early-warning system. British radio-guided missiles with speeds of over 2,000 miles per hour were announced by the British Minister of Supply in 1953, and there are, no doubt, American and Soviet missiles of a similar breed. These are more than a tactical match for raiding bombers and fighter bombers. But will there ever be enough of them, expertly handled and free from radio interference, to defend effectively a whole country? This must seriously be doubted. Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Supply, said with great confidence in August 1953 that no piloted aircraft could hope to outmaneuver radio-controlled defensive rockets of the above kind. Their guidance mechanism is locked automatically onto the enemy and they change course as the enemy changes. But initially the rockets must depend on radar for early warning and sometimes for initial launching. Radar can be jammed and so interfered with, and this is the vulnerability of the guided missile, quite apart from the technical difficulties of servicing it and operating it smoothly.

The early-warning system of this air age has to be speeded up greatly, because the time given to it to operate is now tremendously foreshortened. Even in 1953, fighter bomber raiders carrying atomic bombs were capable of over 650 miles per hour. By 1960, this speed will probably be 1,000 miles per hour. And then there are the guided rockets with a speed of 4,000 miles per hour, and perhaps even faster, launched from land-based ramps, submarines, and aircraft flying faster than sound. Defense reaction

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must be truly split-second and operate at maximum efficiency in its five basic functions: getting information on the enemy; transmitting it to the defense echelon; taking the necessary action; putting it in a form to help quick decisions to be made; and, finally, allocating, operating, and controlling the air defense weapons against the threat of the attack. The present system of plotting incoming aircraft by hand and using the human voice on the telephone means an unacceptable loss of time and inevitable human confusion and inadequacy. An electronic means of collecting and transmitting data and information throughout the entire air defense system must be devised. There is a vital need for an electronic brain to be brought into the modern air defense system.

Can this be done, and even if it is achieved, can it solve the problems of air defense? It seems as though modern air defense will probably always be vulnerable to the long-range rocket and to a high-speed low-altitude bomber which can discharge a rocket-powered wing missile which has automatic navigation. According to the Royal Air Force *Flying Review* of July 1953, such a weapon is being developed which is not subject to radar interference and jamming and which can be released so that it automatically sets course accurately for the target. But, on the other hand, air defense has a number of important non-military weapons which are not to be despised. These are the dispersal of industry and the building of factories and defense installations underground, the inspiring of resilience and patriotism in a people whose morale even stiffens under heavy bombing.

Despite the gloomy picture, we can take comfort from the limits which national economies may impose. Atomic and hydrogen bombs, large rockets, guided bombs, and modern aircraft are expensive brutes. The days of the thousand-bomber raids are over. Budgets for strategic bombing are not limitless either in Moscow or in Washington. Both sides must build transport aircraft, reconnaissance planes, and tanks and guns and trucks. It is said that in the vital business of defense, countries must not cheese-pare. In fact, they always have to, for there will nearly always be too few weapons doing too many jobs in modern war.

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# CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

By ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN

## III. Conditions and Prospects for Economic Growth

In general terms, by the end of 1952, mainland China's productive capacity was reactivated and its institutional framework transformed to such an extent that the regime felt the time was ripe for launching an ambitious and comprehensive program of economic development. However, the announcement of a Five-Year Plan for China does not seem to have been preceded by a major debate on issues, methods, and problems of industrialization such as occurred in Russia in the 1920's. It would appear that Chinese Communist thinking and policy, as it has emerged, is almost completely hypnotized by the Stalinist model of economic development, with Preobrazhenskis and Bukharins absent from the scene.[1]

Proceeding on this basis, the regime envisages a development focused on the rapid expansion of producers' goods and defense industries. This is to be accompanied by a more modest rate of growth in the manufacture of textiles needed for barter with the countryside. Agriculture is to be developed primarily through better organization, rather than through capital investment; specifically, this is to be based upon creation of capital by underemployed labor in mass water conservation and other labor intensive projects. Finally, this process of industrialization is to be financed, at least in part, through net resource transfers out of agriculture. In order to make sure of this, the peasantry is to be gradually collectivized, but in such a way as not to disrupt output

* Parts I and II of this article appeared in the October 1954 issue of *World Politics*; the concluding section will appear in April 1955.

[1] For an excellent analysis of the Soviet industrialization debate, see Alexander Erlich, "Preobrazhenski and the Economics of Soviet Industrialization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXIV (February 1950), pp. 57-88.

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drastically or damage farm capital. Thus, in this respect, Chinese Communist leaders would like to avoid the costly Soviet, one-sweep collectivization experience.

The financing of industrialization through net resource transfers out of agriculture has, of course, been a feature of economic development in many countries, even though in a much less extreme and deliberate form than in the Soviet case. Perhaps the most notable of these, from the Chinese point of view, is the Japanese experience. However, Japan's evolution differs from the Sino-Soviet model in several respects. At the very outset, the Japanese placed great emphasis upon agricultural development. This was attained chiefly through the introduction of Western technology, but most especially through large applications of imported fertilizer.[2] By all indications, Chinese Communist policy-makers are not prepared to sacrifice imports of industrial capital for agricultural requisites, with the possible exception of some imports of seed and livestock for breeding, which absorb only a small share of export proceeds. The impact of these improvements is, however, generally much slower and less dramatic than is the case with commercial fertilizer.

In essence, this is a model which involves industrial development at the expense of agricultural development. Industrialization is accelerated at the outset, by virtue of the very fact that since agriculture is kept on a short investment ration, a larger share of investment resources can be concentrated in industry. This policy, in turn, sets up its own vicious circles; just because agricultural development is sluggish, while the demand for farm products grows—owing to an increasing population, urbanization, and exports—the regime is forced to extract a rising proportion of farm output if this demand is to be met. This very process, however, further interferes with agricultural development, so that the screw must be applied even tighter. Under such circumstances, farm output is sacrificed for control and strong compulsions are set in force which drive the system toward collectivization.

[2] Bruce F. Johnston, "Agricultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan," *Journal of Political Economy*, LIX (1951), pp. 498-513.

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Thus, given their economic objectives and the nature of their program, the Chinese Communists are caught in a series of dilemmas, of which the agricultural problem is the most fundamental. These dilemmas, and the ways in which they are likely to affect the character and rate of economic growth within the confines of mainland China's economy, will be analyzed below. However, before proceeding on this path, it may be well to examine where the Chinese economy stands today in relation to Japan, the Soviet Union, and India.

### A. MAINLAND CHINA'S STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT ON THE EVE OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The Chinese Communist economy of 1952 was at a stage of development roughly comparable to Meiji Japan and present-day India. On the other hand, it was much more underdeveloped than the Soviet economy was on the eve of its first Five-Year Plan in 1928.

The data in Table 7 show that the Soviet Union embarked upon its drive for industrialization in a much more favorable economic setting than that which confronted the policy-makers of present-day China. Low density per unit of cultivated land and vast and high-quality mineral resources were all factors that facilitated the "take-off." As a result, starting from an aggregate economic and industrial base which in 1928 was not appreciably above that of China today, it was possible to treble Soviet gross national product in twenty-five years.

Over and above this, the Soviet Union launched its program of deliberate industrialization in a much more favorable international setting. The Soviet Union could devote from ten to twelve years of undivided effort to building up its industrial and military potential without involving itself in Korea-like interruptions which would have drained resources away from internal construction and investment. Furthermore, strategic trade controls were absent from the interwar landscape, so that the Soviet Union could import capital goods, technology, know-how, etc., from the West without any restrictions. However, this was counterbalanced by the fact that the Soviet Union was politically

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# TABLE 7

## INDICATORS OF COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, JAPAN, AND INDIA*

| | | USSR | | | | JAPAN | | | | INDIA | | CHINA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Approximately 1928* | | *Approximately 1950* | | *Meiji* | | *1930's* | | | | | |
| | *Units* | *Amount* | *Year* | *Amount* | *Year* | *Amount* | *Year* | *Amount* | *Year* | *Amount* | *Year* | *Amount* | *Year* |
| *Gross national product* | Billions of 1952 US dollars | $ 35.00 | 1928 | $100.00[a] | 1952 | $ 2.20 | 1878–82 | $ 22.60[c] | 1936 | $ 22.00 | 1950 | $ 30.00 | 1952 |
| *GNP per head*[b] | 1952 US dollars | $ 240.00 | 1928 | $490.00 | 1952 | $65.00 | 1878–82 | $ 325.00 | 1936 | $ 60.00 | 1950 | $ 50.00 | 1952 |
| *Population* | Millions | 147.00 | 1926 | 198.00 | 1950 | 35.56 | 1875 | 69.25[f] | 1935 | 358.00 | 1950 | 582.00 | 1953 |
| Crude birth rate | per 1,000 | 43.50[d] | 1926 | 25.00 to 34.00 | 1950–51 | 39.00[e] | 1885 | 31.20 | 1931–37 | 38.00[g] | 1949 | 40.00 | 1930–35 |
| Crude death rate | per 1,000 | 19.90[d] | 1926 | 10.00 to 16.00 | 1950–51 | 32.00[e] | | 17.90 | 1931–37 | 24.00[g] | 1949 | 34.00 | 1930–35 |
| Proportion in agriculture and fishing | per 1,000 | 76.50[h] | 1926 | 49.00 to 53.00[i] | 1950 | 84.80 | 1872 | 42.10[k] | 1940 | 68.00[l] | 1931 | 80.00 | 1952 |
| *Agriculture* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of persons dependent on agriculture per acre of cultivated land | Persons per acre | 0.20 | 1926 | 0.20 | 1950 | 2.00 | 1872 | 1.60 | 1936–40 | 0.60 | 1931 | 1.90 | 1953 |
| Paddy rice yield | Metric quintals per hectare | 21.50 | 1934–38 | | | 21.60 | 1880–84 | 36.30 | 1934–38 | 13.30 | 1934–38 | 25.30 | 1931–37 |
| Wheat yield | Metric quintals per hectare | 7.90 | 1934–38 | | | | | 18.80 | 1934–38 | 6.80 | 1937–39 | 10.80 | 1931–37 |
| *Industry* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coal | Total in million metric tons | 40.10 | 1929 | 281.00 | 1951 | 0.60 | 1875 | 41.80 | 1936 | 34.90 | 1951 | 53.00 | 1952 |
| | Kilograms per capita | 273.00 | 1929 | 1,419.00 | 1951 | 17.00 | 1875 | 604.00 | 1936 | 97.00 | 1951 | 96.00 | 1952 |
| Pig iron | Total in million metric tons | 3.30 | 1927–28 | 19.40 | 1950 | 0.01 | 1877 | 2.00 | 1936 | 1.90 | 1951 | 1.60 | 1952 |
| | Kilograms per capita | 22.00 | 1927–28 | 98.00 | 1950 | 0.20 | 1877 | 29.00 | 1936 | 5.00 | 1951 | 2.75 | 1952 |
| Crude steel | Total in million metric tons | 4.30 | 1927–28 | 24.80 | 1950 | none | | | | 1.50 | 1951 | 1.20 | 1952 |
| | Kilograms per capita | 29.00 | 1927–28 | 125.00 | 1950 | none | | | | 4.00 | 1951 | 2.00 | 1952 |
| Finished steel | Total in million metric tons | | | | | none | | 4.50 | 1936 | | | 0.70 | 1952 |
| | Kilograms per capita | | | | | none | | 66.00 | 1936 | | | 1.00 | 1952 |
| Generating capacity of electric power | Total in thousand kilowatts | 1,900.00 | 1928 | 16,000.00 | 1949 | none | | 6,777.00 | 1936 | 2,409.00 | 1951 | 2,850.00 | 1952 |
| | Kilowatts per capita | 0.01 | 1928 | 0.08 | 1949 | none | | 0.10 | 1936 | 0.01 | 1951 | 0.005 | 1952 |
| Cotton spindleage in industry | Total in thousands | 7,465.00 | 1929 | 10,000.00 | 1949 | 8.00 | 1877 | 11,823.00 | 1936 | 10,144.00 | 1952 | 5,000.00 | 1952 |
| | Units per capita | 0.05 | 1929 | 0.05 | 1949 | negligible | | 0.17 | 1936 | 0.03 | 1952 | 0.01 | 1952 |
| Cement | Total in million metric tons | 1.90 | 1928 | 19.40 | 1950 | negligible | | 4.30 | 1929 | 3.20 | 1951 | 2.30 | 1952 |
| | Kilograms per capita | 13.00 | 1928 | 98.00 | 1950 | negligible | | 63.00 | 1929 | 9.00 | 1951 | 4.00 | 1952 |

* Compiled by the author.

[a] 1950 GNP was $87 billions, or $440 per head.

[b] To nearest $5.

[c] 1938 GNP was $24.6 billions, or $355 per head.

[d] European Russia.

[e] Not official statistics, but based on the interpretation of Irene B. Taeuber and Frank W. Notestein, "The Changing Fertility of the Japanese," *Population Studies*, I, No. 1, pp. 1-28.

[f] Official statistics (implying some understatement of both).

[g] Estimated from the official returns by applying the Kingsley Davis figures; estimates by Davis for 1931-41 are 45 per 1,000 birth rate and 31.2 per 1,000 death rate. See his book, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton, 1951.

[h] Distribution of the male labor force. The figure is 77.6% for the distribution of the population and 81.8% for the distribution of the total labor force.

[i] Distribution of the male labor force. The figure is 53-57% for the 1950 distribution of the total labor force. It was 53.8% for 1939.

[j] Distribution of the total occupied population, including females. Some estimates place the 1872 percentage at 77.1%.

[k] Distribution of the total occupied population, including females. The 1936 figure for the occupied population, excluding women in agriculture, is 30.1%.

[l] Distribution of the total population.

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isolated, and had no Communist partner to "lean on." Obviously, this is not the case with China. How concrete a role the Soviet Union is likely to play in mainland China's economic development is left to a later stage of this analysis.

In contrast to the Soviet case, the Japanese experience is much more encouraging from a Chinese Communist point of view. In terms of all major indicators, Meiji Japan was at about the same level or lagged behind present-day China. Thus Japanese per capita product, degree of population pressure, and birth and death rates were just about the same as in China. On the other hand, Japan possessed practically no factory industry and a much poorer mineral resource base. However, Meiji Japan, to an even greater extent than the Soviet Union, launched its "take-off" in a favorable international climate. The world economy was expanding, the volume of international trade was increasing, and the impediments to trade were minimal as compared with the post-World War II era. In this setting, it was relatively easy for Japan to find foreign markets for its products and thus earn foreign exchange with which to import the technology and wherewithal of economic development. As a matter of fact, given the paucity of natural resources, foreign trade was absolutely central and vital to Japan's economic growth. This is probably less the case for China; therefore, export marketing difficulties and trade restrictions may slow down, but will not necessarily frustrate, economic growth in China.

Despite the quite backward state of Meiji Japan's economy, and its poor resource base, gross national product was raised roughly tenfold in about sixty years, between 1880 and 1940.[3] Were Communist China's economy to grow at about the same rate, its gross national product would attain the 1952 level around 1980, while the 1952 US level would be reached around 2010. Of course, on a per capita basis, China's output would still lag behind current US levels. On the other hand, should China grow at the Soviet rate (though this seems most unlikely),

[3] Shigeto Tsuru and Kazushi Ohkawa, "Long-term Changes in the National Product of Japan since 1878," *Income and Wealth*, Series III, Cambridge, Eng., 1953, pp. 19-44; Yuzo Yamada and Associates, *Notes on the Income Growth and the Rate of Saving in Japan*, Mimeo. 19, Tokyo, 1953, p. 1.

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current Soviet gross product levels would be attained around 1970, while US output would be approached around 1990.

Several references have been made above to the comparative resource endowments of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. The following data may serve to illustrate these differences:[4]

| | Mainland China | Soviet Union | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coal reserves (millions of MT) | 265,000 | 1,200,000 | 16,218 |
| Iron ore reserves (millions of MT) | 2,504 | 10,900 | 38 |

China is particularly well endowed with coal and non-ferrous metals, but is comparatively poor in iron ore and petroleum. However, quantitative resource limitations do not present a serious problem at this stage; much more immediate and pressing are the questions of accessibility and quality. Thus, many of the deposits are not reached either by inland water or by railroad transport. At the same time, while aggregate coal reserves are abundant, China is quite short of coking coal, and much of this coal is of inferior quality. Similarly, most of the known iron ore deposits are low in iron content; the principal exceptions to this are the Tayeh mines near Hankow, where one of the new steel mills is to be located, and the high-quality ore of Hainan Island. The latter, owing to its strategically vulnerable location, is apparently not fully exploited at present.

The bulk of the Manchurian ore deposits are lean, with an iron content of less than 40 per cent, so that they have to be concentrated before they can be charged into a blast furnace. Moreover, rich ores are found to occur in veins or dikes and to involve underground mining methods, whereas the lean ores are massive and can be mined by surface and open-cut equipment.[5] All of this, of course, raises investment and current operating costs in the iron and steel industry.

Probably the two most critical bottlenecks and immediately limiting factors in mainland China's economic development are

[4] *China Yearbook, 1948*, Nanking, 1948; United Nations, *World Iron Ore Resources and Their Utilization*, New York, 1950; W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, New York, 1953.

[5] Edwin W. Pauley, *Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States*, July 1946, p. 98.

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power and transport. While China's current generating capacity exceeds that of the Soviet Union in 1928, this capacity is taxed to the limit. On the other hand, transport is an even more critical factor than it was in the Soviet Union on the eve of the first Five-Year Plan, since the density of the Russian rail network was almost twice as great as that of China today. This is of particular importance, since the Chinese rural economy is much less commercialized and more fragmented than was Russia's in 1928. Given China's geographic configuration, she is just as dependent as Russia upon inland railroad transport, while Japan, with her comparatively small inland distances, could rely to a much greater extent upon a more economical form of transport, namely, coastal shipping.

The Chinese Communists have recognized their dependence on inland transport and have devoted a great deal of attention to railroad rehabilitation and development, and they plan to continue this effort in the future. However, while transport is an absolutely essential prerequisite of economic growth in the long run, it draws away resources from industrial investment despite the lavish substitution of labor for capital and thus slows down the process of industrial expansion in the short run. For this reason, the Soviets confined railroad development to rather modest proportions. Obviously, the Chinese cannot afford to do this. The dilemma is aggravated by the fact that the new regime seems to have embarked upon an extensive, rather than intensive, type of railroad development; that is, primary emphasis is placed upon the construction of a railroad line that will eventually run from Chungking to Tihua in Sinkiang, and then connect up with the Trans-Siberian, thus linking West China simultaneously with the Soviet Union and with the rest of China. However, most of this railroad will run through underdeveloped dead space which might eventually be developed, but which can have only long-run economic significance.[6] From a purely developmental point of view, it would have been more logical to extend

[6] The first portion of this railroad, running from Chungking to Chengtu, is an exception inasmuch as it links the Szechuan rice basin to the rest of the country. Generally, the reasons for concentrating on this western line are probably primarily strategic and political, designed to bring these remote areas under closer control by the center.

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this network in South China and build feeder lines in other regions of population concentration so as to tap more effectively agricultural resources and output.

This brief review of some of the salient factors facilitating or impeding the "take-off" in China as compared with the Soviet Union and Japan would not be complete without a consideration of China's population dynamics. The data in Table 7 show that population pressure in China is close to the level of Meiji Japan, and exceeds that of modern Japan, India, and the Soviet Union. Thus, mainland China's preponderantly rural population is pressed down close to the bare margin of subsistence, with very little room left for saving and capital formation. However, on the basis of the available evidence—most of it poor and incomplete—rates of natural increase have been low in China.

Chinese birth, death, and infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world.[7] They exhibit characteristics typical of countries in which population movements are close to the biological limit and in which the Malthusian checks are still more or less fully operative. They also show very large annual fluctuations, in response to famines, floods, epidemics, and civil war.

The character of this whole population dynamics is bound to change with the advent of the Chinese Communist regime. Under this regime, all of mainland China has been administratively unified and more or less pacified, for the first time in decades. Injection of a centralized authority, with its tentacles of control extending down to the village level, and maintenance of political stability as a prerequisite for survival of the regime are factors which are likely to have a direct or indirect impact upon the death rate.

The very termination of civil conflict must have had the most immediate effect upon the death rate. Administrative unity combined with rehabilitation of transport has extended the scope of food distribution so that local famines can be kept within narrower bounds than heretofore. Moreover, the Chinese Communist regime has devoted a great deal of attention to flood con-

[7] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1952, pp. 224-31 and 264-69; Woytinsky and Woytinsky, *op.cit.*, Tables 63, 82, and 86.

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trol, which, to the extent that it proves successful, is likely to contribute to famine control. This may be counterbalanced to some extent by rising rates of extraction from agriculture and increasing TB rates occasioned by harder work, long meetings, and long hours for the urban labor force.

The very character of the regime, its goals, and its commitments to the effective and comprehensive control of all segments of the population, to military prowess, and to industrialization compel it to institute a public health program of some dimensions. Under conditions such as prevail in China, even primitive, rudimentary, and inexpensive measures can go far in checking epidemics and disease. Thus, the regime embarked on a series of nation-wide campaigns for cleanliness and disease control, while the anti-American, bacterial warfare hoax has been effectively utilized to propagate domestic bacteria controls. People were induced to enter fly-catching competitions, with prizes being awarded to those bringing in the largest number of flies.

In view of all of the aforementioned considerations, it is most probable that there has already been some decline in the death rate, and that, barring a civil conflict or external adventures of major proportions, the reduction in death rates is likely to be accelerated. This conclusion is reinforced by the experience of other countries. Thus, the death rate is estimated to have declined by about 30 per cent in India between 1920 and 1940; by 20 per cent in Egypt between 1940 and 1949; by 26 per cent in Mexico between 1940 and 1950; and by 45 per cent in Ceylon between 1939 and 1951.[8]

At the same time, birth rates in all of these countries remained approximately stationary at a very high level. One may expect the same general relationship to prevail in China as well—at least for the decade ahead—since the complex of cultural, social, and economic forces which influence the birth rates is much more resistant to change.

Proceeding on the basis of the considerations outlined above, one may expect the death rate to decline appreciably within a

[8] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*; Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton, 1951, pp. 36-37.

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decade, thus yielding a rate of natural increase of about 1.0 to 1.5 per cent a year.[9] This rate would still be substantially below the Soviet rate of the 1920's and would roughly correspond to current Indian rates.

### B. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MAINLAND CHINA

Chinese agriculture—and, for that matter, agriculture in most underdeveloped areas—is called upon to foster the process of economic growth in three principal ways: it must serve as a reservoir for an expanding labor force; it must provide for food consumption standards (urban and rural) at levels designed to foster an increasing productivity of labor and the maintenance of political stability; and it must produce a surplus for exports.

The first function can be discharged without too much difficulty under Chinese mainland conditions. At this juncture, there is considerable unemployment not only in the rural sector, but in the urban as well. This urban unemployment and underemployment has been aggravated in recent years by what the Chinese Communist press refers to as "blind migration to the cities." While the factors and forces which induce this migration are somewhat obscure, particularly since government policy frowns upon it, it is more than probable that this exodus is primarily propelled by "push" rather than "pull"; that is, it may indicate a deterioration in rural economic conditions under the impact of government extractions, to the point where at least some elements of the rural population seek escape in the cities. It may also be influenced by a general sense that the regime is concentrating its constructive efforts on the cities and that prospects there are more promising.

This urban unemployment and underemployment, however, may prove to be only a transitory condition which will gradually disappear as industry expands. Should industrialization proceed at the rates projected in the model (see Table 12*), the rising

[9] There were recurrent reports in the Chinese Communist press, in the spring and summer of 1954, that a sharp fall in the death rate has occurred. See, for example, *New China News Agency*, Peking, March 10, 1954, for a report on partial census results.

* In the concluding section of this article, to be published in April 1955.

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demand for labor could be met out of population growth without reducing the size of the rural labor force. In fact, according to Table 12, the rural labor surplus would actually be augmented unless large tracts of new lands were settled and brought under cultivation.

Unlike the problem of labor, the capacity of agriculture to expand output so as to meet a growing demand for its products is one of the most critical questions facing the regime. With this in mind, some of the salient factors affecting the demand for, and supply of, farm products will be explored below.

(1) *Demand*

Proceeding from the assumptions underlying our model in Table 12, in order to meet domestic consumer requirements, food production in Communist China would have to increase by about 8 per cent in 1957 and 16 per cent in 1962. This is based specifically on the assumption that, while the per capita urban-rural consumption differential will be maintained, per capita consumption within each sector will remain constant. The findings of the National Sample Survey suggest that in India, urban per capita consumption is 1.6 times that of rural consumption. Of course, this does not mean that the real urban content of living is that much higher than the rural, since part of this differential is due to the higher costs of feeding an urban population, particularly in an economy in which, even in the rural areas, food represents the major item in the household budgets, and in which the transport system is still quite undeveloped. For China, there are no adequate household budget data or other reliable indicators of consumption levels and behavior; however, it may be assumed that this differential is at least as great as in India, and, in view of the much lower railway density per square mile in China, probably even greater.

Agriculture, however, will have to provide not only for domestic requirements but also for exports. Before the war, about 70 to 80 per cent of mainland exports consisted of farm products. At the same time, the mainland was a net importer of rice and wheat, and a net exporter of coarse grains. This situation has

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changed since the Communist conquest; while agricultural exports have been maintained at roughly the prewar level, food imports have ceased. Moreover, in 1952 about one million tons of grain—mostly coarse grain—were exported, which thus constituted less than 10 per cent of total exports and close to 1 per cent of mainland grain production.

From the model in Table 12, it is possible to calculate certain hypothetical levels of import requirements for the last year of the current Five-Year Plan, 1957, and for 1962. These computations would tend to indicate that to sustain the projected rate of industrial and aggregate growth, imports would have to rise to about US $1.6 billion (1952 imports were roughly around US $1 billion) in 1957, and to about US $2.5 billion by 1962. These estimates are based on the following assumptions:

(a) That about 60 per cent of total gross investment will be in industry and transport, as indicated by the 1953 and 1954 investment budget allocations (see Table 8).

(b) That 25 per cent of this industrial and transport investment will be in electric motors, generators, transformers, machine tools, and complex equipment of varying kinds which cannot be manufactured in China and must thus be imported. This percentage is based on US capital coefficients for 1947[10] with some qualitative adjustments for Chinese conditions.

(c) That, *pari-passu*, with increases in industrial production, raw material requirements will rise.

On the basis of these assumptions, capital goods and raw material imports alone would have to be almost US $1.4 billion in 1962. To this must be added imports of military equipment and some consumer goods. However, since there should be some raw material savings owing to expanding domestic production, and since 25 per cent as the import component of capital formation may be too high, a total import estimate of US $1.6 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively, may not be unreasonable.

Obviously, a large share of these imports will have to be paid

[10] See *Estimates of the Capital Structure of American Industries, 1947*, prepared by James M. Henderson and others, Harvard Economic Research Project, June 1953 (hectograph).

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for with agricultural exports. It is most unlikely that even the increased production of minerals such as coal, iron ore, tungsten, molybdenum, antimony, and others envisaged in Chinese Communist plans would be sufficient not only to maintain, but to raise, the proportion of non-farm exports. Thus, assuming that the ratio of agricultural and non-agricultural exports remains constant, the volume of agricultural exports would have to rise from about US $700 million in 1952 to $1,120 million in 1957, and $1,960 million in 1962; that is, an increase of about 60 per cent and 180 per cent, respectively. Actually, this may be reduced somewhat by Soviet economic assistance; assuming such aid to be equivalent to about US $130 million,[11] farm exports may be projected, under these formal assumptions, as US $1,030 million and $1,800 million, respectively.

The share of cereals in this agricultural export total will depend upon the success attained by the government in increasing the output and collection of grain and upon the availability of other farm products. On the basis of present indications, however, cereals are not likely to play a major role in the export trade.

In order to meet this growing export demand and to maintain per capita food consumption standards in the urban and rural areas, the aggregate net product of agriculture would have to be raised from an estimated US $12 billion in 1952 to $13.3 billion in 1957 and $15.0 billion in 1962.[12] This would mean an increase of approximately 11 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.

### (2) *Supply Prospects*

The total cultivated area of mainland China may be estimated as 240-250 million acres,[13] which in 1952 yielded an estimated net product of about US $12 billion or US $48 per acre. This yield is attained with very small inputs of capital and a tremen-

[11] See the section on the Five-Year Plan below.

[12] The agricultural and all other value products in this article were estimated in terms of Chinese Communist currency (JMP) and then converted into dollars at the official rate of exchange. Therefore, they reflect the 1952 price relationships in mainland China, with their peculiar institutional distortions. For this reason alone, if for no other, these value products are not internationally comparable.

[13] T. H. Shen, *Agricultural Resources of China*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1951.

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dous expenditure of labor. In this intensive, at times almost garden-type, agriculture, the Chinese peasant has shown admirable ingenuity in maintaining the fertility of the soil. He has accomplished this without a system of crop rotation, and has done this in the south on land which has produced two rice harvests for centuries.[14] Using these age-old practices, he obtains much higher rice and wheat yields than the Indian peasant and, to some extent, even the farmer of Meiji Japan. However, he has probably pushed these practices to the limit, so that further increases in yields will have to depend upon the introduction of modern farm technology.

In the following, an attempt will be made to explore the technical possibilities for increasing farm output, both through extension of the cultivated areas and through increases in per acre productivity, as well as some of the economic and institutional obstacles which may impede or limit the realization of these possibilities.

The most promising areas for new land settlement are found in northern Manchuria, where, according to varying estimates, from 20 to 30 million acres may be brought under cultivation. This is a dry-farming, steppe-like region close to the northern limits of the wheat belt. Thus, methods of cultivation would have to be extensive, and unit yields may be expected to be comparatively low; at the same time, owing to the rigors of the climate, large annual fluctuations in output may be anticipated. The resource costs of reclaiming this land are probably fairly high, particularly if one considers that all external economies—roads, housing, schools, structures for the state apparatus and the party, power and other facilities—would need to be newly constructed. Therefore, it may be considered most unlikely that new land settlement on such a large scale is likely to be undertaken within the next five or ten years. At the same time, however, the new regime has already reclaimed some land in that area, and probably will continue to do so on a modest scale. From

[14] Pierre Gourou, "The Development of Upland Areas in China," in *The Development of Upland Areas in the Far East*, IPR International Secretariat, New York, 1949, p. 10.

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the regime's point of view, this not only provides an opportunity for expanding agricultural output, but also for establishing state and collective farms in a setting where institutional resistances are minimal.[15]

There are also some opportunities for increasing the cultivated land area in a few of the old settled regions of China. For instance, it has been estimated that the wheat acreage in northern and central China can be increased by close to 10 million acres, while cotton acreage may be extended in the Yellow and Huai river valleys.[16] Provided that water conservation projects currently in progress actually lead to improved flood control in the future, these acreage extensions could probably be accomplished more easily and at much lower cost than those in Manchuria.

Buck's sample surveys show that almost 25 million acres of farm land are occupied by graves, ancestral shrines, and the like, and that an unknown, but considerable, area is taken up by uncultivated strips separating the small land fragments belonging to different farmers. Of course, the institutional obstacles to bringing this land under cultivation are enormous. It is most doubtful that it could be accomplished without far-reaching collectivization. However, should the Chinese Communists seriously pursue their objective of bringing about one-half of the peasant households into producers' cooperatives by 1957,[17] they will have made considerable progress in consolidating farm holdings and eliminating these uncultivated strips.

On the basis of this brief survey, and assuming that the regime will undertake land development only where this can be accomplished with inputs of underemployed labor and relatively little capital, it may be concluded that possibly about 15 million acres of currently uncultivated land may be brought under the plow within the next five to ten years. This would mean roughly a 6 per cent increase in the land cropped.

Judging by the Japanese experience, and taking account of

[15] As a matter of fact, the first collective farm in China—"The Spark"—was established in this region.

[16] Shen, *op.cit.*, p. 363.

[17] See the statement by Teng Tzu-hui, head of the Chinese Communist Party's Rural Work Department, noted in *New York Times*, November 2, 1954, p. 9.

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the conditions just analyzed, if farm production is to be increased, major reliance will have to be placed upon raising unit yields. It may be interesting to note in this connection that in Japan average rice yields increased by about 20 per cent in the decade between 1880 and 1890. Similarly, the combined unit yield of six major crops rose by about 50 per cent in the four decades between 1880 and 1920.[18] A major part of this rise was accomplished through increasing applications of commercial fertilizer. Thus, by 1936, 3.4 million tons of chemical fertilizer were applied in Japan, on a crop area about 1/16 that of mainland China, as compared with only about 200,000 tons applied to the latter.[19]

The Chinese National Agricultural Research Bureau conducted experiments before the war which indicated that in order to raise unit crop yields by about 25 per cent, applications of 6,500,000 tons of ammonium sulphate, 3,800,000 tons of calcium superphosphate, and 300,000 tons of potassium sulphate would be required. As of 1943-1944, the ammonium sulphate capacity on the mainland was about 320,000 tons, practically all of it concentrated in Manchuria. Most of this was exported to Japan before the war, but is now retained in China, so that, according to official Communist sources, about 350,000 tons were consumed in 1952. However, while this indicates an increase over prewar consumption, it still represents very small applications indeed.

Since domestic fertilizer capacity is so small, practically all of it would have to be imported. Thus, if the experimental increases in yield are to be attained, China will have to spend about US $800 million on imports of ammonium sulphate alone (in 1952 prices); that is, about three-fourths of her total 1952 import value. Obviously, this is beyond the realm of reasonable expectation for a long time to come. At the same time, expansion of domestic productive facilities to anything approaching required levels seems most improbable within five to ten years, in view of high initial capital costs and high electric power requirements

[18] Johnston, *op.cit.*

[19] E. B. Schumpeter, *et al.*, *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940*, New York, 1940, p. 251; Shen, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

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in current operations. Raising chemical fertilizer applications to levels where they would significantly affect unit yields would therefore be very expensive, and would force Chinese Communist policy-makers to sacrifice many of their other industrial objectives.

However, there are other possible ways of increasing unit yields in agriculture, even though these are likely to produce results more slowly. The most notable is, of course, improved water conservation; that is, better flood control, extension of irrigated areas, and better use of water for irrigation. This is a field to which the Communists are devoting most attention, particularly since it can be largely effected through mass applications of labor underemployed in agriculture. These efforts will undoubtedly have some effect on agricultural output within the next five or ten years. For instance, in 1949, a particularly bad year, about 20 million acres were flooded; at the same time, the average annual flooded area of the major river basins may be estimated as about 7 million acres.[20] As was indicated earlier, these floods and droughts have been the major causes of famine throughout Chinese history.

Additional improvements could be expected from other comparatively capital-cheap measures such as better seed selection, introduction of new strains and varieties, plant and animal disease and pest control, grassland and forage crop improvements in the upland areas, and afforestation. However, some of these measures are of a rather long-term character, while all of them require the organization of a capable and efficient network of farm extension services. The Communists are attempting all of these measures to some extent. They are, however, seriously handicapped by an acute shortage of technically qualified cadres.

Therefore, combining the possibilities of expanding acreage and raising yields within the technical and economic limitations discussed above, but abstracting for a moment from possible effects of collectivization, it would seem most unlikely that farm output in China could be raised by more than 10 per cent within

[20] "Economic Developments in Mainland China, 1949-1953," in United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, IV, No. 3 (November 1953), pp. 17-31.

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five years and a maximum of 20 per cent in a decade. This means that in terms of purely technical and economic considerations, even within the context of current rates of agricultural investment, it would be difficult for increases in output to keep pace with rising requirements posed by urbanization and exports. In these terms, then, the question of agricultural development will revolve to a large extent upon government price, marketing, and land policies, and the Chinese peasant's reactions to them.

Official Chinese Communist policy is openly and unequivocally based upon collectivization as a definite goal which is to be attained gradually and without the loss of output that accompanied the Soviet experience and the stagnation of output that has occurred in Eastern Europe. With this in mind, the regime has evolved a series of transitional forms of farm organization, each involving a more advanced form of "cooperation." A mutual aid team, the most rudimentary type of agricultural cooperative, is essentially based on a more or less temporary pooling or exchange of labor, with the individual farm operator retaining at least theoretical control over his production, consumption, and sales (after taxes). However, usually at least one member of the mutual aid team belongs to the Communist cadre, the function of which is to show the peasants the advantages of more advanced forms of cooperation. This "education" is combined with economic incentives, disincentives, and pressures so as to induce the peasants to form producers' cooperatives, which are collectives in fact, if not in name. The cooperatives involve pooling not only of labor, but of tools, and also call for joint cultivation and planning of production, with distribution of returns based on a complicated system of weights for labor and land input, with high premiums on the former, and low premiums on the latter. Yet, in these producers' cooperatives, the peasant theoretically retains his individual right of ownership of land, and his right to withdraw at any time. In the next stage, the collective, even these theoretical rights are abolished.[21]

In effect, this strategy of collectivization bears a strong family

[21] For a fuller discussion of these cooperatives, see A. Doak Barnett, "China's Road to Collectivization," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXV (May 1953), pp. 188-202.

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resemblance to the methods tried and used in the East European satellites. The Chinese have, however, contributed to the "storehouse of this strategy" by using the mutual aid team as their point of departure; that is, a form rooted in Chinese tradition, but not generally applied in Eastern Europe.

In appraising the possibilities for collectivization, it should be noted that the Chinese system of farming does not *per se* present any insurmountable or inherent obstacles. There is no question that rice culture presents very serious barriers to mechanization, but collectivization is perfectly feasible without mechanization. Under conditions where there are still large pools of unemployed and underemployed labor, such as in China, its principal function is to give the state more direct access to the farm produce. It was coupled with mechanization in the Soviet Union because industrialization proceeded so rapidly that the demand for urban labor could not be met without introduction of labor-saving technology in agriculture. Thus, the barriers to collectivization in China are not primarily technical but, rather, cultural and institutional.

By 1953, close to half of the peasant households were organized into mutual aid teams and about 273,000 households were organized into 14,000 producers' cooperatives. By 1957, the regime plans to encompass about half of all farm households in such cooperatives.[22]

In the fall of 1953, this stepped-up drive toward collectivization was combined with a complete reorganization of the system of grain collections, and the introduction of rationing.[23] The new system provides for compulsory deliveries of grain to the state—over and above the tax grain—at fixed prices. Thus, it is modeled after the East European system of collections, a system that has plagued the satellites since its inception. Generally, the growing similarities between Chinese and satellite economic policies are striking.

[22] "Decision on the Development of Agrarian Production Cooperatives," December 16, 1953, reported in *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong, February 12, 1954.

[23] "Order of Government Administrative Council for Enforcement of Planned Purchase and Planned Supply of Grain," issued November 23, 1953, published by *New China Agency*, Peking, February 28, 1954.

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It is therefore quite clear that the regime is not prepared to place primary reliance upon market incentives for expanding agricultural output. This would not only require a diversion of investment resources to consumers' goods production as incentives, but would also commit the regime to accepting a private market economy over the face of agricultural China, with all the relaxation of political control and perpetuation of traditional peasant attitudes that this would entail.

The question still remains, however, as to what is likely to be the impact of these collectivization and collection measures upon the structure of incentives in the countryside, both in and out of the collectives or producers' cooperatives. Will the satellite experience repeat itself, where such serious disincentives were set in motion that despite considerable investments in agriculture, farm output still lags below average prewar levels?[24]

One may also ask oneself whether this problem has any relevance at all in the Chinese cultural setting. Judging by past experience, this question can be answered in the affirmative: Chinese peasants seem definitely responsive to positive price and income inducements. This was demonstrated, for instance, by the effectiveness of some of the Chinese Communist policy measures, such as the raising of the cotton-grain ratio as a means of expanding cotton production. What about disincentives? In this respect, the situation may be much more complex.

For agriculture in the process of gradual and "peaceful" collectivization one might distinguish three effects, which may be termed the expectations effect, the tensions effect, and the disruption effect. Thus, the very fact of vigorous collectivization propaganda, pressure, and targets for organization of producers' cooperatives is likely to set in motion a chain of expectations which will tend to discourage the peasant from making long-term improvements on his farm. Similarly, discriminatory measures directed against "rich peasants" may actually induce the comparatively more capable and prosperous farming elements to

[24] United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, Geneva, 1953, p. 166, and Chart 13, p. 177.

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curb their output and incomes so as to avoid being placed in this undesirable category.

At the same time, the drive toward collectivization, compulsory grain deliveries, high tax rates, and a constant harassment of the "rich peasants" are almost certainly bound to lead to a state of more or less permanent tension in the countryside. In turn, this state of tension may seriously inhibit that cooperation between farmers and technical cadres (government extension agents) which would be required to introduce better practices and modern technology.

Finally, the very process of collectivization cannot help but entail at least some measure of disruption. The actual degree of disruption would, of course, depend upon the manner and the speed of execution; if it is carried out quite slowly, the disruptive effects may be minimal and transitory.

Thus, the cumulative impact of these three effects upon agricultural production may be considered as negative, in the sense that they all would tend to discourage the farmer from adopting and instituting those measures that might enable him to raise his output. However, in the case of the disruptive effect, the consequences could easily lead to an actual decline in production.

On the other hand, high rates of net resource transfer out of agriculture may, under certain conditions, have just the opposite effect. Thus, a Chinese peasant who lives close to the margin of subsistence will tend to bend every effort to produce enough to meet his own needs and those of his family. In these terms, onerous extractions by the state may actually force him to increase output, to the extent that this is possible within the means at his disposal, so as to satisfy his own demands as well as those of the state.

On balance, this analysis indicates that current and prospective agricultural policies in Communist China may tend to undercut the very measures which would make it possible to raise farm output. Therefore, unless these policies are reversed or relaxed, it is unlikely that agricultural production could be raised by the 10 to 20 per cent projected above on the basis of purely technical and economic considerations. However, if this output lags, then

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the rising requirements imposed by growth of population, urbanization, and exports could not all be met simultaneously. In such a case, given the over-all character and objectives of Chinese Communist policy, the regime may be expected to bend every effort to transfer the principal burden of this shortfall to the countryside.

Under Soviet or Soviet-type institutional conditions, a lag in agricultural development need not present insurmountable barriers to industrialization and economic growth. For instance, at the height of the collectivization drive in 1930 and 1931, when farmers were slaughtering their cattle and agricultural production was seriously disrupted, the Soviet Union dumped about 5 million tons of grain on the world market. Thus, at a time when grain production was abnormally low, exports from the Soviet Union were higher than during any other interwar year. Since the regime had the will and capacity to enforce a high rate of extraction from the countryside, these grain exports fulfilled a very important function at a critical juncture in the Soviet industrialization program; they enabled the Soviet Union to import the capital goods for the first Five-Year Plan. To be sure, this level of exports could not be maintained indefinitely in the face of declining production. However, this example serves to illustrate the principle—perhaps in its most extreme form—that in a Communist society high rates of resource transfer out of agriculture can be maintained in the face of stagnating production and, in the short run, even in the face of declining production. Actually, at any given level of output, the rate of net resource transfer out of agriculture is largely limited by the administrative capacity, degree of ruthlessness, and political stability of the regime.

### (3) *The Five-Year Plan*

It is a curious fact that despite the official announcement of a Five-Year Plan in 1953, the plan itself has not been published thus far.[25] The launching of the plan was followed only by the

[25] As of November 1954.

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publication of annual targets for the first year, i.e., 1953,[26] and by the definition of certain general goals in an article in *Pravda* published in Moscow on September 28, 1953.

Actually, it is rather doubtful that China's mainland economy is operating within the framework of a comprehensive and total economic plan of the Soviet type. It is more likely that annual targets are being fixed in terms of a broad set of five-year objectives, but without an attempt at detailed planning. Thus, these plans may be viewed—to use Stalin's terminology—as "prognosis, guess-plans which bind nobody,"[27] rather than plans based on a system of "balanced estimates" or definite inter-industry relationships.

Within this context, one must view the planning process in Communist China as evolving gradually from a series of loosely coordinated plans into a national plan. This process is paralleled by a gradual shift from primary reliance upon indirect controls to increasingly direct controls. In a country such as China, with only a partially monetized rural sector, and with an underdeveloped bureaucratic and economic control apparatus, the task of planning resource use and resource allocation is seriously handicapped and greatly complicated. It is for this reason that, as the scope of planning is widened and deepened, technical and administrative bottlenecks are becoming more serious, bottlenecks which Soviet advisers are called upon to resolve.

In the early days of their rule, when their principal task consisted of organizing the state apparatus and the economy, the Chinese Communists drew on their own past experience, instituting policies of their own making. However, this began to change as they gradually entered into the development and industrialization phase of their program, when they faced problems which were unfamiliar and therefore required Soviet technical assistance in planning and execution.

[26] Po I-po, "The 1953 State Budget of the People's Republic of China," Supplement to *People's China*, March 26, 1953; Chou En-lai, "Report at the Fourth Session of the National Committee of Chinese People's Consultative Council," in *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, February 5, 1953.

[27] Speech at the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), Moscow, 1927; verbatim report, p. 67.

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Viewed in these terms, 1953 may be considered as an experimental and preparatory year in mainland China. For instance, production targets were revised three times during the year; at first they were sharply curtailed, but toward the end of the year many of the cuts were partially restored.[28] One generally gets the impression of a considerable measure of groping, uncertainty, and confusion during this first planning year. This may have been a function of inadequate organization, lack of planning experience and skills, and, most important of all, of a failure to come to an economic aid agreement with the USSR until the middle of the year.

Once the regime knew what it could expect from the Soviet Union, it apparently felt ready to embark upon a new phase of "austerity" and "bitter struggle." This phase was marked by a general acceleration in the tempo of nationalization and collectivization within the framework of the new "general line of the state."[29] In the course of this new drive, the rate of resource mobilization is being stepped up, as illustrated by the new compulsory grain delivery scheme and the launching of another bond drive.[30]

Inadequate planning and failure to attain overambitious goals is also reflected in the government expenditure pattern, as shown in Table 8. Thus, total 1953 outlay was somewhat lower than budgeted, and while investment fell almost 20 per cent short of the goal, military expenditures substantially exceeded budgeted amounts. In appraising the level of military expenditures, it is important to note that these may be financed partly through long-term lend-lease arrangements between the Soviet Union

[28] Compare Po I-po, *op.cit.*; Chia To-fu, "Report to the 7th Session of All-China Trade Union Congress," in *New China News Agency*, September 25, 1953; Wu Lun-hsi, "New China on the Road to Industrialization," in *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, October 1953.

[29] This "general line" was first announced in an editorial of the *People's Daily*, on October 1, 1953, under the title, "Struggle for the Distant and Great Goal of Socialistic Industrialization." Incidentally, all of our references to collectivization include producers' cooperatives, on the assumption that the *de facto* distinction between the two is slight.

[30] The new bond issue valued at six trillion JMP (about US $240,000,000) was launched in December 1953. See *New York Times*, December 10, 1953, January 23 and February 9, 1954.

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TABLE 8

CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, 1953-1954
(in trillion JMP)

| | 1953 | | 1954 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Budget* | *Actual* | *Budget* |
| Expenditures: | | | |
| Military | 52.3 | 95.9 | 52.7 |
| Government administration | 23.8 | | 46.9 |
| Other | 3.6 | | |
| Economic construction: | 103.5 | 86.0 | 113.2 |
| Industrial enterprises under state budget: | 47.6 | 42.9 | 54.1 |
| Heavy industry | | | 42.4 |
| Light industry | | | 11.7 |
| Agriculture, forestry, water conservation | 11.8 | 11.3 | 11.9 |
| Trade | 4.4 | 9.9 | 12.8 |
| Transport | 14.8 | 12.4 | 17.6 |
| Other | 24.8 | 9.4 | 16.7 |
| Cultural construction | 34.8 | 32.0 | 36.7 |
| *Total* | 218.0 | 213.9 | 249.5 |
| Revenues: | | | |
| Agricultural tax in kind | 25.7[a] | 25.7[a] | 25.7[a] |
| Taxes from industry and trade | 87.5 | 92.5 | 104.4 |
| Receipts from government enterprises | 70.0 | 75.4 | 83.3 |
| Other | 11.9 | 6.4 | 4.6 |
| *Total* | 195.1 | 200.0 | 218.1 |
| Deficit | 22.9 | 13.8 | 31.4 |
| Proceeds from special levies, bond issues, note issues, and other types of deficit financing | 12.4 | 30.7 | 13.8 |
| Carry-over | 26.0 | 26.0 | 42.8 |
| Cash balance | 15.5 | 42.8 | 25.2 |

[a] Since the price of tax grain is not varied from year to year, the constancy of tax revenue indicates that the quantity levied remains unchanged. The differential between the price of tax grain and the market price accrues to the state trading companies and thus appears under "Receipts from government enterprises."

SOURCE: Report of Minister of Finance Teng Hsiao-ping on the 1954 State Budget at the 31st Meeting of the Central People's Government Council, held on June 16 and 17, 1954, in *New China News Agency Daily Bulletin*, Supplement No. 204, London, June 24, 1954.

and Communist China, over and above the economic assistance rendered.

After a series of protracted negotiations that lasted almost a year, a Sino-Soviet economic aid agreement was finally an-

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nounced in September 1953. The announcements referred only to 141 "enterprises"—50 of which were already under way—that were to be rehabilitated or newly constructed with Soviet aid. The bulk of these "enterprises" are in the field of electric power generation, mining, chemicals, and producers' goods industries, particularly metals and engineering; however, they also include some fertilizer and textile plants.[31]

On the other hand, information on the total value of aid is withheld. This is particularly strange in view of the fact that no secret was made of Soviet and Communist Chinese aid to North Korea and of the 1950 Sino-Soviet aid agreement. On the contrary, the US $300 million granted to China over a five-year period was hailed as an act of great generosity. These circumstances, combined with the protracted nature of the negotiations, would tend to suggest that the level of aid projected may not be very high.

There have been unconfirmed reports that the agreement provides for a ten-year aid program totaling US $1 billion.[32] According to this version, the agreement is retroactive to 1950 and thus includes the 300 million dollars originally granted. If this is correct, then the annual level of aid for the 1954-1959 period can be estimated as US $117 million, i.e., an amount which, while representing close to a doubling of the 1950-1953 rate of aid, is still very modest by United States standards. Over and above this, the Soviet Union advanced an additional 520 million rubles within the context of more recent Sino-Soviet arrangements concluded in October 1954.[33] While it is not quite clear for what period this new loan is granted, the general context of agreements would suggest that it also may run through 1959. This would involve an annual level of additional aid of about US $25 million, at the official rate of exchange. On this basis then, Soviet economic assistance to China may be currently estimated at a maximum of US $142 million; however, allowing

[31] *New China News Agency*, Peking, September 15, 1953.
[32] Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Aid to China," *New York Times*, October 5, 1953.
[33] "Text of the Soviet-Chinese Communist Communique on 7 Accords," *New York Times*, October 12, 1954.

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for gross overvaluation of the ruble, it probably is actually less than that.

According to the aforementioned *Pravda* article, part of this Soviet aid will be used to achieve the production targets given in Table 9.

TABLE 9

SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION TARGETS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

| *Product* | *Index 1952=100* | *Units* | *Output 1952* | *Target Date*[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude steel | 400 | thousand MT | 1,215 | 4,860 |
| Rolled steel | 250 | thousand MT | 740 | 1,850 |
| Coal | 160 | thousand MT | 53,000 | 84,800 |
| Electric power | 200 | million KWH | 5,700 | 11,000 |
| Mining equipment | 200 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Metal-cutting machinery | 350 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |

[a] No exact date is given; reference is made either to the last year of the plan, 1957, or to the year when the current aid agreement expires, i.e., 1959.

SOURCE: *Pravda*, September 28, 1953, Table III.

Should these targets be met, mainland China's crude steel capacity would exceed the current output of Canada, Belgium, and the other small countries of Europe, but would still lag considerably behind the levels attained in Japan during the 1930's. At the same time, the projected levels of steel output would be roughly equivalent to that of the Soviet Union in 1928.[34]

On the basis of United States and Latin American investment costs, to expand mainland China's crude and finished steel output to the levels planned would call for an aggregate investment of about US $600 to $900 million, depending upon the size of the newly built mills.[35] However, construction labor costs would undoubtedly be lower in China than in the United States, but

[34] See Table 7 and Woytinski and Woytinski, *op.cit.*, pp. 118-21.

[35] United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, *Study on Iron and Steel Industry*, II, E/N, 12/293, Santiago, 1952, Add. 2 and 3. This study gives the investment cost per ton of finished steel in a plant with a 250,000-ton capacity at US $400. The investment cost per ton of crude steel is estimated at US $170, all in terms of 1948 prices. In the 1,000,000-ton plant at Sparrows Point, Maryland, unit investment cost is estimated at US $283 per ton of finished and US $126 per ton of crude steel.

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this may be counterbalanced, at least to some extent, by lower productivity.

A similar calculus for electric power plants would indicate that to expand generating capacity up to the planned levels would involve a total investment of about US $340 million. This is based on US investment cost per KW of installed thermal capacity of US $120.[36]

It should be clearly borne in mind that all of these estimates can represent no more than the crudest of approximations to the actual investment costs in China. This is even more true in the case of power than of steel, since the former does not take account of the vastly different investment cost structure in hydroelectric power construction.

Thus, the total capital cost of new steel mill and power plant production may be estimated as about US $1 billion. According to the stated plans, these projects are to be completed before 1959; in that case, they would absorb about 10 per cent of total industrial investment resources projected in Table 12 for 1953-1958. It may be assumed that about one-third of this total investment would have to be imported from the Soviet Union,[37] which would mean that about half of the estimated Soviet economic aid for this period would be channeled into expansion of power and steel production.

On the basis of these calculations and assumptions, this rate of growth would not seem to lie beyond the resource capabilities of the Chinese Communist economy.

The only specific Five-Year production target disclosed by official Chinese Communist sources is that which calls for a 30 per cent increase in annual grain output between 1953 and 1957. Unlike the industrial goals analyzed above, this target appears to be quite unrealistic, particularly if it is appraised against the background of agricultural investment, marketing, and land

[36] U.S. Federal Power Commission, *Steam-electric Plant Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses*, Washington, D.C., 1950.

[37] Input-output studies for the US economy, conducted by the Harvard Economics Research Project, would tend to indicate that about one-third of the new investment required per unit of increased output in steel and power production would consist of complex types of equipment. It was assumed that this equipment could not be manufactured in China and would, therefore, have to be imported from the Soviet Union.

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policies discussed in Section B above. A 30 per cent increase in crop production over a huge land area such as mainland China, where the opportunities for bringing new areas under cultivation are very narrowly circumscribed, and where the possibilities for raising fertilizer consumption are also quite limited, would be most extraordinary indeed. As was indicated in Section B, it is most unlikely that given favorable farmer incentive conditions, crop production could be raised by more than 10 per cent within five years. However, in the face of current and prospective agricultural policies, the disincentives may become strong enough to block or seriously impede any increase in farm output.

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*Review Articles*

# FOREIGN POLICY: The Conservative School

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War*, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954, 379 pp. $5.00.
Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953, 800 pp. $6.00.

THESE two books are as dissimilar as two books can be which deal with essentially the same problem and are inspired by essentially the same philosophy. The problem is the survival of the West, and the philosophy is one of progressive conservatism. In foreign policy, both authors share a preference for the traditional outlook and methods and an aversion to the crusading tendencies of mass democracy.

Yet the qualities of mind which these two authors bring to bear upon the same problem are worlds apart; their intellectual styles have hardly anything in common; and the impact they make upon the reader is bound to differ according to the receptivity of the reader's mind to one or the other style. Each author exemplifies a distinct style of thinking about matters political. Having developed these styles to perfection, their books tell us something not only about their own ways of thinking and the problems they are thinking about, but also about two distinct typical modes of political thought. Thus the attempt to review them together cannot help becoming an exercise in the typology of political thinking.

## I

Mr. Aron's style is impressionistic, if not pointillist. At close range, the canvas he paints appears as a bewildering mass of individual dots which fall into the coherent pattern of a picture

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only if one steps away from it and looks at it from a certain angle; and the pattern of the picture may well change with a change in the angle of observation. Its structure is difficult to detect from any angle. There is no beginning or end, no center or periphery, no top or bottom. There is much to admire in detail, much that pleases through its form, much that enriches through acute observation, much that enlightens through new insight. However, looking at the whole, one cannot escape asking oneself whether this is a coherent picture at all, or a series of different sketches of the same motif, variations on the same theme, which have been inorganically connected with each other and put in the same frame.

Mr. Aron is the intellectual *par excellence*—which is another way of saying that he loves the work of the mind for its own sake. His purpose is not to prove a thesis, to develop a system, or to tell a coherent story. Thus he presents no program for action, no political philosophy, no history, but rather elements of one or another as the occasion arises. You will find a most illuminating and original analysis of Marxist theory and practice here, an equally illuminating discussion of the economics of Western Europe there, and a historical analysis of modern technology still elsewhere. Yet the total impact of all the details that one learns is not a total illumination of the contemporary scene, but rather a series of glimpses flashing on and off, illuminating many fragments in succession, but never the whole at any one time.

Nor is it easy for the reader to fashion in retrospect a coherent whole out of so many divers fragments. For the author's impressionistic mind responds to whatever intellectual stimulation comes its way. That response is never superficial, always interesting, frequently incisive, and sometimes profound. But it is not always sustained. The author attacks a problem very much as a cat attacks a mouse. He tosses it around, takes hold of it, lets it go, and catches it again; but, in contrast to the cat, he never consumes and digests more than part of it. For the reader the subtlety, suppleness, and elegance of the play will always be enjoyable, even though it will sometimes be hard for him to follow the rapid turns of movement. Yet from time to time he

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cannot help asking himself in confusion what happened to the mouse.

Nevertheless, two great themes hold the book together: the paramountcy, in our century, of politics over all other spheres of human endeavor, especially economics, and the organic interconnectedness of the great wars of the century, the unsolved problems of one engendering the increasing fury of the next. Upon these two themes Mr. Aron brings to bear his immense learning and great gifts as a thinker and writer. They are also, by implication, the themes of Sir Winston Churchill's book. Here, however, the comparison ends.

## II

In contrast, the range of *Triumph and Tragedy* is narrow in every respect—in subject matter, in style, and in purpose. It covers the period from the invasion of Normandy in June 1944 to the Potsdam Conference of July 1945. Its theme is, in the words of the author, "How the Great Democracies Triumphed, and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." Its central problem is simple: military strategy and its relation to foreign policy.

The style is of the same classic simplicity as the problem. As the problem raises a perennial issue of statecraft, so does the mode of thought which the author brings to bear upon the problem move within the perennial categories of political thought. Sir Winston Churchill's mind is not that of an intellectual who loves to think and know for the sake of thinking and knowledge. His is the intellect of a man of action who relives in thought past action and what preceded and followed it. Sir Winston thinks with a purpose which transcends thought. His purpose as a thinker is that of the man of action and, hence, is intensely personal; it is so in three different respects.

Its most personal purpose is to enable the author to relive in reminiscence his part in the drama of history, enjoying its victories, mourning its defeats. Yet this process of recollecting and reflective reliving is also one of simplification, of seeing, and of

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making others see, perhaps for the first time, the essence of one's action and its purpose, aside from what is but pretense and by-play. The first purpose, then, is autobiographical in the strict, classic sense of the term.

The second purpose is autobiographical in what one might call the political sense. It is to justify the author as past actor on the political scene. It is to prove that the author was right when he did what he did and when he gave advice that was not heeded. When the author must admit that he was wrong in action or advice, he at least evokes the sympathetic companionship of the reader, who learns to his satisfaction that the great and the powerful share in the human fallibility of all. Thus the author assigns himself the place in history which he deems his due or, at the very least, helps future historians to assign it to him.

Finally, the book teaches a lesson. By contrasting the mistakes of the past with the principles of right action, the author calls our attention, by implication, to opportunities in the more recent past and in the future of making the same mistakes by neglecting the same principles. Thus by implication the book tries —as does, in the words of Ranke, all history—"to make us not clever for one day but wise forever." It is this contribution to political wisdom which makes this book important, particularly for us and at this time.

As autobiography in both its senses, this last volume of Sir Winston Churchill's history of the Second World War aggravates weaknesses which could be noticed already in its predecessors. The narrative is both incoherent and fragmentary, and the documentary sources are fragmentary in the extreme. To check his own recollection and implement it with that of others, let alone to use all available documents for that purpose, is beyond Sir Winston's intent. This is a very personal, even willful, account of the past. What, then, elevates it far above the common run of the apologetic polemics of statesmen, diplomatists, and generals? What transforms so fragmentary and technically defective an account of history into a source of political wisdom? With this question we approach the secret of Sir Winston's greatness.

That secret cannot be explained in this space, if it can be ex-

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plained at all; it can only be adumbrated. It seems to lie in the conjuncture of three qualities, one intellectual, one practical, and one moral. These qualities are the intellectual grasp of statesmanship, the ability to act according to the requirements of statesmanship, and the subordination of all other considerations to these requirements. Others are as wise as Sir Winston; others again are as effective in action; and others still have dedicated themselves as single-mindedly to a purpose. Yet nobody alive combines to such a degree intellectual excellence with ability in action and dedication to a cause.

What John Stuart Mill said of Bentham applies also to Churchill: "The field of [his] labours was like the space between two parallel lines; narrow to excess in one direction, in another it reached to infinity." The field of Sir Winston's labors, of his interests, and of his understanding is narrow. To compare the range of his book with that of Mr. Aron is to be struck by the richness and variety of Mr. Aron's interests and understanding and the narrowness of Sir Winston's. Yet this comparison strikes one also with the enormity of the purposeful intellectual and moral force that sweeps through the narrow confines of his cause: to remember the past in order to learn how to act aright in matters political and military.

The outstanding quality of that intellectual force is the ability to see a problem in its true proportions, by not allowing the involvement of will and emotion to interfere with understanding. What is required of the statesman is, first of all, to see clearly: himself, the enemy, and then himself again as the enemy sees him. To see clearly means to see without passions, without the passion of pride, of hatred, and of contempt. The statesman must master the paradox of wanting passionately to win over an enemy to whom he feels passionately superior, and of having to view his relations with the enemy with the detachment and objectivity of the scholar. This book provides proof of the extent to which Sir Winston has mastered this paradox. His most spectacular failures are his support of "unconditional surrender" and his inability to reconcile Great Britain's moral and legal commitment to the independence of Poland with the political and mili-

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tary realities which the Russian conquest of Eastern Europe had created.

The moral counterpart of the intellectual ability of mastering this paradox of passion and understanding is humility toward oneself and generosity toward others. As such, this moral attitude is not only a moral virtue in itself, but one of the conditions for political success as well. The extent to which this book reveals these qualities is another measure of Sir Winston's greatness as a statesman. He deplores President Truman's decision to withdraw the American troops, on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, to the zonal borders agreed upon at Quebec and Yalta, a step against which he had repeatedly warned, and there is no doubt in his mind now, as there was none then, that he was right and Truman wrong. Yet he enumerates all the mitigating circumstances which can be cited in explanation and support of Mr. Truman's decision and adds: "Those who are only wise after the event should hold their peace." And, while he bends every effort to forestall Stalin's designs, with what understanding does he speak of Russian interests, and with what respect does he pay tribute to Stalin's qualities!

If the cause to which Sir Winston brings these qualities were less challenging intellectually, less demanding morally, and less vital for all of us, we would think less of Sir Winston's greatness. As it is, upon our ability to learn Sir Winston's lessons the survival of the West may well depend. That, then, completes Sir Winston's greatness: that he brings a great intellectual and moral force successfully to bear upon the greatest of all contemporary causes.

## III

What are the lessons we can learn from Sir Winston's book?

The relationships between political and military policy being its main theme, this book is a study in contrasts, the contrast between British and American policies, between Churchill's and Roosevelt's strategy and statecraft. That contrast can be defined in two fundamental and interrelated propositions. For Churchill, the war was a military means to a political end, and the in-

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fluence of the political end upon the military means was to increase with the speed with which the armies of the Allies were approaching military victory. For the United States, the war was essentially a self-sufficient technical operation to be performed as quickly, as cheaply, and as thoroughly as the technical rules of warfare would allow. The political issue with which Churchill's strategy and statecraft was primarily concerned during the last year of the Second World War was no longer German and Japanese imperialism, but the imperialism of the Soviet Union. For the American government, the approaching defeat of German and Japanese imperialism signified the elimination of the major political problem which faced the Western world, and what remained could safely be left to mutual good will, especially toward the Soviet Union, and to the United Nations.

In one word, Churchill's was a historic concept of the war, while the American was apocalyptic. Churchill viewed the war as part of a historic continuum, as a product of historic forces not in essence different from those that had preceded it and were likely to follow it, subject to historic laws, which are of the timeless essence of politics itself and for whose disregard a nation must pay a heavy price. Our government looked at the war as the catastrophic interruption of a normalcy which the victorious conclusion of the war would almost automatically restore. For us the war was like a thunderstorm darkening a peaceful scene; its passing would by itself restore peace. For Churchill the war—in its causes, manifestations, and consequences—was, as it were, part of the natural environment of nations, and its consequences would be determined by the policies carried on during the war.

Sir Winston is not the first to point to this contrast in basic attitudes. It is the central theme of Chester Wilmot's book, *Struggle for Europe*. Sir Winston's book provides us with a case study of the theme. We already knew how the main protagonists acted; and now we learn how they thought and argued in advance of their action.

In Churchill's thought and argument, as revealed in this book, one concern took precedence over all others: to meet the Russians as much to the east as possible. Whenever a military de-

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cision had to be made, small or great, Churchill hammered on this concern to the point of obnoxiousness. During the Italian campaign, he was obsessed with the opportunity to occupy Vienna before the Russians and urged that the invasion of southern France be sacrificed to the exploitation of this opportunity. After the Allied armies had crossed the Rhine, he urged striking directly at Berlin rather than southward, in order not to leave Berlin to the Russians. For similar reasons, he advised occupying as much as possible of Czechoslovakia, and more particularly Prague, and keeping what had been occupied. And when the war in Europe had ended with the surrender of Germany, he continued to view military operations in the light of their political consequences: he urged an over-all settlement with the Soviet Union while the armies of the United States were still intact and in Europe.

Churchill was defeated on every major issue. The only important exception was Greece, where Churchill was able to act on his own, subordinating military to political considerations. When Greece was about to be conquered by Communism and, through it, by Russian imperialism, he sent British forces to Greece to defeat that very underground army which had just been successfully fighting the Axis. It was argued then, as it is being argued now, that Churchill's advice was militarily unsound. However, this is not the point which Sir Winston's book raises. Sir Winston's concern—and ours—is not with the military soundness of this particular action or that, but with the political quality of thinking which led to military action, however sound or unsound it might have been in its own military terms. It is the contrast between his own thinking and that of his American counterparts, and the political superiority of his to theirs, which is the main revelation of the book. If Sir Winston were less generous than he is, he might have sharpened the contrast by quoting from the messages exchanged between Generals Eisenhower and Marshall in response to his urgings to advance as far east as possible and stay there.[1]

[1] See Forrest C. Pogue, "Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe," *World Politics*, IV (April 1952), pp. 356-68.

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It would be as comforting as it would be false if one were to conclude that the main lesson of Sir Winston's book has been learned. Looking at Asia, the Middle East, and Europe—let alone at Washington—one cannot escape the conclusion that it has not been learned. Everywhere the requisite primacy of foreign policy over military policy is at best tenuous or ineffectual, if it exists at all. This book, then, is not only a repository of perennial wisdom; it also carries, as does Mr. Aron's in a less tangible form, a very timely warning.

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# PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS:
## The Freudian Connection

By PHILIP RIEFF

Ernest Jones, M.D., *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, I: *The Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-1900*, New York, Basic Books, 1953, 428 pp. $6.75.

FOR roughly a century—if we take the years from Fourier and Bentham to the triumph of Freud—the study of politics concerned itself mainly with institutions. Fourier, in plotting a utopia, took his individuals just as they were, expecting by the perfection of social arrangements to turn individual weakness and vice into virtues. Bentham also by-passed the infinite problem of the individual (this was relegated to religion) and concentrated on the finite reform of institutions; the greatest happiness of the greatest number was never the principle of an individual psychology, although since 1832 Bentham's formula has grown ironically appropriate as the individual in a mass society has become, characteristically, a quantity.

But the focus on institutions by which the liberal and radical mind (Marx had no individual psychology either) hoped to achieve a true and lasting reform of human society did not appear to bear up under the test of events. Of all the sources to which the liberal mind has retreated, in the face of the recalcitrance of events to institutional reform, Freudianism has been not only the most influential but also the most complex. Little needs to be said about Freud's importance. The excellent biography under review, written by the last remaining of Freud's original disciples, stands as a monument to an influence over both educated and popular opinion that is diffuse, obvious, and powerful. Freud's reputation is, however, chiefly clinical; the student of individual disorders has obscured for many the student of the social order. But if we think of politics not in the narrow but in the wide sense—as what Ernest Barker called the

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study of "the moral phenomena of human behavior in political societies"—it will become plain how deeply Freud engaged himself in considerations relevant to political science.

This is not to neglect his beginnings in the clinic and, even before that, in the zoological and neurological laboratories. Freud's intensive medical background exerted a shaping influence upon his mind; details of his early career and the essential ambiguities of his self-image emerge clearly from Dr. Jones's volume. Nevertheless, as he himself asserted, his scientific training represented "a detour from my true interest in the human and social."[1] Although ours is an era in which technical vocabularies have the greatest power to convince, we ought to resist the temptation to sort Freud's writing evaluatively into early and respectable "clinical" and later "speculative" phases. Freud's clinic housed not merely individuals but all of society as patient. Indeed, the therapist of individual disorders, so far as he can be isolated, is destined to be taken less and less seriously. The therapeutic successes of Freudian doctrine are not impressive; even as converts continue to gather, the cured are hard to find, and our permanent Freud may well prove to be less the technician of healing than the psychologist of the individual in and against society.

But neither was Freud, properly speaking, a social psychologist. While he softened the distinctions between social and biological science, between individual and group behavior, it must be stressed—in view of the on-going vogue of Freud in American social science—that he never abandoned individual psychology for social. Although in *Group Psychology* he called them the same,[2] he still meant the study of collective behavior to refer back to individuals. Freud rejected the independent consideration of society; a political revolution was for him first of all something that goes on in the mind and, by analogy, is susceptible to the same analysis as an individual breakdown. If it is true that the renewed appreciation of psychology on the part of a liberal political science has dampened the ardor for reform, the sources

1 Sigmund Freud, *An Autobiographical Study*, London, 1946, p. 133.
2 Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, New York, 1923, p. 2.

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of this influential impulse toward retrenchment need not be sought only in Freud's social essays. It is an attitude equally clinical—Freud's mixed inheritance of the optimism of the Enlightenment (the hope of changing people's minds in order to make them more rational) and nineteenth-century pessimism (the impossibility of altering the destructive balance in human nature)—which has questioned with renewed gravity the possibility of a good society.

The first of Freud's books which bears on politics throughout, *Totem and Taboo* (1912), does so only at a dubious interpretive remove, and is perhaps the least promising place to begin assessing the connections which he made between psychology and politics. In this lengthy quasi-anthropological volume, Freud unfolded a theory of political society as originating in a kind of social contract, which was not (as in Hobbes) a deliberative act out of prudence and fear, but an expression of guilt on the part of the brother-members of the germinal human clan that followed—in Freud's well-known "scientific myth" of social origins—the killing of a primal father. However, despite this special notion, the book extends and develops all the themes of coercion and submission that preoccupied Freud throughout both his clinical and his social writings.

Freud apparently listened to some of the recurrent criticisms of *Totem and Taboo* as being based upon an outmoded anthropology, applying, if at all, to simple groups like the family or clan, but hardly to the complex articulations of civilized society. It is worth noting that in Freud's later *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1923), he leaves the cover of conjectural prehistory, and offers an implicit rebuttal to such charges against *Totem and Taboo*. But if, in beginning "not with a relatively simple group formation . . . but . . . with highly organized, lasting, and artificial groups" like the church and army,[3] Freud appeared to have dropped for the better the evolutionist fascination with origins for a more strictly contemporary analysis, *Group Psychology* is vitiated by an even more significant narrowness—manifest

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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in Freud's very title. The English rendering "group" misses the immediate political sense of the German *Massen*, a word charged with reactionary connotations within a widely read genre of political psychology—mainly French and Italian—which flourished at the turn of the century. Taine's *Origins of Contemporary France* (1868) is perhaps the first example of the school, and reveals its deepest animus: against the French Revolution and all its consequences. The bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century appeared to conservative observers to unleash a new force: the emotions of the mass, deeper by far than historical institutions or political ideas. (The Italian pioneers of the school revealingly subsumed the psychology of the mass under a new science of "criminal anthropology.") Of course, elitist opinions on the part of political theorists are hardly a product of the nineteenth century. But the accent of the new psychology of the mass was unlike early modes of conservatism, and certainly distinct from the legalistic political science of the nineteenth century; it differed in feeling that institutions—churches, armies, parties—really counted for less in politics than sentiments, and this feeling connects Freud with minds of a most special and sometimes repulsive bent—Taine, Lombroso, Bagehot, Sighele, Le Bon, Bernheim. However they may disagree, all share with Freud a concern for the politics of culture. It is as a result of this insight, for example, both within and without the Freudian frame, that anti-Semitism has been recognized in recent years not as a peripheral problem of group sentiments, but as a fundamental consideration of a science of modern political life.

But whatever the theoretic fruitfulness of the concern with group sentiments, one has to admit the naïveté of Freud's fashionable disdain of popular democracy in *Group Psychology*. Such period clichés may be culled from Dr. Jones's biography as early as the letters which Freud wrote to his fiancée while a medical student in Paris during 1885-86:

> The town and the people are uncanny; they seem to be of another species from us. I believe they are all possessed of a thousand demons. Instead of "*Monsieur*" and "*Viola l'Echo de Paris*," I hear them screaming "*A la lanterne*" or "*A bas dieser und jener.*" They are the people of psychical epidemics, of historical mass convulsions (p. 184).

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Freud's *Massenpsychologie* differs little from these youthful fantasies of Paris as still the city of the Revolution and the Commune, except that between youthful rhetoric and the writing of the later treatises Freud had studied and translated the books of Bernheim, which discuss the suggestibility of the masses and the blood horrors of popular revolution. So little was Freud's disdain of the masses distinguished from that of his sources that he copied out entire passages from Le Bon's *The Crowd* (1895), the most influential of these intractably anti-democratic works which masked themselves as scientific political psychologies. That Freud borrowed from a notorious racist, a political anti-Semite and intellectual servitor of the French military class, reflects no secret authoritarian beneath the great defender of the individual against the repressive society. Yet Freud's work is touched—not altogether harmlessly—by the animus of his predecessors.

Because *Totem and Taboo* and *Group Psychology* are so marred, we shall have to search more deviously for Freud's political psychology; and we shall not be disappointed. If Dr. Jones's biography unwittingly reveals how much Freud's rare and ingenious mind was also damagingly isolated and independent (the price of his aggressive determination to be original was to be sometimes banal and overexcited about what has become—at least since Nietzsche—obvious in the possibilities of psychology as a master-science), it cannot be denied that Freud speaks to the right questions: on the basis of human community and on the causes of its dissolution. The chief difficulty in following Freud is the lack of concrete social reference in what he has to say about society, that disinterest in history which is at once his deepest failing and greatest strength. For if it is true that Freud ignored the busy world of everyday government, I want to suggest how near—particularly in his central theme of *authority*—he came to the essential interests of political science.

Understanding Freudianism as a psychology of authority—cutting across the clinical and the public life, boudoirs and parliaments—we get a more accurate sense of Freud's conservatism. It is not encompassed by the naïve disdain of the masses to be found in *Group Psychology*. Freud can be turned neither into

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a democrat nor into an elitist. He is a neutralist with respect to all political forms; if in one text he diagnosed American democracy as suffering from "psychological malaise" for want of heroic leaders, in another he accused Russian Communism of combining a grandiose utopian vision with the ethical sadism of a rationalist elite. Concentration on the psychology of the ruled inclined Freud to view democracy as no less authoritarian than other forms of government. All authority, we learn, refers back to the "authority figure." Therefore, in the new psychology, all political units break down from the Hegelian enlargements in which we have tried to understand them into the most personal units. Both the Many and the Few rule by virtue of their "Identification" with the One; even a "leading idea," Freud remarks, refers back genetically to some concrete person. Authority is transferred from one representational agency to another in an ascending line of abstractness—from parent to teacher to ruler to God.

A related point which Freud makes—it is the subject of his late essay, *The Future of an Illusion* (1928)—is that politics and religion originate together, as different names for public authority. Freud rejected the conventional and largely Christian-inspired separation between religion and politics, thus missing the fact that, through religion, groups have frequently lodged a protest against the political order. Fixed on the primitive form (cf. *Totem and Taboo*), where it is identical with social restraints and proscriptions, Freud's consideration of religion as the chief device of authority appears from our experience of nakedly political repressions as defiantly naïve. Yet there is also a certain ambivalence in Freud's idea of religion, and of the authority of "culture" in general, since culture may be viewed positively as (a) the sum of human achievements in the struggle with nature, and (b) a system of obligations necessarily limiting individual happiness for the sake of the general advantage.

Freud's proposals for a more conciliatory attitude on the part of society toward the underside of human nature are as tentative as we might expect from a psychology which—in positing immutable conflicts within the psyche—debunked the chance of

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any kind of final reconciliation. The social system, however it is adjusted, must function as a cage; there is a heavy fatalism in Freud's psychology, the relation of individuals to society remaining in any foreseeable future antinomical. The acquisition of rights by government he grudgingly supposed to be justified by the anarchical tendencies of the individual—more precisely, of the instincts. And since the outward moral and political repressions were only reagents of the inward, there could be no permanent deposing of tyrants—new imagoes would have to arise. History (i.e., mass psychology) is in the Freudian view a set of disguises, manipulated by the Unconscious below and conscience above, locked forever in a cold war in which reason is a weak third force, probably never destined to rule but only to arbitrate.

To reach into social reality by way of the anti-social instincts is not as indirect a method as it may appear. Since Plato, political conceptions have regularly had as their matter arguments from the nature of human nature. The manner in which Freud differs from political science is not so much analytical as ethical: he no longer treats the state as even a slim basis for optimism about the future of mankind, and the disparagements of political life fundamental to his psychological approach to politics persist even in the apparently remote work of his non-clinical disciples, who have superimposed upon Freud an optimistic social-engineering approach. For Freud, politics can have no autonomous meaning: the state holds no promise of elevating human nature, except through irrational and transient enthusiasms; in general, the state epitomizes the worst elements of human desire.

What is unusual is not the method of Freud's contribution (moving from the study of human nature to political society, instead of from the institutions of political society to the historical character of men) but rather its now familiar anti-political temper. By his anatomy of the familial sources of group coercion, of the inner compulsion that gathers membership into chance crowds, churches, states, by his sinister evocations of the guilt from which obedience springs, Freud absorbed the study of society into a medical science—but one in which any thought of a complete cure had become a rationalist piety.

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Yet there is also a strain in Freud's psychology which verges on hopefulness. From his straightforward Enlightenment conviction that "science" has refuted "religion," Freud launched a critique of society in the name of the individual that is not easily answered. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the failure of his discussion of religion lies not so much in facile analogies with the infantile or sexual, but in his identification of religious ideas with the conventional bourgeois creed. And it is through such an identification that Freud's rationalist ideal of a scientific abrogation of one's psychological burdens also came to denote a conquest over the generally inhibiting pressures of public authority. The whole tenor of Freud's clinical science (though not always that of his followers) is socially and ethically subversive at the same time that it remains quite unstirred by the large possibilities of altering the established order. It is unfortunate that this fascinating tension in Freud's own thought—between the Promethean aims of his therapy and the Schopenhauerian pessimism of his social theory—has so frequently been diverted by those he influenced into either a theoretic hedonism or an ethic of social adjustment.

Freud's contribution to political science is markedly anti-political, and one cannot readily extrapolate the major Freudian-style insights in the fashion of contemporary political science. Often, Freud's precise connection between psychology and politics is reversed. One influential turn appears as a *soi-disant* "democratic" debunking of the objective dignity and rectitude of public figures. Freud, with his conservative snobberies, saw politics mainly as vicissitudes in the irrationality of the ruled, and there are revealing hints in Dr. Jones's biography of an intense enthusiasm on Freud's part for Bismarck. The revelation of the political personality as essentially vulgar, as someone with an intense and ungratified craving for affection (or "deference") both accentuated and unsatisfied in personal relations, would be quite intolerable to Freud—with his old-fashioned respect for "great men" like Moses—although it proceeds on principles that are Freudian enough. There is no place for hero

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worship in this use of psychology. One can never be as ardent a New Dealer while keeping in mind the personality significance of the crippled legs of FDR, or be quite as straightforward a Marxist while recalling that the failure of the established order to place Doctor of Philosophy Marx in a university was of no small consequence in launching him on his resentful career.

I mention first the idea of leadership as a "displacement of private motives" because it is the most widely popularized notion in political science insofar as it has been affected by Freud. Actually, the leader as neurotic is a note struck only once in Freud's writings (in his remarks on Shakespeare's Richard III) and there clearly not meant to be generalized; moreover, it is a "Freudian" idea which has long been refuted from within the psychoanalytic camp. The work of Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and others has led to a revaluation of Freud's geneticist overstatements, and it is now seen that the criterion of the importance of a motive is not always, as Freud implied, how deeply it is buried in the past. To borrow an example from the psychologist Gordon W. Allport (in a recent and excellent article on "Current Trends in Motivational Theory,"[4]), one might take the numerous families—the Adamses, Tafts, Lodges, Kennedys, La Follettes, Roosevelts—where both father and son have been politicians. According to the genetic political psychologists, even when the son is fifty or sixty years old, he is still "working through" or acting out his early "identification" or "fixation" on his father. But surely, while we may agree with the geneticist that an early father identification may have started the son in a political direction of interest, it is not reasonable to assume that the early fixation necessarily still sustains the son's political conduct, and therefore renders it irrational and suspect. If political psychologists would make a sharper distinction between infantilism and motivation that is strictly contemporary and of age, most of the debunking theory of political leadership which has appeared—wrongly—as Freud's chief contribution to political science would be obviated.

[4] *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XXIII (January 1953), pp. 115-16.

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While psychiatric studies of leadership continue to be an important Freudian trademark, the impact of Freudianism on political science has lately been a more sanguine one. Since Freud's grim intimations of the pathologies of public life are, it is true, balanced by an inclination to see in the rational knowledge of psychology itself a limit to our abiding irrationalities, this hope has been transplanted whole into Freudian political science. Starting from Freud's therapeutic interest—authority (superego)—and his therapeutic aim—the enlargement of the power of reason (ego)—recent studies have hopefully concentrated on the psychological structure of authority (and submission) among citizenries, and the development of rational or "democratic" rule on the model of the tolerant ego. When used crudely, totally shorn of Freud's penetrating insight into the irreconcilable antagonisms which constitute society, this idea proves little more than a vapid utilitarian aspiration toward the balanced society. Here is the definition offered by the psychoanalyst Franz Alexander:

> Democracy requires a broad application of what we have previously called the reality principle. The mature Ego must have a comprehensive view of the total situation and voluntarily accept the restriction, postponement, and even renunciation of the satisfaction of some desires in order to safeguard others more important. It must estimate pleasure and pain in terms of the general economy of life. A responsible member of a democracy should also have society in mind and subordinate his own immediate interests to the welfare of the community. The capitalist should be ready to renounce surplus profits, when they upset the economic balance, and should increase wages to encourage internal markets, putting the interests of society above those of his own class. The wage earner in a democracy should moderate his demands where they endanger production on which his living ultimately depends.[5]

Further Freudian studies in political science have attempted to expand this almost parodic Benthamite recipe for democracy into a fresh polarization of psychological types. Two representative studies are *The Authoritarian Personality* (1951) by T. W. Adorno, *et al.*, the outcome of a research project on racial and religious prejudice, using interviews conducted in this country,

[5] Franz Alexander, M.D., *Our Age of Unreason: A Study of the Irrational Forces in Social Life*, Philadelphia and New York, 1942, p. 233.

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and *Psychoanalysis and Politics* (1952) by R. E. Money-Kyrle, based on the author's postwar experience in the German Personnel Research Branch in the British Zone, which employed a form of psychiatric interviewing to choose suitable leaders for the new democratic Germany. Both Adorno and Money-Kyrle found that the "prejudiced person" or the "nazi-apologist" had as a rule in childhood a highly ambivalent relation to a domineering father, combining latent rebellion with overt submission. This conflict is typically solved by "identifying" with the strong, dominant figure; one's own passivity and submissive dependence are thereby denied by hating weakness in others. (Note that this is the same formula which has been used for some time to describe the citizen who "displaces" his private father-motives onto the body politic.)

For a description of the "democratic personality"—as we might expect, quite negatively put—one can turn to Alexander's book or to Harold D. Lasswell's *Power and Personality* (1948), where being undemocratic is defined as a function of "interpersonal situations in which low estimates of the self are permitted to develop" (from low self-estimates come a host of "defensive reactions," which include the most destructive behavior), while democratic attitudes develop in those who, as newborn members of society, received "enough positive indulgence from the human environment to enable [them] to be indulgent toward [themselves] and others."[6] Few psychoanalytic studies in politics have ventured beyond the cliché that political history is the superstructure of emotions, that these include not only the determinants of class, status, and the usual molds for social imitation, but also private emotional needs, especially those shaped by the family situation in early childhood. The "democratic" or "humanistic" personality came "from homes in which there had been an unusual degree of both freedom and affection." Conversely, the authoritarian personalities, "with an almost monotonous regularity, spoke of the strict patriarchal nature of their early environment to which they gratefully attributed their own re-

[6] Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, New York, 1948, pp. 162-63.

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gard for discipline."[7] Once it is assumed that the influence of the state results from the fact that it is nearly always personified as a "parental figure," the connection between family life and politics follows as a matter of course. We learn that in

> many ancient civilizations there was a single individual, who clearly played this role. He no longer exists in democratic countries; but we still tend to project them into the collective authority which now performs his legislative, judicial and administrative roles.[8]

Freudians may cavil a little at this sketch of their political interest, for as scientists they still take comfort in the notion that they are free of the infirmities of political opinion—either in the form of a nostalgia for authority or of a partisan critique of it. Certainly Freud's individual psychology, with its conceptual apparatus of repressions, projections, displacements, has enriched political science whenever it has been soberly used. But the tyranny of psychology has tightened. Too frequently depth psychology has been used by political scientists to mask problems of objective social processes, reducing them to characterological problems. Such books as the recent *A Study of Bolshevism* by Professor Leites add to the general dampening of all critical attitudes by automatically rejecting the possibility of cognitive value in political positions and attending finally to motivation, which it is then the task of political psychology to unmask.

Overawed by the energetic motions of the new science, a rather old and tired political science offers herself in a comically traditional marriage, bringing her cumbersome dowry of data to be reduced and refined by psychology, the arrogant playboy of the Western mind, who assures her that these offerings have not much face value but that by a new alchemical interpretation he can wipe away the appearance of gold and reveal the real dross beneath.

Political science has always been an eclectic discipline, drawing upon cognate fields of economics, history, sociology, etc. But we may certainly distrust the masochistic rush to psychology by political science if all it has to teach us, redressed in the modern

[7] R. E. Money-Kyrle, *Psychoanalysis and Politics*, New York, 1952, p. 13.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

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consciousness of the unconscious, is the superficiality of our own subject-matter. Plunging below war, psychology turns up varieties of "aggression," as if these somehow subsume diplomatic history and the development of modern weapons. Exploring behind the offices of institutional authority, psychology revives the classical analogue of state and family. Burrowing under creeds, aspirations, altruisms, psychology uncovers the petty displacements of private motives.

It is inevitable that all large minds, as they are transposed beyond their original *ambit* into neighboring disciplines, undergo changes of accent and truncating of insight in the labor of incorporation. But something more than partial distortions have characterized Freud's impact on the social sciences; much of this impact testifies to a sharp inversion of emphasis. Perhaps the difficulty is that, while much psychoanalysis bears directly on the problems of political science, Freud's insights become sharply falsified when they are forced to translate out into a politicized psychiatry whose grim and already realized apotheosis may lie in a technocracy of "social psychiatrists" who will use cartoons, movies, television, and, when necessary, even "narco- and hypnoanalytic aids to the general reduction of tension in the community."[9] Freud's value for political science, which I believe to be intractably theoretic, is as a *critical* psychology. The conflict between individual and society, between (in Freud's terms) the instinctual and the repressive, is his basic contribution to the social sciences. It would be a sad misreading of the critical richness which Freud has to offer political thought if all we are to discover, under the tutelage of psychology, is how easily the emotions are attracted to power, and that the individual becomes politically minded only as a result of some regular failure in the private affections.

[9] Lasswell, *op.cit.*, p. 200.

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# THE DIFFICULT ART OF GENERALIZATION

By BERT F. HOSELITZ

Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development*, New York, Harper & Brothers, Council on Foreign Relations, 1954, 410 pp. $5.00.

IN the past few years a large number of books, articles, and pamphlets have been published on the future problems of underdeveloped countries. In most of these accounts, economic, cultural, or administrative questions receive chief attention. Mr. Staley has now produced a book in which the international political problems of the underdeveloped countries are given primary emphasis. In particular, the book concentrates on one problem area: what role do underdeveloped countries play in the present division of the world into a Communist and a non-Communist bloc; what are the doctrines and strategies the Communists have worked out for underdeveloped countries; what chances are there of the underdeveloped countries falling under Communist domination; and, finally, what policies can be adopted by the non-Communist countries, particularly the United States, in order to keep free from Communist infiltration and subversion as large a portion of the world as possible?

To be sure, Mr. Staley touches upon a multitude of other problems, but the conflict between American vs. Communist strategy with regard to underdeveloped countries is the central focus of this book and all other topics are subordinated to it. Mr. Staley himself formulates his approach in the following words:

> The first major thesis of this book . . . is that the future of the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe and the Americas is a vital matter for the future of Western civilization, including, of course, the security and the way of life of the American people. Economic development of these areas in cooperation with the West is a necessary part of the conditions for Western survival . . . (p. 3).

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One could question whether this proposition is true in such an absolute form. Would it not be more realistic to ask which underdeveloped countries must be kept outside the Communist orbit in order to ensure the economic and political survival of the West? Only recently, the most varied opinions were voiced by statesmen and military men, by Americans, British, French, Indians, and others, as to what the loss to the Communists of all or part of Viet Nam would mean, and what the actual consequences of the division of the country along the Seventeenth Parallel actually implies. It is obvious that the establishment or preservation of free and democratic institutions in all, or at least in the larger number, of the underdeveloped countries would be desirable from the American point of view. But a study which seriously tries to solve the problem of how to meet the Communist threat in the economically underdeveloped portions of the world must present some reasonably convincing estimate of the economic and strategic value of these various countries for the survival of the West, and must make some at least tentative predictions as to what form of Communist expansion would constitute so great a danger that it would have to be opposed not merely by the economic means proposed by Mr. Staley but by military force as well.

An analysis along such lines is absent in this book. If it had been undertaken, it would have become clear, I believe, that different strategies are called for in different parts of the world. One American policy toward underdeveloped countries which Mr. Staley rightly criticizes is the rather universal preference given to military and political considerations and the very subordinate position of economic cooperation. For example, he points out how the relative paucity of economic aid to Iran was a serious error (pp. 363-66) which had detrimental effects on American diplomatic success in that country, and how Burma, on political grounds, refused proffered American economic aid which that country badly needs (p. 24). The American record on economic aid contains a number of painful episodes and even in Latin America, where many troublesome questions which beset American diplomats in Asia and Africa are absent, inter-

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national economic relations are, on the whole, one of the weakest links in the chain between the United States and its "good neighbors" to the south.

This relatively unsuccessful situation in economic relations between the United States and the less-developed countries has brought Mr. Staley to feel that if a new beginning could be made, many troubles now faced by American diplomats could be avoided. In the general conception of this book, he has pinned almost all his hopes for success on economic measures, some of which, to be sure, must be taken by the underdeveloped countries themselves, but many of which can be subsumed under the general heading of economic aid from the more advanced countries, especially the United States. What are the objectives of this policy of self-help combined with foreign economic aid, as Mr. Staley sees them? Here are the targets for the underdeveloped countries: (1) higher levels of production and income, widely shared; (2) progress in democratic self-government; (3) growth of democratic social relations; and, as a result, (4) less vulnerability to Communism. In addition, Mr. Staley stipulates several international-political objectives which must be met by the policies of economic aid and economic development in general. These are: (1) growth of attitudes that make for peace and the absence of use of power to oppress others; (2) growth of mutually beneficial trade and investment; and (3) strengthening of the over-all resources of the free world (pp. 94-95).

This is a big order, and Mr. Staley knows it. It is therefore surprising that he handles these objectives throughout as indivisible and that he nowhere discusses what portion of any one set of objectives might be given up in order to attain others. But the very question of whether all the objectives can be met simultaneously is foisted upon one by the literature on the economic and political aspects of economic development. Can one have a sizable growth in the over-all level of real income and attain simultaneously a wide sharing of this increased income? A good deal of historical evidence appears to contradict this; and even on purely theoretical grounds one might say that, given the doubtless very high propensity to consume on the part of the

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masses of people in underdeveloped countries, and given the need to secure a rather high level of domestic real savings for the sake of development, a wide sharing of income increases may be incompatible with a rapid rate of economic growth. Or take the relation between economic growth and the growth of democratic values and institutions. To be sure, there exist historical examples which prove that attainment of both of these objectives simultaneously is possible. But the experience of late-comers to economic development—Germany, Japan, and Russia—offers examples to the contrary; and although it would be wrong to regard all planned development as being associated with a growth of totalitarianism, there are real tendencies in some development plans to foster "managerial" attitudes and to lead to results which are not necessarily favorable to democratic forms of government. Finally, let us take a third pair of possible contradictions: the effective economic growth of a country and the maintenance of peaceful relations with its neighbors. Here again, historical evidence appears to be against Mr. Staley. Several countries experienced their most aggressive period during the stage of rapid economic growth, and at least one student in the field, Professor Kuznets, is so impressed by this coincidence that he has pointed repeatedly to it.[1]

The resolution of these knotty problems would lead us toward a more realistic appraisal of the precise nature of the Communist danger to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Staley feels more comfortable if he ignores them and if he emphasizes again and again the importance and potential significance of economic policies. His answer to the problem of how the threat of Communism can be met in underdeveloped countries is simply to point to the need to achieve the objectives which he stipulates, and to emphasize especially that they must be achieved rapidly and with little or no social disorganization in the countries concerned. Although I have tried to show that this answer glosses over some real difficulties, let us examine somewhat more closely his premise and

[1] See, for example, Simon Kuznets, "The State as a Unit in Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic History*, XI (Winter 1951), p. 34. More extended and explicit reference to this circumstance was made by Professor Kuznets in an as yet unpublished address delivered at the bicentenary anniversary of Columbia University.

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his conclusion, the nature of the Communist threat, and the conditions of meeting it by attaining the objectives of successful development as postulated by Mr. Staley.

In evaluating these aspects of his work, I must mention several features of Mr. Staley's research procedures which, incidentally, are not peculiar to the present book but seem to be characteristic of his work in general. In the first place, he only rarely penetrates really deeply into a problem. For example, he treats all underdeveloped countries as more or less alike. Geographical, cultural, and ethnic differences are of course recognized, but their significance is essentially underplayed. Or take another example: Mr. Staley's discussion of the economic development of Western countries included in the fourth chapter of the book, entitled "A Glance at History." In that chapter, he writes:

> It took a considerable degree of individual and intellectual freedom to make possible the invention and initial growth of the modern industrial system, including modern science and all that goes with it. That is why modern economy *originated* in the countries of the West where political and social freedoms were gradually growing after the Middle Ages, and why economic development and democratic political development tended to reinforce each other. But once industrialism has been invented and demonstrated, it can be *taken over* and deliberately installed in unfree environments . . . (pp. 82-83; italics in original).

This pushes the problem of why the West had such a spectacular period of spontaneous economic growth only one stage further back, for it leaves unanswered the question of what determined the "considerable degree of individual and intellectual freedom." And it glosses over another problem much too easily and superficially: that of the nature of the process of "taking over," i.e., acculturation. Can modern industrialism really be "deliberately installed" without grave social dislocations? What changes occur in the social structure and the value system of a country accepting a series of innovations which may be designated as "taking over" modern industrialism and its social appurtenances? Many students have spent considerable effort in the study of this problem alone. Given the multi-valued objectives of Mr. Staley, the total social situation in which individualism, industrialism, and modern science thrive would have de-

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served a more careful historical and sociological analysis than he has given it.

A second feature of Mr. Staley's book is that, on the whole, it is a rather tiresome production. In part, this is a matter of style. I believe it is difficult to treat a rather dry subject in a less lively fashion than he has done. But, in part, it is a result of his research procedure. Mr. Staley deals with a subject which has manifold ramifications. It extends into several disciplines and, from a geographical viewpoint, covers almost the whole world. It is impossible for one person to have expert knowledge on all the topics and all the countries and parts of countries to which references are made. In such a situation, two scientifically appropriate solutions are possible. One may confine oneself to a limited number of cases, or one may discuss problems of such a general nature that details of specific countries and specific cases become unimportant and may be neglected. Mr. Staley uses neither of these two strategies, but a third, and that is to rely in the case of each more specialized topic on one or two fairly standard works. This means that his source material is too scanty to allow him to gain a really well-rounded picture of the various specialized topics which he discusses. For example, on the vast and complex problem of Indian economic development, Mr. Staley cites a small number of sources, several of them travelogues or general accounts of a visitor's impressions. Only three or four are serious journal articles. No reference is made to the official Indian five-year development plan (only to secondary interpretations of it), or to the Colombo Plan. On the whole, relatively few primary documents are used. Apart from some United States Acts, Congressional and Executive reports, standard United Nations documents, the only primary sources are a small number of statements by political leaders—notably, Communist leaders. In discussing the strategy and tactics of Communists in underdeveloped areas, the entire rich mine of materials contained in reports of the Asian Communist parties, the congresses of the Comintern, or the numerous articles on "colonial and half-colonial" countries in such publications as *International Press Correspondence* is ignored. This is the more serious in that

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for a long time neither Lenin nor Stalin (who are cited by Mr. Staley a few times) but Zinoviev and Bukharin were the chief spokesmen of Soviet policy for underdeveloped countries. Similarly, none of the Communist spokesmen for India, South East Asia, or the Middle East are cited, and their writings were apparently not used.

The question may legitimately be asked whether a more varied use of sources would have led Mr. Staley to present a different picture of Communist strategy in underdeveloped countries. This point is arguable, for he does present, of course, a fairly accurate outline of Communist objectives and means in these countries. But, in his hands, Communist strategy appears to follow a single pattern, repeating itself again and again in all countries.To be sure, evidence is often scarce and sketchy, but there is no question that there exist great differences in Communist strategy and methods, not only between pre-Communist Russia and China, but also between the latter and Indochina, North Korea, and countries not under Communist domination. It would have been interesting to point to differences in Communist behavior as between countries where the Communists are in a minority but not outlawed (Mexico) and those where they are outlawed (Middle East); as between countries where Communists are engaged in active guerrilla warfare (Malaya) and those where apparently no armed Communist opposition exists (South America); as between countries where Communists have lost in popular appeal (Burma) and those where they have gained or at least held their own (India). All these differences are important not only because they tell something about Communist policies, but also because they are factors determining anti-Communist policies, and it is chiefly to the latter that a good part of the study is devoted. In addition, attention to these factors would have given the book a richness and possibly a liveliness and variety of interest which it largely lacks.

A third noteworthy aspect of Mr. Staley's procedure is his failure to distinguish sufficiently between programmatic and analytical sources. In discussing Communist aims and methods, he appears to regard the writings of Stalin or Mao Tse-tung as

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providing insights of a nature similar to those of Benjamin I. Schwartz or Morris Watnick. In dealing with American policies, he treats official pronouncements of the State Department and learned analyses of American foreign policy objectives as if they were equally reliable. One cannot escape the impression that he accepts many of his sources too uncritically and tends to assign the same demonstrative power to statements contained in documents which have the primary purpose of expounding policy objectives as to those which are critical evaluations or historical accounts of policies performed. The general result of this form of presentation of his materials is an account which possesses a certain idealistic, almost starry-eyed, appearance. Mr. Staley leaves no doubt that he is fully in favor of "virtue," i.e., freedom, democracy, and material welfare for all the peoples of the world. But he also tends to see the current world conflict with respect to the underdeveloped countries as a struggle between the forces of virtue and those opposed to it. Whatever objectives grounded on considerations of *realpolitik* or national interest the Western democracies may have, they are obscured behind this interpretation, which only sees glaring white or stark black. Thus Mr. Staley tends to interpret all Communist movements alike and does not distinguish in any significant way between movements which dominate the thinking of a large majority of the population (as, for example, in Viet Minh) and others which are conspiracies of small, partly underground, cells (as, for example, in parts of Africa). Mr. Staley's disgust for Communism is understandable and appreciated, but the purposes of a work such as his are not served unless due emphasis is placed on the differential qualities of political movements which, though similarly inspired and subservient to the same ultimate ends, find their practical forms of operation in culturally and politically varied environments.

Finally, a fourth characteristic of Mr. Staley's work (and this holds true of his other books as well) is his diligence and his ability to cover a given field of enquiry fully and without significant gaps. It would be difficult to name a really significant problem affecting the future of underdeveloped countries which is

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not touched upon in some form in this book. If it has some unsatisfactory features, therefore, they are not lack of coverage, or non-recognition of important questions, but rather a tendency to oversimplify, to draw too stark contrasts, and to introduce a schematism into the discussion of politico-economic affairs which robs them of some of their subtlety, variety, and liveliness.

For all these reasons, Mr. Staley's book is likely to be more successful with the intelligent general public than with scholars specializing in problems of underdeveloped countries. The main features which may impinge upon its success with this general audience are its length, its rather dry manner of exposition, and its great degree of detail. There is no question that the American public needs to be made aware of the threat of Communism to underdeveloped countries and of the fact that there are other and more efficient means of fighting this danger than with bombs and tanks or even with propaganda. A good case can be made for the need of making available a book such as Mr. Staley has written. It is to be regretted that he has not found ways and means of presenting his case more concisely. As it stands, the book unfortunately may not fully satisfy either of its potential audiences. It will have little appeal to the scholar because of its overly schematic character; or to the layman because of its length and, however paradoxical it may seem, the very conscientiousness of its author.

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# THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES

By JAMES L. McCAMY

Arthur W. Macmahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs*, University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1953, 275 pp. $3.50.
John J. McCloy, *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953, 81 pp. $2.00.

THE onrush of enormous changes that struck American foreign relations in 1940-1941 brought with it most of the current problems in the administration of foreign affairs. For one change, the conduct of foreign relations has become not only the largest function of the federal government, but also the largest function of all governments in the United States. In 1948, at midpoint between World War II and war in Korea, the costs of foreign relations, including military outlays, accounted for 54 per cent of all money spent by all governments, federal, state, and local, for all public purposes. No matter whether we measure the relative size in costs, in personnel devoted to it, in impact upon the political economy, or in commitments of the United States, this work of government has exceeded all other.

For another change, the older dominance of political relations in the concern of nations has been displaced by the new elevation of economic, military, and psychological elements in foreign policy. One who works in foreign relations now finds that historical precedent, treaties, and international law are only part, and often a minor part, of the total relations of the United States. Economic aid, military supplies and bases, radio stations and information centers have become the stuff of foreign relations since 1941.

Another great change, often difficult for us to grasp, although clear to all observant foreigners, has been the shift of control in foreign relations since 1946 from the Executive to Congress. This has occurred within the Constitution, although it was probably never contemplated by the founders. As economic and military

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foreign policy have grown in importance, Congress has become the locus of final decision, for appropriations are necessary to a policy. Congress has also begun to reassert its powers after the secondary role it played in depression and war. President Eisenhower, like President Truman, has been kept in a subordinate position.

The other great changes have occurred within the executive branch, although, as always in our system, they have been reflected in the supplications to Congress, and to a degree they have affected Congressional decisions. In one such change, the military departments have become full partners in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. If once it was smart to say that wars were much too important to be left to the generals, now it is accurate to say that American foreign relations are too important to be left only to the civilians. The creation of the National Security Council formalized the role of the military in general policy-making. Other federal agencies in addition to the military have also risen to prominence and power in the conduct of foreign relations: economic agencies, propaganda agencies, and the older departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury. Abroad, various missions and various types of personnel represent various agencies, and the lines of jurisdiction have multiplied.

No longer does the simple, single mission established in one country count for as much as it once did. Even without its new ties to various agencies in Washington, the mission to a single country has been pushed into second place by the development of negotiation at international conferences and by the need for regional arrangements in which a number of nations participate. Diplomacy at conferences is conducted by people from Washington. Ambassadors attend only as advisers, or to keep informed. Regional arrangements are made either by a man from Washington or by a special representative to a regional headquarters.

A more subtle change, brought out by Mr. McCloy in the book under review, has occurred in the work of an American mission abroad. It is the new and difficult task of interpreting American intentions to a world that questions our ability to be steadfast in foreign policy, that is jealous of our power, and irritated by

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the intrusions that must follow our aid. No one ever wants Santa Claus to hang around after Christmas to see how the gifts he delivered are being used. Other nations need us but resent their need and their benefactor. Our representatives must try to overcome such feelings in competition with skillful Communist propaganda that attacks all things American.

All these major changes, and their reverberations, have drawn students of public administration into the field of foreign policy. And their arrival has produced a number of books and reports concerned as much with how the United States handles its foreign relations as with what those relations are. The two books under consideration here are the latest in the stream. The authors, Professor Macmahon from the academic world, Mr. McCloy from experience as Assistant Secretary of War under Roosevelt and as the first High Commissioner to Germany under Truman, not to mention his two years as president of the World Bank, discuss problems—and some possible solutions—in the race against time to make America efficient as well as powerful in international relations.

The word that covers most of the problems is the tiresome but inescapable one, "coordination." How can the President—and this term means in fact all his civil and military subordinates in all their various agencies—work with Congress to make sound policy and to carry it out? How can the surfeit of executive agencies—all their units and all their employees—work together to produce unified policy and execute it with the least dissension? How can political, military, economic, and psychological considerations be recognized in each decision so that the right hand knows what the left is doing and why? Without coordination, military decisions can jeopardize economic and political concerns, or vice versa.

Dull as such questions may be, the answer to them will make or mar the future of the United States as a world power. It is quite possible—some think probable—that we will lose our place if we do not learn to reach wise decisions. As this is written, the Executive's hands are tied by outspoken individuals in the Sen-

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ate in regard to all negotiations in which China is involved. In a broad sense, we have here a dangerous failure of coordination.

Neither of these authors copes with the alarming question of Executive-Congressional coordination. The subject of executive behavior is enough for them. Nor do they deal extensively or intensively with executive coordination. Both books are lectures set in print and, as is usual with lectures, they suffer from loose organization, wandering parentheses, statements of flat conclusions in generalities without supporting evidence, a lack of completeness, and a style that needs spoken emphases to make it live. These are not the faults of the authors, but rather what is to be expected when lectures are made into books. We should read them for content rather than form. None of us who have worked in this field has written the definitive, comprehensive book. I doubt that any of us ever will. The subject is too large and the changes too rapid. We should welcome, then, all calm and sensible comments such as these two books offer, until we can find a sum of views and perhaps see the answers clear.

Professor Macmahon's solution to the problem of executive coordination is a larger Department of State with more authority and a new name—Department of Foreign Affairs. He reaches this solution after finding that the National Security Council gives advice that is divorced from its application and, like all interdepartmental committees that must resolve conflicting views, strikes "a balance in generalities." The Council's concern with synthesis, however, is "an indispensable step in the final estimate of relative urgencies." The final choice of alternatives in any case rests with the President and Congress.

This means that within the Executive, the President must be equipped with instruments of coordination that can move with more precision than the National Security Council and can act for him to carry out policy. Professor Macmahon is faced at this point, as all observers are, with the choice either of recommending staff work for the President by some agency within his own Executive Office of the President (such as, for example, the Bureau of the Budget or the former Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion), or of recommending that an established de-

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partment serve as staff adviser to the President for all matters primarily in its field. He chooses the second alternative.

Staffs for the President can be dangerous. They can become ministerial rather than advisory; they can short-circuit action at the top; they can make mistakes because they are not responsible for action.

> It will be the sounder course to seek the magic of free minds by equipping for creative thinking men rooted in responsibility, especially the Secretary of State himself. . . . The essential arm of the President for foreign affairs is the Secretary of State and the department that assists him. Both as a voice in council and as the President's ultimate adviser, the State Department is not a spokesman for any one element in international dealings—like peace by diplomacy as contrasted with the strategy of arms (pp. 55-56).

A new kind of department is needed to do the job, as Professor Macmahon sees it. Briefly, it should lead in economic, psychological, military, and political decisions in the field of foreign relations, using other agencies as consultants but apparently not in equally shared authority, although authority might be delegated. It should conduct all operations abroad, and thus combine responsibility for action with policy related to action. The core of the new department should be the Department of State as it is, except for the Technical Cooperation Administration and the International Information Administration, which were in the department at the time Professor Macmahon wrote but were later moved to separate agencies. In the new Department of Foreign Affairs, these would become autonomous operating wings, or sub-departments, under common leadership. Presumably this would now mean that the independent agencies that have been created for foreign information and economic operations would be made autonomous units within the new Department of Foreign Affairs. Within this proposed new department, "The incompatibilities that must be overcome are admittedly serious. . . . But to admit difficulties is not an answer; they may call for adjustments, not the higher price of a divorce" (p. 95).

I think few would quarrel with Professor Macmahon for his theory. It is reasonable, and he argues it with wisdom. One might suggest as an axiom of organization that the more staff offices

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(e.g., coordinators, planners, liaison agents) appear to be necessary, the more is wrong with the whole organization of the line units. Cures should be sought first where the work is done. Staff work at best is always problematical. Its quality depends upon finding persons who really "have a passion for anonymity," when so few of God's creatures can be content with second place or keep their hands off other people's business.

The difficulty in accepting Professor Macmahon's thesis comes when we face the facts of history and the distribution of power within the jurisdictional politics of the Executive that have come about since the great changes began fourteen years ago. In terms of history, the Department of State has lost ground and lost prestige within the Executive. In terms of power, the military has risen to new and higher status, and so have the economic and propaganda agencies.

From his experience in administration, Mr. McCloy unconsciously contradicts Professor Macmahon's theory. He feels that the Department of State was not ready to handle large affairs or was bypassed in the assignment of work so that it never learned in World War II to "think big" about policy and operations.

> The deep political and economic implications of our assumption of world leadership and of the growth of our military power [says Mr. McCloy] unfortunately did not lead to a corresponding increase in the influence, prestige, or capacity of the civilian agencies of our government. Indeed, with the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was almost a complete abandonment by the political agencies of any further direction of foreign affairs except in the noncombatant areas. . . . The isolationism of the 1920-1940 period had produced a vacuum of political objectives. The State Department did not have, indeed it was not encouraged to have, any political aims in the world (pp. 36-37).

It is a defensible assertion, I think, that under Stimson's secretaryship, "More thinking along political lines was being done and being asserted in the Munitions Building—this was before the era of the Pentagon—than in the old State Building" (*ibid.*). Probably the same could be said of the Navy under Knox, not to mention Treasury, Lend Lease, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of War Information, all of which had to think politically to accomplish their own special purposes and all of

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which were annoyed rather consistently by the smaller, and sometimes petty, concerns of the Department of State which slowed up their work. In a crucial time of revolutionary change in the ideas of other American leaders, Secretary Hull was most noted for his faith in reciprocal trade agreements, which others considered to be archaic as solutions in a world that had exploded. His own memoirs are evidence of the startling irrelevance of much that his department thought to be important in those days and of the department's isolation from the main stream of White House and military handling of foreign affairs.

To emphasize even more the dominant place of the military, President Roosevelt dealt directly with uniformed military chiefs, who also dealt directly with Congress. When a conference was called by the President after the surrender of Germany to discuss steps to end the war in Japan, Mr. McCloy reports, no representative of the Department of State was present. Only after military strategy had been settled and the meeting was breaking up did anyone suggest an attempt at a political solution. The result was the appeal to Japan to surrender, which was rejected, but which started debate within the Japanese government. If this political approach had been as carefully discussed as the military strategy, if the policy that we later followed in Japan had been promised, the outcome might have been different. The point is not the outcome, but the fact that a proposal for a political solution came almost by accident and not from the Department of State.

One can speculate at length about why the Department of State failed at the critical turn in our foreign affairs to keep up with the procession. Mr. McCloy sees three causes. First, the purse was in the hands of the military and, he might have added, in the hands of the economic agencies, at a time when foreign policy began to be governed by the purse. Second, the planners for peace, in retrospect the most consequential of all the department's various wartime units, were not meshed into the discussion of current policy because the President thought foremost of winning the war as quickly as possible by military means. Third, and here I suspect Mr. McCloy pulled a boner that he wishes he

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had caught in proof, ". . . the active, energetic new blood which was infused into the Washington scene during the war period largely went into the War Department, Lend Lease, the Armed Forces—everywhere, it seems except the State Department" (p. 50). His first two causes are sound. His third is inaccurate and no doubt a surprise to Dean Acheson, Thomas K. Finletter, Charles P. Taft, Livingston Merchant, Will Clayton, and many like them, although not as prominent, who served in the department during the war.

I think we can add two other causes. One was the leadership at the very top of the department, and to this extent Mr. McCloy is correct about personnel. During the entire course of the war, when the power was shifting to other agencies, we had Secretaries of State who did not measure up to the high standards set for top executives by such men as Stimson, Knox, James Forrestal, Leon Henderson, Henry Wallace, Elmer Davis, Donald Nelson, Emory Land. We had Hull, a noble man but querulous, pedestrian, encouraging his career subordinates to stay in their ruts by accepting as significant all the trivia that they produced from their routine. He was followed by Stettinius and Byrnes, neither of whom showed enough comprehension and ingenuity to be notable. It was not until George Marshall and Dean Acheson, assisted by such men as John Foster Dulles, Philip Jessup, George Kennan, James Webb, and others, that we had Secretaries of State who dealt with large patterns in large ideas. Mr. Dulles as their successor cannot really be measured fairly because of his appalling plight in relation to Congress and his party.

The second cause was the confused and frustrating organization of the Department of State. Good men, and there were many, not only had slight leadership from the top; they also had to work in a labyrinth that was—even for wartime Washington—a shocking model of organizational monstrosity. Units fought each other, one chief might be kept in ignorance of what other chiefs were doing, jurisdictions had to be settled and resettled by the hour. Many decisions taken below the Secretary's level often had to be cleared by so many "sisters and cousins who were

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reckoned up by dozens" that it was impossible to think of large goals. Life was spent in coordinating conferences.

Whatever the causes for the lapse of the Department of State, the truth is that it stood still while other agencies, and especially the military, moved ahead, as Mr. McCloy says. Once it lost place, it became difficult, if not impossible, to restore it to a superior position.

Mr. McCloy is disturbed by the present system of making foreign policy, including the decline of the Department of State. He favors more civilian policy-making. He thinks that men in uniform must understand international politics but that they should not make political decisions. He thinks that the President should deal with the civilian heads of the military departments. He thinks that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made more independent of their respective services so that they can take a longer view. He thinks that the whole relation between uniformed officers and Congress should be reviewed. Abroad, the chief of the State Department mission, the ambassador or minister, should have authority over a unified mission which includes all the activities of the United States in the nation in question. The chief of mission, Mr. McCloy believes, should be given a large grant of authority and independence. It should be recognized by the foreign leaders with whom he deals that although he is working within the larger policy settled in Washington, he can "exercise his own imagination and ideas and that his words and actions are fully supported at home."

A fundamental change is needed in the Department of State, Mr. McCloy concludes, but he stops short of Professor Macmahon and sees only the need for political leadership.

> Above all, we must have officials in the State Department who have political vision and the ability to foresee and act upon vital world problems. . . . Though they must have a full realization of the limitation which military and economic considerations impose, they must have courage, initiative and force in the political field. . . . They must be prepared to put forward creative proposals and they must not fold up at the first negative paper which emanates from the Pentagon, however formidably it is presented (p. 51).

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To do this work, these specialists in political affairs must shed "the stultifying process of too much cable sending and answering. So much emphasis is put on the day-to-day cables and on reporting that little time is left for planning" (*ibid.*).

Both these views have merit, the one based on sound theory by Professor Macmahon, the other on thoughtful observation from experience by Mr. McCloy. It seems to me that Mr. McCloy is more in tune with recent history, for he accepts the rise of the military and other agencies and wants to build the Department of State into a more competent specialist in political affairs and a more competent planner for the future. Administration, like other human affairs, almost never conforms to the ideal, nor does it overcome accomplished facts in the distribution of power among executive agencies. In view of the new distribution of power since 1940, the role in which the Department of State can be most accepted and contribute most talent, if it follows Mr. McCloy's advice, is the role of leader in the making of large policy and in anticipating the future. It can be a specialist in international politics working alongside other agencies that specialize in military, economic, and psychological concerns. This is not adverse comment on the merits of the theory of organization proposed by Professor Macmahon but only a reflection of the new atmosphere in which such a proposal would be received.

If, in the new atmosphere, the Department of State will now be accepted as only one of several agencies sharing equally in the conduct of foreign affairs, coordination of the whole executive must come from the President's staff, hazardous as this may be if handled unwisely. The form of organization such a staff would take is by no means clear. Suggestions can be found in some precedents. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was useful. Mr. Averill Harriman as Director of Mutual Security, and earlier as President Truman's general assistant in foreign affairs, and Mr. Harry Hopkins as President Roosevelt's loyal servant who sometimes had as much weight as his boss are examples of the strong individual aide. With the right person, this solution can be very useful, and with the wrong person can multiply

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troubles for the operating agencies. The National Security Council and its staff offer another model for study. One first question to be answered is whether the President should have a special staff for foreign affairs or whether he should have a staff office for all matters of national policy. Probably the arrangements will be made by trial and error. In the long view, the groping we have seen during the past fourteen years may actually be a process of trial and error. But we can hope that it will not continue much longer.

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# THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By DAVID S. LANDES

A. K. Cairncross, *Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913: Studies in Capital Accumulation*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 251 pp. $6.00.

Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 362 pp. $8.50.

THERE are times when these two volumes seem to repeat each other; common to each is a core of interest in investment and economic growth, and if the titles divide the terminology, the books share the territory. Nevertheless, each of the authors approaches the problem from his own point of view, and for all the overlap, there are wide areas of individual treatment. Moreover, even where both deal with the same questions, the evidence produced is usually different, and the reader can only be grateful for his double feast of tables, graphs, and citations.

Indeed, the collections of statistics offered by both volumes are not the least of their contributions to scholarship. Some of these figures have been newly worked up by the authors on the basis of original research; the study by Cairncross in particular contains time series on British investment which first appeared in his doctoral thesis in 1935 and have since been used and abused by almost a generation of economists—indeed, it was the sight, as he puts it, of his series "in unfamiliar uniform, marching and countermarching in an impossible campaign," that convinced him of the need to "legitimize" his dissertation by publication.

In addition, many figures which have always been available are here assembled and collated in convenient form for the first time. Thomas especially has been wide-ranging in his searches in British, American, Imperial, and Swedish materials, and lavish in his presentation—138 compound tables and 43 graphs make

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his book valuable as a statistical compendium alone. Thorough and ingenious though the authors have been in exploiting their data, one feels sure that their tables will furnish material for others in the future.

Both men are in the tradition of historical economics, as opposed to economic history. Essentially, they rely on time series as their primary source of evidence, lining one variable against another, or others, to discern correlations and lags. Non-quantitative historical material is used only to buttress and fill out arguments derived from numbers; Thomas is particularly clear-cut on this point (cf. p. 166), and it is he who is more sophisticated—and sometimes more complicated—in his statistical techniques. For Thomas, the old-fashioned comparison between absolute values is obsolete; the more subtle comparison of index numbers is inadequate; even semilogarithmic graphs do not satisfy. Instead, wherever possible, series are calculated as percentile deviations from trend. The effect is to eliminate false impressions of correlation where two series, fluctuating independently, are tied to the same or similar secular trends. On the other hand, this method can give the impression of decline when in fact there has been an absolute increase, and vice versa. On balance, it seems to present the picture well; its implications for analysis and interpretation will be discussed below.

Books of this kind hardly make easy reading. Some of this is due to the organization of the material; both volumes are collections of semi-autonomous essays, Cairncross' admittedly, Thomas' in fact. As a result, the argument is choppy and there is considerable repetition. Much of the difficulty, however, is inherent in the subject; there are some things that simply cannot be "tenderized" for easy digestion.

For the reader who is prepared to work through the volumes, however, the rewards are many. Together, they correlate some of the most important aspects in the economic development of England and the United States in particular; if the relationships thus developed are not always new, they have never before been analyzed so systematically and precisely as here; and they often imply significant revisions of existing thought on these questions.

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I

While it would be difficult to convey here the full contribution of these works, a selection of major themes may give some impression thereof. Fundamentally, both authors start with the premise that movements of capital and men are interdependent; building on this, they demonstrate the long-term tie between British investment, transatlantic migration, and British and American economic growth. In terms of a long cycle of approximately twenty years, both find that export of capital went along with export of men, that foreign investment in England took place at the expense of home investment, and vice versa, that building and economic growth tended to be more rapid in the United States and slower in England when migration and capital flows from England to America were greater, whereas English growth picked up and American development languished in the opposite circumstances. In brief, they demonstrate the give and take of an Atlantic economy united—in the longer as against the traditional short run—not in a simultaneous experience of the same economic fluctuations, but rather in a seesaw of adjustments in which the capital and labor-hungry American economy grows in spurts at the expense of the politically rejected but materially retained mother country.

Around this core each author weaves his own analysis. Professor Cairncross is particularly concerned with the components of British home and foreign investment: fluctuations in building expenditure, railway and ship construction, machinery production, overseas earnings, and so on—indeed, the heart of the book is the painstaking derivation and collation of statistics and the construction of unified indices. His analysis lays great stress on the terms of trade as the ultimate determinant of the distribution between home and foreign investment: unfavorable terms are said to have led to increased foreign investment, and vice versa. More than Thomas, he is interested in the qualitative aspects of these problems: the nature of the capital market, the character of the British investor, the geographical distribution of overseas holdings.

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At the same time, much of Cairncross' evidence derives from a close examination of local developments: building in Glasgow, internal migration into and out of specific areas in Victorian England. The result is a strong awareness of the limitations of broad generalizations. On long cycles, he writes:

> That fluctuations occur in various economic phenomena with peaks many years apart is beyond dispute. But there is rarely any constancy in the periodicity or any concentration on a standard period. The building cycle and the horse cycle show certain regularities that might be described as long waves. But there is no interdependence between them. The building cycle varies from town to town and country to country; in periodicity, amplitude and timing. If we are to speak of long waves, therefore, we must limit ourselves to a local fluctuation (p. 11).

Mr. Thomas, as his title suggests, focuses his attention on migration; his analysis of British overseas investment, for example, accords no influence to shifts in the terms of trade—the matter simply does not arise in this connection. It is the movement of men, induced by spurts in population and the introduction of technological innovations that make for redundancy of population in rural Europe, which makes possible the expansion and technical development of the American economy and creates a situation in which the investment of foreign capital is not only welcome here but good business for the investor on the other side. Similarly, it is the influx of cheap unskilled labor that calls forth the invention of the increasingly automatic, capital-saving machinery which becomes the hallmark of American capitalism.

To this difference of emphasis corresponds a difference of interpretation. Where Cairncross sees the terms of trade as the primary determinant of real wages, and hence considers the export of capital, acting to bring prices of imports down, a prerequisite of higher living standards for the English worker, Thomas views home investment as the critical factor, and the export of capital as deleterious to the wage-earner. The effects of this outflow of funds were particularly unfortunate, he feels, in the decade preceding the First World War, when the long-run development of the British economy was prejudiced by neglect of the great electrical and chemical innovations, which consti-

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tuted a sort of second industrial revolution, for an "orgy of foreign investment in such things as gold, diamonds, rubber, Egyptian cotton, and Japanese and South American ventures" (p. 229).

In the same way, although both men see the ebb and flow of home and foreign investment as an invaluable mechanism of stability in the pre-1914 world, they view the process differently. Cairncross implicitly assumes a business cycle dominated by fluctuations in investment; it is the seesaw between home and abroad which, by maintaining the level of *total* British investment, tended to diminish the amplitude of boom and slump. For Thomas, on the other hand, the cycle is something quite different, tied particularly to the money market and, through it, to England's balance of payments. It is here that the alternation of sowing and harvest—outflow of funds and men followed by heavy purchases abroad and deficits on commercial account—exercised its beneficent influence by enabling the "backward" countries of the day to draw on England for decades without becoming victims of a "sterling crisis."[1]

## II

For the political scientist, the major significance of these works lies in the contrast between the picture they draw and the conditions in which the Atlantic economy finds itself today. The contrast is implicit in Cairncross, explicit in Thomas: on the one hand, an economy which had in the free movement of men and capital a reasonably effective cure for imbalance between areas and stagnation in any given area; on the other, an economy composed of more or less closed compartments among which imbalance is chronic and in many of which stagnation has operated to strengthen the barriers that have made their ills so difficult to cure.

The contrast is by no means new, although the writers have made an important advance in our understanding of the days

[1] So far as the relation of the level of investment to the business cycle is concerned, Thomas is impressed not by the stabilizing effect of a fairly steady total, but by the cyclical influence of the fluctuating domestic portion of this total; only Thomas' cycle here is not the traditional one, but rather his twenty-year "minor secular" trend.

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that are no more. Moreover, Thomas has gone beyond delineation to draw some lessons from the story. He points out that just as much of the world was dependent on British capital in the nineteenth century, so it is dependent today on exports of American capital. The trouble is that these American exports, unlike the British, fluctuate without any mechanism of compensatory trade movements: when the American economy slows down, foreign loans are called in, imports fall, and the countries across the Atlantic tremble for their production, employment, and even social stability. Besides, even in the best of times, the American economy is not as dependent as the British was on foreign supplies. Home industry and agriculture furnish the bulk of our necessities; imports provide mainly frills.

The remedy? An American version of British free trade would be eminently desirable, but the tradition and temper of the nation are against it. Even the moderate trade concessions in effect today are hard to maintain in the face of protectionist pressure. The problem then resolves itself into an organized effort to maintain an even flow of capital abroad independent of American slump and boom. Thomas has some hope that coordinated measures of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could go a long way toward this goal. In addition, he feels that "it would be of great advantage if in the future the Americans were to change their attitude to international migration. Why should there not be a moderate two-way traffic of settlers?" To which the skeptical reader will reply: For the same reasons that there is not likely to be a revolution in American tariff policy.

In the meantime, what of Britain? Her difficulties, according to Thomas, date back to excessive export of capital in the period before the First World War. Since 1918 she has found herself undertaking a costly program of industrial renovation in an age when the terms of trade are less favorable than ever before and her foreign holdings are at their lowest point in over a century. Some have proposed emigration as a solution—a decrease in population to cut food imports and trade deficits. On the basis of the empirical evidence of the prewar period, Thomas rejects

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the idea; falling population means falling investment, renewed export of capital, economic stagnation. And where would the emigrants go? To the cities of Australia, New Zealand, and other primary producers, where they can consume some of the crops, leave less for export, cause food prices to rise, and worsen further Britain's terms of trade? Thomas' solution: *im*migration and home investment.

But what of those who call for a dispersal of Britain's "surplus population" among the other Commonwealth nations for reasons of security, who point out that Australia can hardly defend again 3,000,000 square miles with a population of 7,500,000 or that Canada needs people for safety if for nothing else? Thomas is not sold. In the last analysis, he feels the safety of the Western world is in the hands of the United States. In the meantime, England has a double role to perform; she is not only the leader of the Commonwealth, she is also the first nation in Western Europe. She can hardly play both parts if she is to be drained of men and pastoralized into a second-class power.

## III

The arguments of both authors are persuasive; indeed, the reader cannot help but be impressed by the wealth of data and the sophistication of the statistical techniques. Nor are the differences in interpretation of the two men so much contradictory as complementary; both Cairncross' terms of trade and Thomas' migration have their place in any ultimate synthesis. Yet a few doubts do arise.

First, as to method. Both men are aware of the limitations of statistics. Cairncross, especially, indicates that he has had reason to be dismayed by others' use of his own figures since their first appearance in his dissertation. Nevertheless, there is something about statistics that both men find irresistible. When Cairncross explains why a certain index of construction prices is not worthy of credence and then concludes, "One can hardly be captious, however, when there is no other index to put in its place" (p. 152), the reader is impelled to ask, "Why not?" And when Thomas builds his analysis on British and American national

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income figures going back to 1870, the question arises how accurate such estimates really are and how much weight they can bear in further analysis. Most nineteenth-century macro-economic time series of investment, income, and the like are compounds of reasonably accurate figures, intelligent guesses, adjustments, interpolations, extrapolations, and so on. In the splicing of the different strands, inconsistencies are supposed to stand out so that they can be modified and corrected. Before long, however, even a Solomon would be hard put to decide how much of the selection and adjustment is done to fit the figures to the preconceived model—to make them look right, in other words—and how much represents an objective evaluation of the evidence. Under the circumstances, the authors' analyses might benefit by the inclusion of simple—as opposed to compound—variables for which our figures are more reliable: British coal and pig iron outputs, for example. Certainly these would provide firmer ground for Thomas' calculation of percentile deviations from trend to the second decimal place, a statistical embellishment which has little real meaning.[2]

Yet it must in fairness be pointed out that both Cairncross and Thomas are interested in fluctuations rather than absolute values, and that the figures they offer generally suffice for this purpose. Not always—they hardly seem up to Thomas' painstaking efforts to establish lags by testing correlations of series at dif-

[2] This still leaves the question whether the writers have always used the most suitable series available of a particular variable. For his terms-of-trade index, for example, Cairncross employs a series prepared by P. Debenham, corrected for imported materials used in exports. Whether such a series has greater merit than, say, the gross barter terms of trade, or any of the other indices proposed for this purpose, is a debatable question. (It is true, as Cairncross points out [p. 189, n. 1], that a rise in the price of an import commodity used in part in the manufacture of exports can under certain conditions give the impression of improved terms of trade, when in fact the opposite is the case. Nevertheless, the argument of his illustration is incomplete—it is not the proportion of the total value of the manufactured commodity in question to the sum of exports that is relevant, but rather the proportion of the value of the imported raw material used in the manufactured commodity to the export total. On this basis, the biases introduced are not likely to be too serious. Certainly they do not offer as great a problem as some of the other shortcomings of indices of this kind. For some calculations along these lines, see W. W. Rostow, "The Historical Analysis of the Terms of Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., IV [1951], pp. 61-62.) One thing is certain: some of the other series yield quite different results and cast doubt on Cairncross' simple correlation of terms of trade and real wages. Cf., for example, the index of gross barter terms of trade in A. H. Imlah, "The Terms of Trade of the United Kingdom," *Journal of Economic History*, X (1950), pp. 180-82.

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ferent intervals of time, cutting his series here, splicing there, and finally selecting intervals on the basis of a .1 or .2 difference in coefficients. But generally the statistics do paint a clear picture of lines moving up and down together or in opposite directions.

This brings us, however, to the major problem, namely, that of explaining the behavior of the lines. It is here that the books seem least satisfactory. For one thing, there is the question of reconciling models of economic behavior and the statistics; at what point does one stop explaining away the aberrations and start revising the model? Cairncross' discussion of the relation between terms of trade and foreign investment is a case in point: if, in a forty-year period, the series contradict the hypothesis for the first twenty years or thereabouts and agree with it thereafter, it is not enough to explain the discrepancies by introducing outside factors and then conclude nevertheless that the model reflects the "ultimate" determinants of the situation.

Thomas' treatment of the effect of immigration on American technology—*to choose one example*—raises similar questions (pp. 163ff.). For one thing, the statistics do not bear out the argument that immigration induced investment in capital-saving equipment and hence tended to reduce the "Structure Ratio" of the American economy, that is, the ratio of capital improvements and equipment to gross national product. Where the figures are so non-committal, a short range of correlation will hardly justify assumptions as to cause and effect. "There must have been some connection," Thomas writes (p. 165), and points out that cheap unskilled labor required automatic machines, interchangeable parts, and standardization of manufacture. True enough, but if cheap labor makes new techniques profitable, it can also make them unnecessary; indeed, costly labor may often be a stronger incentive to mechanization. For capital-saving machines are often, if not usually, labor-saving as well and it is not always easy to know which of these advantages determined the adoption of a particular innovation. The historical evidence is clear that technical change is far more complicated a phenomenon than Thomas would seem to imply, that its relation to the supply and cost of labor is ambivalent rather than simple, and that scientific and

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market considerations probably exercise a more decisive influence on the supply and adoption of innovations than marginal differentials in wage rates.

These two examples will suffice to indicate what seems to this reader the most troubling aspect of both volumes: a certain tendency to assume that statistical correlation is the same thing as a cause-effect relationship. There are two difficulties that inevitably arise: for one thing, assuming that a cause-and-effect relationship does exist, how does one know which variable is cause and which effect? Time lags? They help, but they shift, and they are often contradictory. For another, how can one be sure that both variables are not in fact functions of a third factor? Or, what is more likely, that there is not an even larger complex of factors, some working in one direction, others in another, with combinations shifting in such a way as to make some factors more important at one time, other factors at another?

Thomas' technique of analysis on the basis of deviations from trend raises special problems in this connection. To begin with, the establishment of a trend line assumes that a combination of relatively persistent factors is guiding the variable in question along the path described over a long period of time—fifty, sixty, seventy years. For some things—steel output after Bessemer, for example—this is a reasonable assumption. But what is meant by a trend of European migration to the United States from 1831 to 1913, or a trend of British capital exports from 1866 to 1912, or a trend of new building in the United States from 1857 to 1913? A glance at the percentile deviations for these series as calculated by Thomas is hardly reassuring. One can always locate a line by the method of least squares; but this in itself is not proof of underlying direction.

What is more, even where the assumption of a trend is justified, the elimination of the trend by the use of deviations therefrom tends to truncate the analysis and make a balanced interpretation more difficult. In effect, the factors making and shaping the trend are put to the side along with it. Their role in the amplitude and timing of changes is discounted; their behavior is implicitly taken for granted.

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Thomas is by no means unaware of the presence and mutations of long-term influences. He offers in one context the suggestion of a major "structural change" in the American economy just after the Civil War; and his interpretation of the historical problem of balance of payments stresses the critical break represented by the First World War. On the whole, however, he seems to have calculated the trends only for the sake of the rest of the statistical analysis. This begs some important questions, particularly in regard to the years around the turn of the century, when so many of Thomas' trend lines turn downward.

It would probably be excessive to say that the interpretation and reasoning of the authors are not as tight as their statistical analyses. Nevertheless, the presentation—particularly that of Thomas—does seem too pat. And while one can hardly reproach either writer with not having done enough work, one might suggest that any final evaluation, even of the twenty-year cycle as such, will require closer consideration of the shape, character, and timing of the longer trends, as well as comparisons between England and other European countries—Germany, for example. At the moment, too much seems to be explained by too little. This is unfortunately the great virtue and great weakness of historical economics. The moving averages and coefficients of correlation cut through a lot of fat to get at the bone and sinew of change. Yet they cut a little too fast and too deep; the anatomy of history is exceedingly complex.

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*Research Note*

# A QUERY ABOUT ASSUMPTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

By GERHART NIEMEYER

IN seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object[1] and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.

## I. The Range of Assumptions

Some illustrations may indicate the range of possible assumptions and their relevance to the way in which research is done in the field.

Fundamental approval of international organization (i.e., the assumption, "International organization is good") has inspired a kind of research in which disapproval of national policies supposedly unresponsive to international organization guides the inquiry. In a study of international organization, this would probably produce an analysis of world politics in terms of the behavior expected of members of a world society; in a study of national policy, it would probably result in exclusive emphasis on the part that interest in the United Nations plays in United States motivations. (One may, e.g., assume that the United Na-

[1] "That of which the mind by any of its activities takes cognizance" (Webster).

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tions is good because "united policies" are preferable to other kinds of policies; research would then presumably concentrate on obstacles to the shaping of "united policies" by international organizations. Similarly, one's effort can be guided by such notions as, e.g., "The United Nations is good because it brings about a world governed by law"; "The United Nations is good because, even though it may not bring about world peace now, it at least affects beneficially the general atmosphere of international relations"; "The United Nations is not a final, but a primitive, stage and should be approved because it is designed to create conditions for further growth," etc.)

One need not go to the other extreme (i.e., the assumptions, "The United Nations is bad because it is un-American"; "The United Nations is bad because it includes Soviet Russia," etc.) to realize that there may be alternative assumptions, all of which are not necessarily unreasonable. If alternatives are simply disregarded or brushed aside, our chosen assumptions are allowed to rest on purely emotional grounds or to play the role of dogma. In that case, we would do research in the light of concepts that are not themselves subject to questioning. The result of such studies could hardly be credited to rational knowledge of what is true and untrue. Particularly in a field in which the human race cannot look back on centuries of experience, the assumptions themselves must be continuously subjected to the process of dialectic reasoning. "United policies" may well be better than disunited ones, but should we not deliberate this premise by stating why policies are to be held more valuable if united to other policies than if disunited? This would enable us to consider the point of view, for instance, that policies protecting recognized values do not necessarily become more valuable by being united with other policies detrimental to those values. International organization may indeed deserve support because it stands for a world governed by law, but should we not test this assumption against, for instance, the view that a world governed by law would be a nightmare if that law were Soviet law or likely to develop into something like it? Again, approving of the United Nations because it makes possible "further growth" is

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reasonable, provided that "further growth" is a good thing. Maybe it is, but should not this question be discussed? What are the values underlying this judgment?

Value assumptions create the perspectives in which we see political reality and the object of research. If one assumes that international organization is good, one asks certain questions and marshals facts in a certain way. (On this assumption, it makes sense to ask, e.g., how it would be possible for people to transfer their loyalties from the state to the "larger group," and, in the course of research, to report favorably on any successful examples of such a transfer. Most likely, however, a research motivated by this assumption would not inquire sympathetically into the possible damage to other values that the transfer of loyalties may have caused.) Still, value assumptions are necessary for research, inasmuch as research should help men to decide rationally upon the kind of political system they prefer. The problem, therefore, is how to proceed from an underlying value assumption toward a rational grasp of truth. Pretending that we do not make any assumptions has turned out to be an illusion. It is also unsatisfactory merely to mention one's preference in a footnote and let the reader make allowance for it, for assumptions do more than inject a little subjective note into reasoning; they guide the asking of questions, the method of inquiry, and the anticipation of solutions. It is therefore important to keep not only the reader but also the researcher himself and his colleagues continuously aware of the values that govern the researcher's procedure. This means that we should decline to take our chosen assumptions for granted, and remain ready to reexamine them in the light of maturing thought. One might then, besides those studies that assume the value of international organization, have other inquiries which would begin by saying, in effect: "We are here confronted with a phenomenon that is new in international relations. It has an ideal purpose which we need to know, but, since it is an experiment, we also need to know whether this type of institution actually promotes that purpose, and furthermore what other effects it may have on

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international politics." If this approach were chosen, a different type of research problem would arise, different facts would be focused upon and related to each other in a different way.[2]

For another illustration, we might look at the range of assumptions regarding the role of the United Nations with respect to the East-West conflict. We may assume that the East-West conflict is taking place within the framework of an existing world society of nations of which the United Nations is the tangible expression; or, alternatively, that the central fact of the contemporary world is the conflict between two super-powers representing hostile ideologies and that the United Nations is a political instrument which both sides are seeking to use in the struggle. One assumption considers the United Nations more basic than the struggle, the other takes the conflict to be a weightier reality than the United Nations. Either assumption would result in its own set of research questions, its own characteristic perspective on the facts, and its own methods of seeking answers. A third assumption might picture the United Nations as neither a community nor a pawn in the great power conflict, but as an island of neutral ground between hostile forces, a facility the political significance of which would depend on changing circumstances rather than on fixed principle. Unlike the assumptions previously mentioned (which concerned values), these are assumptions about the contemporary scene and the forces at work in it. No less than the first type, they tend to give color and direction to research and should therefore be made an explicit part of the discussion.

A third type of assumption can be found in research questions that aim at "strengthening" the United Nations, the overcoming of "frustrations" in the organization, further development of this or that function (economic development, promotion of human rights, peaceful settlement, etc.). Such questions not only take certain values for granted, but, in addition, assume certain theses about the nature of international politics, peace, and war. It is

[2] This is not a plea for one assumption in favor of another. Assumptions are means for understanding reality. Precisely for that reason, however, we should be aware of all the available means and the problem of using them judiciously and rationally.

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fairly obvious that one who seeks ways and means to strengthen the United Nations must have in mind not only some notion of what a "strong" rather than a "weak" international organization would look like, but also an idea of how any international organization—strong or weak—is likely to affect international politics. Likewise, someone who is deeply concerned with "economic development" as an international task might not be untouched by the concept that wars in the last analysis spring from economic causes, just as another, who urges the greatest energy in the international promotion of human rights, is probably convinced that wars begin when certain human rights are flouted, and that international organization is a proper and effective agency for the promotion of a given set of rights.

There can be no reasonable objection to making such assumptions as these, or any others. Without them, we could not even begin to ask questions, much less increase our knowledge. But should we not in our studies avoid treating them as self-evident truths or as articles of faith, if knowledge is what we are seeking? Should we not consider them hypotheses which may serve to raise questions and direct studies, but which should in turn be subjected to criticism as we move ahead in knowledge and understanding? The profession is inviting blame not as it makes assumptions that others may object to, but insofar as it fails to make clear the assumptions and to examine and reexamine them in the growing light of maturing rational thought.

## II. Some Comments on Assumptions and the Problem of Knowledge

### VALUE ASSUMPTIONS

Without real knowledge of the object, we cannot let reason make a judgment. Particularly in matters concerning policy, the objects we seek to know cannot be conceived except in terms of values.[3] One might say that in matters political we attain knowledge as we achieve an understanding of how institutions, rules, actions, and events relate to given values, especially what value

[3] Cf. David Easton, *The Political System*, New York, 1953, pp. 228ff.

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choices they posit and what value prospects they set up.[4] If this is valid, the big question facing the scholar in this field is where to find the value standards to which he is to relate phenomena. If it were a question of studying government, the answer could be considered relatively easy: the values constituting the enduring consensus of the political community would furnish his standard. These would be his starting point, even if he pressed beyond their current formulation and postulated higher norms. In international relations, the matter is different, and when we come to international organization, with its quasi-governmental functions, we are necessarily perplexed. The very nature of the institution seems to demand that it be related to value standards transcending those of any particular nation. Where do we find them? From what manifestations of human life do we draw our knowledge of their substance? Whom do we acknowledge to have authority to decide upon them? Is there, with respect to international organization, anything that plays the role the people play with respect to government? Can we derive the standards of value from a pattern of living, a recognized tradition, a set of symbols, a body of representative thought that could furnish evidence of decisions which may possibly have crystallized in an unspoken plebiscite over the centuries?

If we as scholars cannot identify an objective standard of good relevant to the object of our studies, a standard that we are aware we did not make up subjectively, but recognize as in reality standing over against us, we have only two possibilities left. Either we can attribute value standards to an ideal community that is postulated, or we can introduce valuations that are frankly unrelated to any community decision. In the last analysis, these two solutions may amount to the same thing. At any rate, we find that this is what has occurred in the field of international organization. The world society, the family of nations, the international community—these are formulas through which we have contrived to conceive value systems relevant to international organi-

[4] This is, of course, not equivalent to saying that the study of these matters should be value-bound, in the sense of refusing to see reality unless it happens to confirm one's own preferences. The scholar's probing mind can and should be detached and objective even as he seeks to grasp the value significance of the affairs that he studies.

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zation. And what is the substance behind the formula? Is there evidence of a consensus, of substantive agreement on which political structures could rest and to which they should be beholden? Artificial as those formulas may seem, they need not necessarily be devoid of real meaning. At certain times in history, one could actually perceive something like a community transcending nations; there was cumulative evidence of loyalty to common values binding together men and women of different nations without negating their loyalty to their own community. With a certain amount of justification, one could name this a family of nations, a wider community, or something similar. Whether such a wider consensus exists at any given time is, however, a question of historical fact. Under present circumstances, it would appear most unlikely that, with the political world deeply divided on ideological lines, terms like "world society" or "international community" denote anything that has reality at all. If this is so, whence *do* we draw the value standards to which we relate international organization? From the consensus of the "free world"? From the golden age of nineteenth-century peace? From an alleged residuum of common humanity allegedly still linking the Soviet regime to the non-Communist world? From cultural traits common to all humanity?

One can hardly avoid the conclusion that the profession has not succeeded in making up its mind on this problem. It can know, and give rational advice based on knowledge, only as it relates the institutions and policies of international organization to acknowledged values of human life. In the present world, there is no discernible community of values other than that of the nation and, from the perspective of our own nation, possibly the so-called "free world." Both of these are smaller-than-global communities. In what way can we relate global institutions to a plurality of smaller-than-global value communities? Will it do to postulate values that have no support in actual community consensus? Would this not expose the profession to all the dangers of subjectivism and deprive its findings in this field of the dignity of rational objectivity? Whatever the answer, we can

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no longer avoid facing the question with courage and circumspection.

### CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS

It is clear that the assumptions we are making in the study of international organization are not confined to value premises. In addition to them, we also make assumptions about cause and effect, including estimates of the interaction of various political forces. Again, the main problem here is: In the field of international organization, are the assumptions we have been using fruitful, in the sense that they have enabled us to increase our hold on truth by rational thought? The present writer, having grave doubts on this score, would like to press on to a deliberate examination of this problem: If the economists, for instance, methodologically assume an ideally free interplay of supply and demand (and, incidentally, get quite impressive results by this device), what causal assumptions could be equally productive of good method in the field of international organization?

It would be well to recall first the assumptions that we have been in the habit of making in this field, although it is difficult to identify them clearly, since so few researchers have taken the trouble to make them explicit. International organization being primarily a device to achieve peace, the most important causal assumptions naturally would concern the causes of war and the forces making for peace. The League of Nations Covenant furnishes some clues regarding these assumptions. They might be roughly outlined as follows: Among the primary causes of war are competitive armaments, lack of international judicial procedures, inadequate information on the part of nations about each other's objectives, passionate feelings, and nationalistic prejudices. The Covenant seems to assume that, if these defects were eliminated, nothing would prevent governments from settling their disputes peacefully and uniting their forces for the common repression of an occasional lawbreaker. The United Nations Charter seems to embrace the additional assumptions that among the indirect causes of war are the unequal economic

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development of nations, certain types of domestic injustice, and colonial rule.

If it is not unfair so to summarize basic assumptions, one may venture similarly to sketch some of the subsidiary assumptions on which research in our field has proceeded for two generations. They concern: (1) the kind of support international organization is likely to receive in the contemporary world (e.g., "Today the entire world is united in an overwhelming desire for peace"; "The common danger threatening all nations today is war itself"; "Technological development has made the world one"; "Nations realize that without common action to meet common problems we are all lost;" "The United Nations is as far as present world opinion will go in the direction of world federation," etc.); (2) the role an international organization would play in the contemporary setting of world politics (as exemplified by such notions characterizing international organization as "the town meeting of the world," "the moral power of world opinion," "our best hope for success," "the majority of right," "the community forming moral judgments," "the Constitution of the community of states," "the combined force of the community of nations," "organizing the determination of the world against aggression," "a useful forum for negotiation," etc.); and (3) a gradual transformation of world politics expected as a result of the influence of international organization over a period of time (represented by such concepts as "the passing of power politics," "a primitive stage which will make possible a more highly developed organization," "It changes all who participate in good faith into better members of world society," "It can influence the growth of world law," "By discouraging one aggressor, it discourages all future aggressors," "It induces governments to form the habit of resorting to peaceful methods of settling conflicts rather than to war," "It will convince nations that aggression does not pay," "It will teach nations to pursue common instead of selfish interests," "Every success of collective security is bound to increase the likelihood of future successes," etc.).

It may be unfair to ask whether these assumptions have served us well, in the sense that thinking based on them has reliably

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guided us in the actual political situations involving international organization. Those who are opposed to collective security, for example, would claim that the failure is obvious and that the underlying thinking must have been inadequate; but those believing in collective security could simply reply that the time to judge has not yet come and that the flower may yet be plucked from the nettle. We may therefore have to pass up the pragmatic test. But it may be useful to ask how plausible these assumptions look at first sight. In doing so, let us recall that, for all the precedents in literature and even in the practice of some other civilizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations are novel experiments creating, rather than building upon, precedent in international politics. So far as scientific knowledge is concerned, they have opened up new territory. The significant fact is that we mistakenly assume that territory to be familiar. It is submitted that we do so because it reminds us of familiar terrain: the problems of government. On the whole, we are well acquainted with the way people act when confronted with institutions of government (authority, laws, judges, police, etc.). In this respect, the experience of the race is extremely old and we feel on firm ground even though we may grope uncertainly for a better grasp of details. On the other hand, we have little or no experience of states acting under the influence of similar institutions. Since, therefore, no concepts derived from international relations are available for this situation, we employ, *faute de mieux*, the analogy of government-citizens organizing themselves in a world society ("We the peoples of the United Nations . . ."). This is understandable, but it must be recognized that use of this kind of assumption may lead researchers badly astray, unless they remain ever-mindful of having borrowed the concept from an entirely different context. It may, therefore, be preferable to give up the analogy and to try for assumptions that are more representative of the international scene.

A critical review of those assumptions would incidentally raise doubt about the applicability of certain concepts which we have been prone to transfer, together with our convictions attached thereto, from the field of government to that of international

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organization. How much sense does it make, for example, to speak of "democratic procedure" when it is not the mind of free individuals but the instruction of government delegations that has a bearing on the "communal" deliberations and decisions? How useful is it to speak of the "majority principle" when governments of many nations, large, small, and miniscule, are assembled, and each of them counts for one in the total number? Is it meaningful to employ the term "public opinion" to denote the result of the voting of UN delegations? Where and how can the "common interest" of nations be authoritatively determined? How closely do we move to reality when we speak of aggression as a "crime"?

A deliberate and systematic critique of our own assumptions is necessary if we are to advance the contribution of the profession regarding the problems of international organization. To this end, it would be desirable not only to aim at fuller awareness of the assumptions made in the asking of questions and the devising of methods, but also to have some research projects focus directly on the methodology and the adequacy of a variety of assumptions. The objective here would be to raise the quality of scholarly inquiry and discussion through the most vigorous rational discipline. But beyond this, we should always be mindful of the needs of policy-makers. If we have to state and discuss our assumptions in order to advance knowledge, policy-makers have to decide among various possible assumptions in order to operate with energy and consistency. It seems that scholars could help in this respect by presenting, in the clearest possible fashion, the available choices and their implications. This would probably involve explaining a number of different assumptions not only as adequately (or inadequately) reflecting the facts of life, but also as logically (or psychologically) leading to certain types of policies. If this were done well, the profession would contribute not only to more intelligent and realistic United States attitudes toward the problems of international organization, but also to a more rational correlation between these attitudes and other national interests in the total picture of United States policies.

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